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Current international guidelines for informed consent in research on human subjects 
should be revised in order to be more globally applicable. Because many from less developed 
countries value community to the extent that they would wish to include community in the 
informed consent process, the foundation and guidelines for informed consent must attend to 
how community involvement can enhance or impede autonomy. The present provisions for 
involving community are not specific enough. The reason for this lies in the reliance on the 
traditional account of respect for autonomy, which overlooks the impact that social structures, or 
differences in race, class and gender, can have on autonomy. What is needed is a relational 
account of autonomy that attends to the many ways that social structures affect autonomy. To 
illustrate how this change would be reflected in policy, I argue for a set of ethical conditions for 
respecting relational autonomy in research and propose amendments to the current guidelines. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 2007, sixty-eight percent of the African population was infected with AIDS.
1
 With this 
disease reaching epidemic proportions in less developed countries, research in these areas 
is on the rise. Current international guidelines for research on human subjects stress the 
importance of informed consent, which is meant to ensure that people freely choose 
whether to participate in a research trial. As many of the current international guidelines 
for informed consent in research on human subjects spell out, informed consent rests on 
the principle of respect for autonomy,
2
 the ability to make self-governed choices 
regarding research participation that reflect one’s beliefs and values. 
Although some have written on research on human subjects from less developed 
countries, they have focused on such issues as fair benefit sharing
3
 and what constitutes 
adequate and comprehensible information for the purposes of obtaining informed 
consent.
4
 What is missing is an analysis of whether the current philosophical foundation 
for informed consent guidelines adequately respects important cultural differences. In 
providing the philosophical foundation for informed consent in international research on 
human subjects, the principle of autonomy both justifies the reason for requiring 
informed consent and guides the way that informed consent should be structured within 
the research context. Because the philosophical foundation informs the guidelines by 
                                                 
1
 UNAIDS 2007 AIDS Epidemic Update. 
2
 The Belmont Report 1979, Part B:1; CIOMS Ethical Guidelines 2002, Introduction; 
UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 2005, Article 5. 
3
 For example, refer to Conference on Ethical Aspects of Research in Developing 
Countries 2002 and Arras 2004. 
4
 For example, refer to Ingelfinger  2003 and Mystakidou K, Panagiotou I, Katsaragakis 
S, Tsilika E, Parpa E. and Sahara, J. 2009. 
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which researchers determine whether they have ethically obtained subjects’ informed 
consent to participate in research, it is important to examine the possible shortcomings of 
this foundation. 
In the chapters that follow, I argue that the current account of autonomy that is 
reflected in international informed consent guidelines, an account I refer to as the 
traditional account, does not adequately address important cultural differences, namely 
the importance that some cultures place on community to the extent that they would want 
to include community in their decision-making process. Because community involvement 
is of the utmost value to many in less developed countries and because the principle of 
autonomy demands respecting this, it is necessary for informed consent guidelines that 
are intended to be globally applicable to address community involvement and the ways in 
which this might enhance or impede subject’s autonomy.  
Although my focus is on subjects from less developed countries, my arguments 
also apply to developed countries in which subjects, primarily from certain subcultures 
within society, place great importance on community. However, due to the urgent need 
for research in less developed countries in response to various epidemics, I have chosen 
to focus on less developed countries. Nevertheless, the reader should keep in mind the 
overall applicability of my arguments. 
In order to understand how the current foundation fails to adequately attend to 
community involvement, I examine what I call the general account of autonomy that 
underlies the current foundation. Autonomy refers to the ability to make self-governed 
choices that reflects one’s identity, beliefs, and values, and which one believes is in one’s 
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best interest. While all theories of autonomy share minimal conditions for autonomy, they 
differ in how they define the necessary and sufficient conditions for autonomous choice. 
One way of understanding these differences is to look at the particular account of 
the person that informs the general account of autonomy. Something like this has been 
done before in political philosophy with regards to the account of human nature that is 
implicit in accounts of political autonomy, or the ability to make self-governed choices in 
the political realm.
5
 Although my focus is personal autonomy, or the ability to make self-
governed personal choices, I build on the idea of turning to accounts of the person to 
better understand theories of autonomy. 
In doing so, I examine the three accounts of the person that have become popular 
in the philosophical literature – the abstract individual, the embedded self, and the 
relational self. I believe that these inform three general accounts of personal autonomy 
respectively -- accounts that I refer to as the traditional, embedded, and relational 
accounts. I explain that the traditional account of autonomy currently underlies informed 
consent guidelines on international research on human subjects. I then explain that this 
account fails to adequately attend to the ways in which social structures can impede 
autonomy. 
The term, social structures, is commonly used in the social sciences to refer to 
patterned social arrangements in society, such as people being grouped into economic 
classes or categorized by race, and the ways in which these arrangements influence the 
actions of the people who are socialized into this structure.
6
 In referring to the ways that 
social structures impede autonomy, I am concerned with the ways in which people’s 
                                                 
5
 Jaggar 1983; Sandel 1998. 
6
 Abercrombie 2000, 326–327. 
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membership in an oppressed group in society, such as being a member of an oppressed 
race, class, gender, sexuality, or disability, affects both the beliefs and autonomy skills 
they may have and the restraints that they may encounter in society when trying to put 
their autonomous choices into action. Although there are numerous types of oppressed 
groups within society, I oftentimes shorten the list to include race, class and gender. This 
by no means implies that these are the only oppressed groups within society with which 
we should be concerned. 
In addressing social structures, I categorize the ways that social structures impede 
autonomy into two general categories, internal and external restraints. Internal restraints 
deal with the ways in which oppressive socialization can impede autonomy, such as when 
a person has been raised to adopt common societal beliefs about members of her race and 
uses these beliefs to make choices that further perpetuate her oppression. External 
restraints deal with restraints that an individual encounters when trying to put her choices 
into practice in society. These restraints exist out in the world, so to speak. Being unable 
to exercise one’s autonomous choices due to racist practices in society is an example of 
an external restraint that arises from social structures. 
It is important to note that the negative impact of social structures is at play in 
most, if not all, cases in which people make autonomous choices. Hence, my arguments 
regarding the ways in which social structures impede autonomy have implications 
beyond the research context and extend to other contexts in which people make 
autonomous personal choices, such as decisions regarding medical treatment. This is 
another thing the reader should keep in mind. In the chapters that follow, I focus on the 
ways that involving community in the informed consent process in medical research on 
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human subjects oftentimes magnifies the extent to which social structures impede 
subjects’ autonomy. 
In examining the three general accounts of autonomy, the traditional, embedded 
and relational accounts, I conclude that only relational accounts of autonomy adequately 
attend to the internal and external restraints to autonomy. Because the current 
philosophical foundation for informed consent is the traditional account of autonomy, I 
conclude we should revise the current philosophical foundation to rely on a relational 
account of autonomy. Once we revise the philosophical foundation, I explain how we 
also need to revise current informed consent guidelines for research on human subjects to 
reflect this change. 
1.1 Situating My Arguments Within the Literature 
Before providing an overview of the chapters, it is helpful for me to clarify where my 
arguments lie within the current literature. First, I explain how my arguments differ from 
those within the philosophical literature on respect for autonomy as it relates to informed 
consent in the medical context. Next, I explain where my work fits with regards to the 
various areas within philosophy. 
1.1.1 How My Arguments Differ From Other Arguments Regarding Autonomy and 
Informed Consent 
 
It is important to situate my argument within the current literature on informed 
consent and autonomy in order to clarify what I hope to accomplish. I am not the first to 
address the principle of respect for autonomy on which current informed consent 
guidelines rest. Some have objected to the reliance on a singular philosophical foundation 
for guiding ethical behavior in the medical context. For example, Beauchamp and 
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Childress have argued that we should combine multiple principles; in addition to the 
principle of respect for autonomy, we also should rely on the principles of justice, 
beneficence, and nonmaleficence.
7
 Others have argued that we should continue to rely on 
the singular philosophical foundation, but we should drastically revise what we mean by 
autonomy. Joan Tronto argues for revising the current account of autonomy, which she 
refers to as consent-as-autonomy, to a revised account of autonomy that focuses on the 
authority that medical professionals have, an account she calls consent-as-authority.
8
 
Lastly, some have argued against relying on the principle of autonomy at all. Neil C. 
Manson and Onora O’Neill argue that we should forgo relying on respect for autonomy 
as the foundation for informed consent and, instead, think of informed consent as a 
communicative process that should be guided by various epistemic and ethical norms 
about communication.
 9
 
In comparison to these approaches, I have chosen to examine what changes we 
can make to the current framework of having the principle of autonomy as the 
philosophical foundation for informed consent guidelines on international research on 
human subjects. My reason for choosing to slightly revise the current philosophical 
foundation rather than drastically change it is a modest one. I believe that it is easier to 
work within a current framework whenever possible rather than attempting to drastically 
change it. Because my proposed solution entails slight modifications to the current 
foundation and guidelines as a means of remedying the problems that the current 
foundation fails to address, I believe my solution is feasible. 
                                                 
7
 Beauchamp and Childress 2009 (sixth edition). 
8
 Tronto 2009. 
9
 Manson and O’Neil 2007. 
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1.1.2 Situating My Work in the Philosophical Literature in General 
Recall that I mentioned that social structures impede autonomy in two primary ways, 
what I have referred to as internally and externally. In attending to internal and external 
restraints, I bridge aspects of political philosophy and philosophical psychology. 
Traditionally, political philosophy has focused on how social structures result in external 
restraints that impede a person’s ability to exercise his or her choices. For example, 
political philosophers may be concerned that a woman is unable to exercise choices that 
reflect her beliefs and values due to unjustly limited options that result from sexist 
practices within society. 
In comparison, philosophical psychology is concerned with how a person internally 
formulates his or her choices. A philosophical psychologist might be concerned that a 
person has adopted beliefs that stand in the way of his being able to formulate choices 
that are self-governed. For example, someone who was abused as a child might 
mistakenly believe that abuse is acceptable and, consequently, chooses to have abusive 
relationships. 
In examining the extent to which a research subject’s choices are self-governed, I 
believe it is important to look at both internal and external restraints. The ways in which 
external restraints limit autonomy oftentimes are more apparent. For example, racist 
practices within society that unjustly limit a person’s ability to exercise his choices may 
be visible. Sometimes, however, a person’s autonomy is limited even when there are no 
apparent external restraints. Consider a case in which a research subject encounters no 
external restraints to exercising her choices; there are no racist or sexist practices that 
unjustly limit her options, for example. Despite the lack of external restraints, she may 
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still encounter internal restraints to making an autonomous choice. She might have been 
socialized not to be assertive and not to value her own needs as much as others. As a 
result, she might make choices that reinforce her oppression. As this case illustrates, I 
believe we have good reason to question the extent to which her choices are self-
governed ones. 
1.2 Internalized Oppression and Adaptive Preferences 
In speaking of internalized oppression, some might be reminded of adaptive 
preferences. Adaptive preferences, which are also sometimes called deformed desires, 
refer to preferences that people from oppressed groups formulate as a result of their 
oppressive socialization. The idea is that, if an individual were removed from the social 
context in which she is oppressed, she would see how her preferences further oppress her. 
As a result, she would no longer have these preferences. 
The concern is that adaptive preferences are not autonomously chosen and, 
therefore, impede a person’s ability to flourish in society. For example, some have 
insisted that women’s preference to not pursue intellectual careers stems from the 
deformed desire that results from their being indoctrinated to believing that women are 
best suited for domestic work.
10
 Notably, both internalized oppression and adaptive 
preferences highlight concerns over the ways in which oppressive socialization can result 
in internal restraints to one’s ability to make self-governed choices. 
In the chapters that follow, I have chosen to use the term, “internalized 
oppression”. Simply put, I believe this term more fully captures the harmful effects that 
arise when one relies on oppressive beliefs in formulating one’s choices. However, the 
                                                 
10
 Bartky 1990; Nussbaum 1999. 
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reader can read this as also referring to adaptive preferences that impede one’s ability to 
make self-governed personal choices. 
1.3 Internalized Oppression and Privileged Groups 
Prior to proceeding, allow me to make a clarification with regards to internalized 
oppression. Although people from privileged groups in society might also formulate 
choices based on mistaken beliefs that arise from their socialization, this does not amount 
to internalized oppression. Internalized oppression refers to the idea that mistakenly 
adopted beliefs result in desires and choices that reinforce the position of lesser power 
that people from oppressed groups have within society. 
To illustrate how persons from privileged groups in society who adopt mistaken 
societal beliefs do not suffer internalized oppression, consider the following two 
examples. First, consider the parable from the Bible in which the privileged man thanks 
God for his privilege and for not having been born like those who have less.
11
 Although 
the privileged man operates under the mistaken belief that he is a far better person than 
others, his belief does not detract from his position of power within society. 
In the previous example, the person from the privileged group in society does not 
suffer as a result of his mistaken belief. However, people from privileged groups can 
adopt mistaken beliefs that result from how they have been socialized as a member of a 
specific race, class, or gender that do lead to suffering. Yet, this suffering does not 
amount to decreasing the power they have in society. Consider the second example of a 
privileged individual who adopts mistaken societal beliefs. A father might adopt the 
mistaken belief that he should devote his time to working to make money rather than 
                                                 
11
 My thanks to Alison Jaggar for this example. 
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spend time with his children.
12
 Although he suffers by having missed out on spending 
time with his children, his suffering does not decrease his position of power within 
society. 
1.4 Internal Restraints and Ethical Guidelines 
Having insisted that we should attend to the internal as well as the external restraints 
on autonomy, I must clarify a concern that I have with regards to my arguments and the 
current informed consent guidelines. I insist that we should be concerned with internal 
restraints on autonomy that can arise if one is a member of an oppressed group within 
society. Because internalized restraints are difficult to identify, some might wish to err on 
the side of caution, so to speak, and assume that members of oppressed groups are unable 
to provide valid consent due to these restraints. This is problematic. Denying those who 
are already among the more vulnerable in society the right to make choices that pertain to 
their well-being adds to their oppression.
13
 Instead, we must strike a delicate balance 
between acknowledging the problem of internal restraints and being careful not to deny 
those who are at risk of suffering from these restraints the ability to exercise their 
choices. 
In response to this problem, we can glean a lesson from what I believe are the most 
progressive informed consent guidelines for research on human subjects,
14
 the Council 
for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) International Ethical 
                                                 
12
 My thanks to David Boonin for this example. 
13
 For arguments regarding how oppression results in decreased autonomy, refer to 
McLeod and Sherwin 2000. For arguments regarding how oppressed people continue to 
make autonomous choices, even in the face of oppression, see Narayan 2001. 
14
 To understand why I believe the CIOMS Guidelines are the most progressive, refer to 
Chapter 9: Current Guidelines. 
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Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects.
15
 As I explain in Chapter 
9, the CIOMS Guidelines are the only guidelines that mention internal restraints that can 
arise from social structures, although they do not use the term, “internal restraints”. 
According to Guideline 16, researchers should take special care to promote women’s 
autonomy in the informed consent process due to concerns over their being socialized to 
not be assertive, to submit to authority, and to tolerate pain and suffering.
16
 The CIOMS 
Guidelines direct researchers to more carefully attend to promoting women’s autonomy 
due to the possibility of internal restraints. At the same time, however, they do not 
assume that women lack the requisite skills for providing valid consent. I build on this 
approach, in Chapter 10, where I argue for providing subjects from vulnerable 
populations the option to participate in support groups that can assist them in identifying 
and remedying the internal restraints that can arise from social structures, while at the 
same time not presuming that vulnerable people cannot provide valid consent.  
1.5 Community 
Since I refer to community throughout my dissertation, allow me to indicate what 
I mean by community. Because providing the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
what constitutes a community would comprise a dissertation in itself, I have opted to 
provide the reader with an idea of what I mean by community by laying out certain 
parameters. First, community is not analogous to community leaders. Instead, community 
must include appropriate representation of its various members. For example, in Chapter 
6, I discuss community involvement in the decision-making process as it relates to 
                                                 
15
 CIOMS 2002. 
16
 CIOMS 2002, Guideline 16. 
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research. In doing so, I argue that we should include those who are more directly affected 
by the research. So as to ensure that oppressed groups within society have a role in the 
decision-making process, I also argue for including members from oppressed groups 
based on ethnicity, race, class, gender, sexuality, and disability. 
Because much of my discussion regarding community focuses on the ways in 
which involving community can impede subjects’ ability to make self-governed choices 
regarding research participation, some might focus on the negative aspects of community 
involvement. It is important to note that community can both enhance and impede 
autonomy. In my discussion of relational accounts of autonomy, I emphasize the ways in 
which people’s essential characteristics, their identities, beliefs, and values, are 
constituted to some degree by their relationships to others. This illustrates how 
community provides an important aspect of people’s identity. Community is also the 
framework in which people develop and get a chance to exercise and refine many of their 
autonomy skills. Admittedly, much of my focus is on how community impedes 
autonomy; this is due to the larger context of focusing on revising current informed 
consent guidelines for international research that are meant to protect human subjects. 
Nonetheless, I hope that my focus does not cause the reader to lose sight of the benefits 
of community. 
1.6 Autonomy and Informed Consent 
Prior to presenting the chapter summaries, it is necessary for me to make a 
clarification with regards to my overall project. In arguing that we need to revise the 
account of autonomy that serves as the philosophical foundation for current international 
guidelines for informed consent in research on human subjects, I examine autonomy and 
13 
 
its relation to informed consent. Although I draw on the relationship between autonomy 
and informed consent, it is important to note that informed consent and autonomy are not 
necessarily related. Informed consent refers to making a voluntary and informed decision 
to participate in research. Autonomy refers to making a choice that is self-governed, 
meaning that it reflects a person’s identity, beliefs, and values as these relate to what is in 
his best interest. Obligations to obtain subjects’ informed consent need not be motivated 
by respect for autonomy. For example, they could be motivated by legal concerns. 
However, informed consent is motivated by respect for autonomy in the current 
guidelines for informed consent in research on human subjects. In this context, the 
proclaimed reason for requiring that subjects provide voluntary and informed consent to 
participate in research is to ensure that their decision is autonomous.
17
 Consequently, 
within the context of these guidelines, autonomy has come to normatively frame 
informed consent requirements. It is this normative relationship that I draw on in arguing 
that, if we are serious about respecting autonomy, we must make changes to informed 
consent guidelines. 
1.7 Chapter Summaries 
Although I draw on the relationship between autonomy and informed consent, it 
is helpful to think of this dissertation as consisting of two parts. Chapters 2 through 6 deal 
primarily with autonomy, while Chapters 7 through 10 focus more on informed consent. 
In Chapter 2: Autonomy and the Traditional Account, I provide background 
information for understanding my arguments regarding autonomy. Chapter 2 consists of 
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 The Belmont Report 1979, Part B:1; CIOMS Ethical Guidelines 2002, Introduction; 
UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 2005, Article 5. 
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three parts. I begin the chapter by providing a general definition of autonomy. This gives 
us the necessary conditions for all theories of autonomy, providing us with a list for better 
understanding the various general accounts of autonomy that I address in Chapters 2 
through 4. I also explain the purpose behind an autonomy theory. This provides us with a 
measure by which to gauge how well each general account of autonomy fares. 
After addressing autonomy in general, I explain my categorization of theories of 
autonomy into what I call general accounts of personal autonomy. These accounts differ 
based on the account of the person that informs each. Addressing autonomy theories in 
this general form helps highlight how accounts of the person inform and sometimes limit 
autonomy theories. 
To illustrate how an account of the person informs a general account of 
autonomy, I end the chapter by introducing the most common general account of 
autonomy, the traditional account. Because I believe that there have been many 
misinterpretations of this account, I focus on the primary tenant underlying the traditional 
account. It is not until I have introduced the remaining two accounts and have arrived at a 
set of strong objections to the traditional account (Chapter 3) that I provide a more 
detailed analysis of the traditional account (Chapter 4). I believe this provides a more 
concise interpretation of the traditional account. 
Having introduced the notion of the traditional account of autonomy, I present the 
remaining two general accounts in Chapter 3: Embedded and Relational Accounts. Those 
who espouse an embedded account insist that respect for autonomy is justified by its 
coherence with community beliefs, values, and practices. I argue that we should reject 
this account. First, when a person belongs to multiple communities whose values conflict, 
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it is unclear which community values determine whether to respect individual autonomy. 
Second, even in cases in which we can identify the community values that deal with 
respect for autonomy, we should be concerned that community values might trump 
respect for individual choice. Since research subjects are the ones most directly impacted 
by medical research, their individual choice must always trump community values when 
these conflict. 
In presenting the relational account, I expand on the reasons for requiring an 
account of autonomy to attend to the ways in which dependency and differences in race, 
class, and gender might impede autonomy. I end the chapter with two primary 
conclusions. First, the relational account is better than the embedded one. Second, the 
relational account helps us understand why an account of autonomy should acknowledge 
dependency and attend to differences in race, class, and gender, or what I call social 
structures. 
Building on the second conclusion from Chapter 3, I devote Chapter 4: 
Traditional Autonomy Theorists Respond to an analysis of how well traditional accounts 
attend to the problems of dependency and social structures. My method in this chapter is 
to examine three contemporary theories in the autonomy literature: those by Beauchamp 
and Childress, by Thomas Hill, and by Gerald Dworkin. I do so with two goals in mind. 
My first goal is to illustrate how to identify a theory as either traditional or relational. In 
analyzing these contemporary theories, I conclude that Dworkin’s is relational, while 
Hill’s and Beauchamp and Childress’ are traditional. This helps the reader better 
understand the important differences between traditional and relational accounts of 
autonomy. 
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My second goal in Chapter 4 is to examine the extent to which traditional 
accounts of autonomy make conceptual room for attending to the problems of 
dependency and social structures. I consider a general account of autonomy to leave 
conceptual room for something if doing so is consistent with the aspects of the account of 
the person that informs the general account.  For example, if the account of the person 
claims that people’s identities, values, and beliefs can be isolated from their social 
context, then it would be inconsistent for this account to claim that people’s social 
context can affect the way that they internally structure their values and identities. 
In examining the accounts by Beauchamp and Childress and by Hill, I explain 
how traditional accounts attend to the first problem, dependency. However, they fail to 
attend adequately to the second problem, social structures. I explain that the underlying 
problem is the traditional autonomy theorists’ reliance on the account of the atomistic 
individual, which prevents them from acknowledging the internal restraints that arise 
from social structures. 
Having explained how traditional accounts of autonomy are unable to adequately 
attend to the ways in which social structures impede autonomy, I draw the further 
conclusion that we should reject traditional accounts. Instead, based on my arguments in 
Chapter 3, where I explained how relational accounts of autonomy attend to these 
problems, relational accounts are the best general accounts of autonomy. 
In Chapter 5: Relational Autonomy in the Context of International Research on 
Human Subjects, I expand on my arguments from the previous chapter in order to 
illustrate how a relational account of autonomy is the best account when it comes to 
international research on human subjects. I present two primary arguments in support of 
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this conclusion. First, I explain how a relational account of autonomy is more globally 
applicable by illustrating how it best acknowledges and respects an account of the person 
that is popular in Africa, where much research is done in response to the AIDS epidemic 
there. Second, I present examples of how social structures impede autonomy in the 
context of international research on human subjects. Dependency due to illness, 
differences in class, differences in gender, and the Western framework of mistakenly 
assuming that informed consent is a contract between two fairly equally positioned 
people are all examples of how social structures can impede autonomy in the informed 
consent process in international research on human subjects. Because only a relational 
account of autonomy adequately attends to these problems, I conclude that it is the best 
account in this research context. 
Having provided arguments in support of a relational account of autonomy, I 
devote Chapter 6: Ethical Conditions for Respecting Autonomy to arriving at a minimal 
set of ethical conditions for best ensuring respect for relational autonomy in the research 
setting. Because I eventually use these conditions as a framework for structuring 
amendments to current informed consent guidelines in international research on human 
subjects, I have intentionally aimed at presenting a set of minimally sufficient conditions. 
Doing so provides the flexibility for adapting these guidelines to differing cultural 
contexts. 
I begin the chapter by explaining how we might construct an ethical condition 
directed towards what I pointed out in Chapter 2 is a universal requirement for autonomy: 
critical reflection of one’s beliefs, values, and choices. I then examine ethical conditions 
that others have recommended that attend to problems with how social structures impede 
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autonomy. In cases in which others have proposed an ethical condition in other medical 
contexts, I examine the extent to which the ethical condition might be applicable to the 
research context. I conclude that providing support systems and having subjects and 
community participate in various stages of the research process are two ethical conditions 
that others have suggested that can be useful in addressing problems that arise from 
differences in race, class, gender, and disability. 
I then examine whether any of the three ethical conditions, critical reflection, 
support, and participation, are singularly sufficient for ensuring subjects’ autonomy with 
regard to providing informed consent. After concluding that none is adequate by itself, I 
examine whether combining these conditions adequately ensures respect for autonomy in 
informed consent in research. In doing so, I argue that a combination is still inadequate. 
We need to add an external monitoring system and a safeguard for prioritizing subjects’ 
choices. Adding these conditions results in a list of five minimally sufficient ethical 
conditions for best ensuring subjects’ autonomous decision-making in research on human 
subjects: critical reflection, support mechanisms, participation, external monitoring 
system, and prioritizing subjects’ choices. I return to this list in Chapter 10, where I 
illustrate how these can inform changes to current informed consent guidelines. 
Having focused on autonomy in Chapters 2 through 6, I bring in the concept of 
informed consent and its relation to autonomy in Chapter 7: Informed Consent & 
Autonomy. In this chapter, I conclude that we have good reason to maintain the 
connection between autonomy and informed consent once we realize that respect for 
relational autonomy overcomes the problems that previous attempts to justify informed 
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consent with the standard, or what I have been calling the traditional, autonomy account 
encounter. 
I begin Chapter 7 by providing a brief history of informed consent in the medical 
context, explaining how informed consent has come to rest on the principle of respect for 
autonomy within the context of research on human subjects. Although I do not intend to 
provide a thorough defense of this relationship, I strengthen my arguments regarding the 
benefits of relying on a relational account of autonomy in the context of informed consent 
guidelines for research on human subjects by addressing what I believe are two of the 
strongest objections against relying on the principle of autonomy to justify informed 
consent. 
The first objection I address is by Neil C. Manson and Onora O’Neill, who insist 
that relying on autonomy to justify informed consent justifies too much in some regards 
and too little in others.
18
 I explain how their objections rest on a mistaken assumption 
about what it means for the principle of autonomy to justify informed consent. The 
second objection I examine is by Joan Tronto.
19
 She argues that the reliance on the 
principle of autonomy as justifying informed consent results in our structuring informed 
consent so that it overlooks the ways that social injustices and disparate power impede a 
person’s ability to make a self-governed decision about medical care or research 
participation. I explain how revising our account of autonomy to reflect a relational 
account remedies these problems. 
To further illustrate the benefits of relying on relational autonomy, I devote 
Chapter 8: Addressing Alternative Solutions to analyzing the feasibility of other possible 
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solutions to structuring informed consent so that it is still aimed at ensuring that people 
make self-governed choices regarding medical treatment and research participation but 
does not rely on the traditional principle of autonomy to accomplish this. My purpose of 
this chapter is not to examine all of the arguments for possible alternative accounts of 
informed consent that are aimed at ensuring that subjects make autonomous choices. 
Instead, my aim is to strengthen my conclusion that we should rely on a relational 
autonomy account to inform how we structure informed consent. To do so, I examine two 
of the more recently proposed alternative accounts of how to structure informed consent, 
those by Manson and O’Neill (2007) and by Tronto (2009).20 Due to insurmountable 
problems that I believe each account encounters and due to the fact that a relational 
informed consent account overcomes these problems, I conclude that relying on a 
relational autonomy account to guide us in how we structure the informed consent 
process provides a better solution. 
I devote Chapter 9: Current Informed Consent Guidelines to an analysis of the 
current informed consent guidelines for international research on human subjects. I 
examine these guidelines to determine on which general account of autonomy each relies. 
In doing so, I conclude that none of the current international guidelines for informed 
consent in research on human subjects adequately attends to the problems arising from 
social structures. I explain how this illustrates the failure of current guidelines to 
adequately respect a relational account of autonomy. 
                                                 
20
 Because I only address two proposals, I am not implying that my arguments lead to the 
conclusion that relational autonomy is the only feasible solution for providing a 
philosophical foundation that aptly justifies and informs how we think of informed 
consent. 
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Because I am concerned with how current policy guides researchers’ conduct in 
obtaining informed consent, I address guidelines that carry some force, whether this is as 
the master document that guides other guidelines (i.e., Declaration of Helsinki) or as an 
enforceable guideline (i.e., Federal Code of Regulations). With this in mind, I address the 
following guidelines: Declaration of Helsinki; Belmont Report; the Council for 
International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) International Ethical 
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects; the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Code of Federal Regulations; and the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. In examining these guidelines, I insist that 
many rely on a traditional account of autonomy. However, the more progressive ones rely 
on a relational account. As I explain, even the most progressive document, the CIOMS 
Ethical Guidelines, requires revisions in order to better ensure subjects’ autonomous 
decision-making in the research context. 
In Chapter 10: Revisions to Informed Consent Guidelines, I propose amendments 
to the current guidelines for better ensuring respect for relational autonomy as it relates to 
informed consent in research on human subjects. Drawing on the set of ethical conditions 
I arrived at in Chapter 6, I explain how these can be translated into specific guidelines. To 
illustrate, I map these changes onto the most progressive guidelines, the CIOMS 
Guidelines, to show how we can improve these guidelines to better attend to cross-
cultural differences regarding community value and the problems that can arise from 
differences in race, class, gender, and disability, especially when we include community 
in informed consent. 
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Chapter 2: Autonomy & the Traditional Autonomy Account 
In this chapter, I provide background information for understanding the general accounts 
of autonomy. There are three parts to this chapter. In the first part, I introduce the notion 
of autonomy. I provide a general definition of autonomy, including laying out the 
necessary conditions for all accounts of autonomy. I then clarify the purpose of a theory 
of autonomy. This will help the reader better understand how the general accounts of 
autonomy fit the more general definition of theories of autonomy. 
In the second part, I explain my categorization of theories of autonomy into what 
I call general accounts. As I explain, I categorize theories of autonomy into general 
accounts based on the account of the person that informs them. 
In the final part of the chapter, I illustrate how accounts of the person inform 
general accounts of autonomy by briefly explaining the general account of autonomy that 
is most common in the philosophical literature, what I am calling the traditional account. 
This sets the stage for presenting the remaining two general accounts, the embedded and 
relational accounts, which rest on accounts of the person that were responses to the 
atomistic account of the person. I address these two accounts in the next chapter. 
2.1 Distinctions 
Before presenting a general definition of autonomy, it is important for me to 
attend to a few distinctions in the autonomy literature. In the first two subsections, I 
explain two types of distinctions that come into play in my discussion of autonomy: the 
distinction between moral and personal autonomy and the distinction between political 
and personal autonomy. In the third subsection, I briefly attend to a distinction that has 
become popular in the autonomy literature but which is not directly related to my focus, 
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the distinction between procedural and substantive theories of autonomy. I do so because 
of the popularity of this distinction and to provide the reader with a general idea of where 
my proposed solutions fall within this distinction. 
2.1.1 Personal vs. Moral Autonomy 
Philosophers draw a distinction between moral and personal autonomy.
1
 Moral 
autonomy refers to one’s ability to formulate and follow the objective moral law. For 
example, treating others with respect is objectively morally good; regardless of the time 
and place, all people deserve a minimal level of respect. One who has moral autonomy 
both recognizes and follows this moral law. 
Personal or individual autonomy deals with an individual’s ability to make self-
governed choices regarding how to act and live her life that will add to her overall well-
being. As Joseph Raz explains, “The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people 
controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions 
throughout their lives.”2 An example of personal autonomy is the career choice that a 
person makes. 
Some of the choices that an individual makes that deal with living what she 
believes is a good life are also moral choices. For example, one might think that treating 
others with respect is part of a good life. Yet, not all personal choices relate to the 
objective moral law. An individual’s decision to participate in a research trial is a 
personal choice that deals with personal autonomy but not moral autonomy. Since I am 
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2
 Raz 1986, 369. 
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concerned with research subjects’ choices regarding research participation, my focus is 
on personal and not moral autonomy. 
2.1.2 Personal vs. Political Autonomy 
Another distinction that comes into play in my discussion of autonomy is between 
political and personal autonomy. Because I draw lessons from political philosophy, it is 
important for me to clarify that my overall concern is with personal and not political 
autonomy. Political autonomy deals with the extent to which people are able to make 
self-governed decisions in the political sphere. For example, those who have political 
autonomy are able to participate in constructing political policies and in providing social 
criticism.
3
 In contrast, recall that personal autonomy deals with choices that a person 
makes with regards to his personal life. 
Notably, limitations to people’s political autonomy can bear on their personal 
autonomy. For example, a couple might wish to have a family but may be unable to do so 
due to current laws that bar homosexuals from adopting children. Although political and 
personal autonomy may be causally interrelated, we can distinguish between the two. As 
I have mentioned, my focus is on personal autonomy as it relates to a person’s choices 
regarding research participation.
4
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Ibid, 3. 
4
 The reader should not confuse my focus on international informed consent guidelines as 
indicating that I am also concerned with political philosophy. I do not attend to the 
question of whether and to what extent such guidelines are justified, which is a question 
for political philosophy. Instead, my arguments are situated within the already existent 
structure of having these guidelines in place. 
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2.1.3 Substantive vs. Procedural Theories of Autonomy 
A distinction that has become popular in the autonomy literature is between 
procedural and substantive theories.
5
 Procedural autonomy theorists focus on the process 
of critical reflection that a person uses in making her choices rather than on the content of 
her choices. For example, Harry Frankfurt presents a procedural autonomy theory in 
“Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”.6 He insists that autonomy consists of 
aligning one’s first-order desires, the desires from which one makes a particular choice, 
with one’s second-order desires, or those desires that reflect one’s true self or the desires 
with which one identifies. Suppose, for example, that an individual identifies herself as a 
health-conscious individual; she has the second-order desire to be healthy. To ensure that 
her choices are self-governed or stem from her true self, she would critically reflect on 
them to make sure that they aligned with her second-order desire to be health-conscious. 
In doing so, she would choose to eat a healthy diet and exercise regularly.  
In addition to focusing on the critical reflection process, substantive autonomy 
theorists argue that we also must consider the content of a person’s choices to determine 
whether her choices are autonomous. Some argue for restraints on the content of people’s 
choices, which is called strong substantive autonomy. Susan Wolf presents a strong 
substantive autonomy theory. She insists that the content of autonomous choices must 
reflect that the chooser is able to distinguish right from wrong.
7
 A son who merely 
mimics the choices that his tyrannous father makes and has not been raised to realize that 
these are wrong does not choose autonomously. 
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Substantive autonomy theories also can take the form of weak substantive 
accounts. Those who espouse weak substantive autonomy theories argue for restrictions 
to the process that are meant to narrow the possible content of people’s choices. Many 
weak substantive autonomy theories take the form of insisting that the content of a 
person’s choices must reflect certain capacities in order to be considered autonomous. 
For example, Trudy Govier argues that a person’s choices must reflect self-worth.8 
A discussion of whether a procedural or substantive approach to autonomy is best 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nonetheless, because this distinction has gained 
popularity in the autonomy literature, it is worth pointing out that my arguments amount 
to weak substantive autonomy. Recall that, in addition to focusing on the process of 
critical reflection, weak substantive autonomy theories also focus on the capacities that a 
person has that affect the content of her choices. In Chapter 10, I present specific 
amendments to current informed consent guidelines for international research on human 
subjects that focus on the critical reflection process by providing questions that subjects, 
community members and researchers should ask themselves to better ensure critical 
reflection. In addition to focusing on the critical reflection process, I also focus on the 
relationship between capacities and the content of people’s choices. As will become 
apparent in my discussion of oppressive socialization in Chapter 3, I am concerned with 
the ways in which a person is socialized as a member of an oppressed race, class, gender, 
etc. that can impede autonomy. I point out that oppressive socialization can result in 
decreased autonomy capacities, such as self-worth, and can result in people making 
choices that further perpetuate their oppression, which I refer to as internalized 
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oppression. In Chapter 10, I present amendments to current informed consent guidelines 
that are intended to address these problems. For example, I insist that subjects should be 
offered the opportunity to participate in support groups that are directed towards 
identifying internalized oppressive beliefs and towards further developing requisite 
autonomy skills, such as self-worth and self-assertion. 
2.2 General Definition of Autonomy 
Having clarified that my focus is on personal autonomy and not moral or political 
autonomy, one might wonder what is meant by personal autonomy. In general, personal 
autonomy refers to self-rule or a person’s ability to formulate and exercise choices that 
reflect her values and beliefs. Thomas L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress point out 
that there are two necessary conditions for personal autonomy: (1) agency, or the capacity 
for intentional action; and (2) liberty, or independence from controlling influences.
9
 I 
would add that theorists also agree on a third necessary condition, critical reflection, or 
the need for an individual to critically reflect on his choices to determine whether they 
reflect his values and beliefs or whether they result from something else, such as 
manipulation or coercion. Although theorists agree that these three conditions are 
necessary, they disagree regarding whether they are sufficient. Some argue for additional 
conditions. In addition, theorists differ in the way that each defines the three necessary 
conditions.
10
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 Most (if not all) theories on autonomy concede that perfect autonomy is an unrealistic 
expectation. Instead, a more realistic account of autonomy grants that autonomy occurs 
along a spectrum. 
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          In my explanation of each general account of personal autonomy, I will explain 
how each interprets these three necessary conditions for autonomy. My reason for doing 
so is two-fold. First, it illustrates how the general accounts of personal autonomy fall 
within the current parameters of discussions of autonomy. Second, how each account 
addresses these conditions illustrates important differences between them. 
In explaining how each account interprets the three necessary conditions for 
autonomy, I focus on how each addresses the second necessary condition of autonomy, 
controlling influences. Specifically, I am concerned with what each account considers to 
be controlling influences by others. Thus, in presenting each of the general accounts, I 
explain how each would generally interpret this condition for autonomy. 
As will become apparent in my discussion of the three general accounts in this 
and the following two chapters, some of the differences in how theorists specify the 
conditions for autonomy depend on what they believe about agents or those who are 
capable of making autonomous choices. These beliefs are reflected in accounts of the 
person. Accounts of the person provide descriptive facts about those who have 
personhood, the necessary and sufficient capacities for moral agency. These descriptive 
facts, in turn, inform ideas about how people can and should formulate and exercise their 
self-governed or autonomous choices. For example, one might believe that people are 
capable of isolating their interests, beliefs, identities, and values from social context, or 
their relations to others. One might also believe that others’ influences taint people’s 
ability to formulate self-governed choices. Based on these ideas about the person, it 
follows that one of the requisites for autonomy will be that people must isolate their 
identities, beliefs and values from others’ influences when making autonomous choices. 
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2.3 The Purpose of a Theory of Autonomy 
It is helpful to explain the purpose of a theory of autonomy, as this provides a 
measure against which to judge the general accounts of autonomy in the proceeding 
chapters.
11
 Simply put, a theory of autonomy spells out the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for determining whether someone has acted freely, or in accordance with a 
self-chosen or self-governed plan.
12
  
In defining autonomy, some theorists focus on the necessary and sufficient 
conditions, or capacities, that an individual must have in order to be autonomous. 
However, focusing on the autonomous person overlooks instances in which those who 
have the requisite self-governing capacities for acting autonomously fail to do so.
13
 For 
example, an individual who does not bother to read a consent form prior to signing it may 
have the capacity to act autonomously but does not exercise this capacity.
14
 
Moreover, focusing on the autonomous person fails to identify cases in which 
those who generally lack the necessary and sufficient conditions to be considered as an 
autonomous person are able to make some self-governed decisions. For example, 
prisoners constitute a population that is not autonomous due to their physical 
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 In this chapter, I am concerned with addressing theories of autonomy in general. As 
will become apparent in my discussion of the principle of autonomy as it relates to 
informed consent in Chapter 7, the purpose of a theory of autonomy can take on a more 
specified role when it is used to provide the philosophical foundation for informed 
consent guidelines. As the philosophical foundation for informed consent guidelines, the 
principle of autonomy both justifies our reasons for requiring informed consent and 
guides us in how we structure informed consent. 
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confinement. Nonetheless, they are able to make autonomous or self-governed choices, 
such as deciding whether to participate in medical research. Similarly, people who suffer 
from dementia fail to consistently exhibit the mental capabilities required for autonomy. 
Despite their dementia, however, many are able to make self-governed decisions some of 
the time, such as deciding what foods they wish to eat or what time they wish to go to 
sleep. 
Because the purpose of a theory of autonomy is to identify when people act from 
a self-governed standpoint, autonomy theories should focus on the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for making an autonomous choice rather than on the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for what constitutes an autonomous person. Autonomous choice 
requires certain mental capacities for being able to formulate self-governed choices, or 
choices that reflect one’s values and beliefs about what is in one’s best interest. 
In focusing on autonomous choice, it is necessary to realize that it does little good 
to be able to make self-governed choices if a person cannot exercise her choices in the 
world. Thus, in addition to considering people’s capabilities for formulating autonomous 
choices, a theory of autonomy also should consider the ways in which an individual’s 
social context affects her ability to exercise her choices. This aspect will become more 
apparent in my discussion in Chapter 3 regarding the ways in which oppressive 
socialization and external restraints arising from social structures impede a person’s 
ability to exercise autonomous choices in the world. 
Throughout this dissertation, I often refer to making autonomous choices. 
However, sometimes for the sake of brevity, I simply refer to the ability to make an 
autonomous choice as autonomy. It should be understood that, in both cases, I am 
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referring to an agent’s ability to make an autonomous choice. 
2.4 Level of Specificity Required in Autonomy Theories 
Given that the purpose of a theory of autonomy is to spell out the ways in which 
an individual’s ability to make autonomous choices can be enhanced or impeded, the 
question arises regarding how specific a theory must be. A theory of autonomy need not, 
nor could it, list all of the things that increase or decrease a person’s ability to make 
autonomous choices. For this reason, theorists provide general categories of what 
enhances autonomous choice and what impedes it. For example, having certain mental 
capacities enhances one’s ability to make autonomous choices, while coercion and 
manipulation impede this ability. 
The question of specificity is related to the question of how to determine when to 
reject a theory of autonomy. Because autonomy theories provide general categories of 
how autonomy can be impeded, we should not reject a theory simply because it fails to 
include some of the specific ways in which autonomy can be decreased. Instead, recall 
from Chapter 1 that I explained that the test of whether we should reject an autonomy 
theory is whether it makes conceptual room for attending to problems that it may have 
overlooked. The extent to which an autonomy theory leaves conceptual room for 
something is reflected by the account of the person that informs the theory.  For example, 
if the account of the person insists that people’s identities, values, and beliefs can be 
isolated from their social context, then it would be inconsistent for this account to claim 
that people’s social context can affect the way that they internally structure their values 
and identities.
15
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Having clarified the specificity required for autonomy theories and the measure 
for when we should reject an autonomy theory, I am now in a position to discuss what I 
call general accounts of personal autonomy. After briefly explaining how I have 
categorized theories of autonomy into general accounts, I present the most common 
general account, the traditional account. In the next chapter, I address the remaining two 
general accounts, the embedded and relational accounts. 
2.5 Categorizing Theories into General Accounts 
I categorize theories of autonomy into what I call general accounts of autonomy 
based on the account of the person that informs each theory. Accounts of the person 
provide descriptive facts about those who have personhood, the necessary and sufficient 
capabilities for moral agency. These descriptive facts, in turn, inform ideas about how 
people can and should make self-governed or autonomous choices. For example, one 
might believe that people are capable of isolating their interests, beliefs, identities, and 
values from others’ influences. Moreover, one might believe that others’ influences taint 
people’s ability to make self-governed choices. Based on these beliefs about the person, 
one would conclude that it is necessary for individuals to isolate their beliefs and values 
from others’ influences in order for their choices to be self-governed ones. 
In presenting the three general accounts of personal autonomy in this chapter and 
the next, I draw from accounts of the person that became popular in political philosophy. 
I do so for a few reasons. First, in responding to problems with liberal political theory, 
                                                                                                                                                 
autonomy to incorporate many of the ways that social structures, or differences in race, 
class, gender, and disability, impede autonomy. As I explain in Chapter 4, doing so is 
inconsistent with the account of the person that informs traditional accounts of autonomy. 
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communitarians and feminists critiqued the account of the atomistic person that underlies 
liberal political theory. Their analysis points to problems with the atomistic account of 
the person. Second, in response to these problems, communitarians and feminists 
presented different accounts of the person. Their arguments demonstrate the various 
accounts of the person that appear in the philosophical literature. And finally, the 
interpretations by liberal political theorists, communitarians, and feminists of what 
constitutes harmful interference by others in the political realm says something about 
how different accounts of the person result in different interpretations of harmful 
interference by others in the personal realm. Notably, because I draw from political 
philosophy to understand accounts of the person and how these affect interpretations of 
harmful interference by others, the reader should be careful to keep in mind that I am 
addressing personal and not political autonomy. 
Prior to explaining the atomistic account of the person that arose from liberal 
political theory and how this has informed traditional accounts of autonomy, allow me to 
respond to a question that some might have at this point regarding my choice of 
terminology. In introducing what I call the traditional account of autonomy, some might 
wonder why I do not refer to accounts of autonomy that rely on the account of the person 
that stems from liberal political theory as liberal accounts of autonomy. I intentionally 
refrain from using the term liberal because it indicates a political doctrine that deals with 
the extent of state intervention. Although my analysis begins with the account of the 
person that underlies liberalism, recall that I apply the account of the atomistic person to 
the realm of personal autonomy. In order to distinguish between political and personal 
autonomy, I refer to the general account of personal autonomy that relies on the atomistic 
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account of the person as the traditional account rather than the liberal account. My 
referring to accounts of personal autonomy that rely on an atomistic account of the person 
as traditional accounts also is meant to highlight the popularity of such accounts in the 
traditional philosophical literature. 
With the distinction between political and personal autonomy in the forefront of 
our minds, I begin my explanation of traditional accounts of autonomy by addressing the 
atomistic account of the person that informs these accounts. Because this account first 
arose in political philosophy, I begin here. I then explain how the atomistic account of the 
person informs the traditional account of personal autonomy. In the next chapter, I 
address the remaining two general accounts of personal autonomy that rest on the 
communitarian and Feminist accounts of the person. 
2.6 The Atomistic Individual 
The West is known for espousing individualism. The emphasis on individualism 
became so dominant in Western thought that the French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, 
insisted that it “functioned in much the same way as a religion”.16 When asked to picture 
the main character of this religion, many picture the caricature of the self-made, self-
sufficient rational chooser who can and should isolate himself from others in order to 
make self-governed choices. For example, Iris Marion Young charges traditional theories 
of autonomy as “positing the self as a solid, self-sufficient unity, not defined by or in 
need of anything or anyone other than itself”.17 Others, such as Lorraine Code, have 
focused on the normative force of the Western ideal of stark self-sufficiency. As she 
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 Applebaum, Lidz, and Meisel 1987, 25. 
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 Young 1995, 239. 
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explains, the Western ideal of the autonomous man is one who “is – and should be – self-
sufficient, independent, and self-reliant, a self-realizing individual who directs his efforts 
towards maximizing his personal gains”.18  
Despite this common caricature, I believe that it is incorrect. For this reason, in 
what follows, I explain where the common interpretation of the atomistic individual is 
mistaken. In doing so, I clarify what I believe is a more accurate account. As I previously 
mentioned, the atomistic account of the person is derived from political theory. Hence, I 
begin with a brief overview of the tenants of liberal political theory as a means of 
deriving a more clear-cut picture of this account of the person. 
2.6.1 Liberal Political Theory 
The primary tenant of liberalism is respect for individual liberty, or “freedom 
from interference either by others or by the state”.19 Respect for individual liberty 
includes protecting people’s ability to decide what constitutes the good life rather than 
insisting that there is an account of the good to which all should adhere.
20
 To enable 
people to formulate their own account of the good, liberalism advances a system of 
individual rights and the need for individuals to approve of any state intervention that 
may be necessary to protect these rights.
21
 Their prioritizing of individual interests and 
individual rights reflects liberal political theorists’ belief that the right is prior to the 
good. Individual rights take priority over and are not justified by a common account of 
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 Code 1991, 78. 
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 Young 1995, 174. 
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 For an explanation of the ways in which liberalism, in practice, departs from their 
commitment against positing a general account of the good, see Jaggar 1983, 174-5. 
21
 Waldron 1993, 44. 
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the good.
22
 These aspects of liberal political theory, (a) the requirement that individuals 
must consent to state authority, (b) the insistence that each individual, and not the state, 
should formulate an account of the good, and (c) the prioritizing of the right over the 
good, illustrate liberalism’s prioritizing individuals’ liberty over the authority of the 
state.
23
 
2.6.2 The Atomistic Individual 
These tenants of liberalism indicate a particular account of the person. What is it 
about human beings that warrant prioritizing individual liberty? According to liberal 
political theorists, the answer is the unique human capacity for rationality. Human 
rationality grounds the claim that individuals are capable of consenting to state authority. 
Rationality also assists individuals in constructing their account of the good. Finally, the 
special capacity for rationality grounds distinctly human rights, such as the right to 
freedom of thought and conscience. 
The most telling characteristic of the human capacity for rationality that is 
reflected in the atomistic account of the person is the idea that this capacity is not reliant 
on society. The idea that rationality does not rely on society rests on liberal political 
theorists’ assertion that the person is ontologically prior to society, meaning that 
“logically, if not empirically, human individuals could exist outside a social context; their 
                                                 
22
 Admittedly, this is a simplistic description of the parameters for defining the role of the 
state and what constitutes harm. Nonetheless, it suffices for the purpose of providing the 
reader with an overview of liberal political theory that will help highlight the aspects of 
the liberal self that come into play in my discussion of autonomy. 
23
 Admittedly, this is a simplistic description of the parameters for defining the role of the 
state and what constitutes harm. Nonetheless, it suffices for the purpose of providing the 
reader with an overview of liberal political theory that will help highlight the aspects of 
the liberal self that come into play in my discussion of autonomy. 
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essential characteristics, their needs and interests, their capacities and desires, are given 
independently of their social context and are not created or even fundamentally altered by 
that context”.24 In other words, those who espouse an atomistic account of the person 
believe that society does not constitute, even in part, what it is to be a person.
25,26 
Because 
rationality is a defining characteristic of what it is to be a person, the insistence that a 
person is not constituted by society includes the claim that rationality is not reliant on 
society. I will refer to this idea as the self-sufficiency of rationality. 
Notably, this self-sufficiency of rationality does not mean that people are capable 
of formulating their beliefs, values, and choices from mere nothingness. People are born 
into a family, community, etc. that provides them with a belief system. What defines the 
atomistic person is the idea that, once an individual has developed the capacity for 
rationality during his formative years, he is able to isolate this capacity from others’ 
influence, using it to do such things as freely formulating his account of the good and 
making self-governed choices. 
In addition, this self-sufficiency of rationality deals with the mental and not the 
physical. Those who espouse an atomistic account of the person oftentimes acknowledge 
that people are physically dependent on others, such as in cases of illness, disease, and 
disability. In Chapter 4, I provide examples of how traditional autonomy theorists, who 
by definition advance an atomistic account of the person, attend to the ways that physical 
dependency can impede autonomy. 
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 Jaggar 1983, 28-9. 
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 For discussions of the atomistic account of the person, refer to Friedman 1995, 187; 
Jaggar 1983, 46-7; and Taylor 1979. 
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 Because liberalism is oftentimes charged with conceiving of individuals as atoms that 
can abstract themselves from the larger whole of society, the atomistic account of the 
person also is referred to as the abstract individual or the abstract self. 
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 With this in mind, we can see that the insistence that a person can isolate his 
essential characteristics from society amounts to insisting that a person is capable of 
mental self-sufficiency once he has developed the human capacity for rationality during 
his formative years. What I am referring to as mental self-sufficiency has two 
characteristics that are relevant for our present purposes. First, mental self-sufficiency 
means that a person is able to exercise his rationality free from his social relationships. 
Second, in doing so, he is able to isolate essential characteristics, or identity, beliefs, and 
values, from his social relationships. As will later become apparent, these characteristics 
have important implications for how one defines autonomous choices. 
2.7 The Traditional Account of Autonomy 
I believe that the same account of the person that informs liberal political theory 
also underlies the most common general account of autonomy that is found in the 
philosophical literature, an account that I have been referring to as the traditional account. 
My purpose in this section is to briefly introduce the traditional account of autonomy. In 
doing so, I describe traditional accounts in their most general form. Recall that I do not 
present a more concrete description of traditional accounts until Chapter 4. As I 
previously explained, my reason for doing so is to be able to respond to objections to the 
traditional account of autonomy, which I present in Chapter 3. This enables me to provide 
a more concise description of the atomistic account of the person than has become 
popular in the literature. I close this section by mapping the traditional account onto a 
particular case, in order to give the reader an idea of how the account works in practice. 
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2.7.1 Overview of the Traditional Account 
The idea that a person’s essential characteristics are not reliant on others 
influences the way that traditional autonomy theorists define self-governed choices. In 
insisting that a person can isolate his essential characteristics, including his identity, 
values, beliefs, and his ability for rationality, from others, those who espouse an atomistic 
account of the person believe that the self exists independently of society. If it is true that 
the self exists independent of others, then the most self-governed choices are those that 
stem from a self that is isolated from others’ influences. 
This is not to say that traditional autonomy theorists deny that others can 
negatively affect a person’s autonomy. Traditional autonomy theorists acknowledge that 
a person’s attempts to exercise his choices can be impeded by others. To understand the 
extent to which traditional autonomy theorists acknowledge how others can impede a 
person’s autonomy, it is helpful to address how they define controlling influences by 
others. In discussing this in the next section, I draw a distinction between internal and 
external restraints. As I will explain, traditional autonomy theorists attend to external 
restraints but not to internal ones. 
2.7.2 Interpreting the Three Necessary Conditions for Autonomy 
To better understand the extent to which traditional autonomy theorists address 
restraints to autonomy, it is helpful to take a moment to attend to how they would 
interpret the three necessary conditions for autonomy. Recall that, in addition to critical 
reflection and intentionality, autonomy theorists insist that autonomy requires freedom 
from controlling influences. Addressing this last condition illustrates how traditional 
autonomy theorists attend to restraints to autonomy. 
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To begin, traditional autonomy theorists insist that a person must critically reflect 
on his beliefs and values when making an autonomous choice. Self-governed choices are 
not ones that an individual makes by blindly adhering to beliefs and values that he may 
have been indoctrinated to adopt. In addition, traditional autonomy theorists insist that 
self-governed choices are ones that a person intentionally formulates and carries out. 
With regard to the final condition for autonomy, freedom from controlling 
influences, traditional autonomy theorists consider manipulation and coercion as 
paradigmatic cases of negative controlling influences by others. However, not all 
traditional theorists who provide particular instances of manipulation and coercion agree 
on what exemplifies these cases. Because I am examining accounts of autonomy in their 
most general form, I believe it suffices to address the question of what constitutes 
controlling influences by others as a matter of scope. 
In attending to the question of scope, I divide the types of influences by others 
into what I call external and internal restraints. Although I present more concrete 
examples of these kinds of restraints in the next chapter, allow me to define these and 
provide a brief explanation as to why I believe traditional autonomy theorists attend to 
external but not internal restraints. In Chapter 4, I provide examples of how they attend 
only to external restraints in my examination of particular traditional autonomy theories. 
Internal vs. External Restraints 
In order to highlight different ways in which others can negatively impact a 
person’s autonomy, I distinguish between external and internal restraints. External 
restraints are those that exist out in the world that impede a person’s ability to carry out a 
choice that she has formulated. Although an individual may have the capabilities to 
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formulate a self-governed choice, or a choice that both reflects her beliefs and values and 
is in her best interest, she is unable to carry out her choice. For example, others might 
coerce her into making a choice that does not align with her values and beliefs. Or, she 
may be unable to exercise her choice due to sexist practices in society. 
In comparison, what I am referring to as internal restraints result from how a 
person has been socialized due to her race, class, disability or gender. These can take the 
form of internalized oppressive beliefs that an individual uses to formulate choices that 
further her own oppression or they can take the form of not having fully developed some 
of the requisite skills for autonomy, such as self-assertion and self-worth. A good way to 
think of internal restraints is that they deal with a person’s capabilities, or what she brings 
to the table, so to speak, when formulating a self-governed choice. 
Although I refer to these restraints as internal, I do so for lack of a better word. I 
am aware that using the term, internal, may make the reader think of as person’s mental 
capacities or thought process, both of which occur internally within a person. My use of 
the term, internal restraints, is meant to include more than the mental aspects that come 
into play when a person makes a self-governed choice. By internal, I wish to include the 
relevant aspects of a person’s constitution that affect her ability to make a self-governed 
choice. This includes the mental aspect of her thought process, which raises concerns 
about whether she has internalized oppressive beliefs in making her decision. It also 
includes other aspects of her constitution, such as the autonomy skills she has developed 
as a result of her socialization. In my discussion of internal restraints, the reader should 
keep in mind that these extend beyond the mental realm to include other aspects of a 
person’s constitution, which come into play when making self-governed choices. 
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Traditional Autonomy and External Restraints 
 Because traditional autonomy accounts rest on an atomistic account of the 
person, they only attend to external restraints. Because I do not provide examples of the 
particular restraints that a traditional autonomy theorists addresses until Chapter 4, I will 
provide a general explanation as to why reliance on the atomistic account of the person 
limits the scope with which theorists attend to internal restraints. 
Recall that those who espouse an atomistic account of the individual insist that a 
person can isolate his essential characteristics from his relationships to others. I have 
referred to this as a kind of mental self-sufficiency. If one insists that a person has this 
kind of mental self-sufficiency, then he will not recognize nor attend to the ways that a 
person’s socialization can affect the self from which one makes self-governed choices. 
Specifically, he will overlook how socialization based on race, class, gender, or disability 
can affect whether someone adopts oppressive beliefs or whether they have not fully 
developed some of the necessary skills for autonomy. Because I have provided a very 
general description of the extent to which traditional autonomy theorists address 
restraints to autonomy, it will help to illustrate how this account works by mapping it 
onto a particular case. Prior to doing so, however, it is necessary to dismiss a possible 
mistaken interpretation that some might have at this point with regards to traditional 
autonomy accounts. 
2.7.3 Dismissing a Mistaken Interpretation 
Recall that I previously pointed out that the common interpretation of the 
atomistic individual is inaccurate; liberalism does not insist that people must be 
completely independent. Due to the common interpretation of the atomistic individual as 
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starkly independent and self-sufficient, however, some might construe the account of 
autonomy that rests on this account of the person as asserting that individuals must be 
free entirely from others in order to make self-governed choices. This is incorrect. As I 
have explained, those who espouse an atomistic account of the person oftentimes 
acknowledge that people may be physically dependent on others. Recall that the defining 
characteristic is not that people physically isolate themselves; instead, traditional 
autonomy theorists insist that truly self-governed choices are ones wherein an individual 
has isolated their identity, values and beliefs from others’ coercive or manipulative 
influence. This will become more apparent in the next section, wherein I illustrate how 
traditional autonomy theorists would interpret a particular case. 
2.7.4 Applying the Traditional Account to a Particular Case 
Because I do not provide a detailed analysis of specific traditional accounts of 
autonomy until Chapter 4, in order to help illustrate how the traditional account works, I 
have chosen to map it onto a particular case. To demonstrate the differences between the 
three general accounts of autonomy, I revisit this case in the next chapter. There I explain 
how proponents of the embedded and relational accounts would determine whether the 
person’s choice is autonomous choice. 
I have the following kind of scenario in mind. A terminally ill patient who has 
been hospitalized is faced with the decision whether or not to have her life support 
systems withdrawn, which would result in her more immediate death. She is emotionally 
at ease with her situation and is not in any pain. In other words, her illness has not 
diminished her ability to make an autonomous choice. She believes that it is in her best 
interest to end her life. An important part of her identity has been as an athlete. She has 
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been an avid runner for much of her adult life and had always promised herself that she 
did not want to prolong her life if it meant being confined to a hospital bed. At the same 
time, however, part of her identity is as a member of her local church community. She is 
active in her church and has many close friends in this community. Her church friends 
disagree with her wish to terminate her life, believing that life is one of God’s greatest 
gifts to humanity. They have expressed their sadness and disappointment regarding the 
woman’s wishes. They are not being coercive or manipulative; they are merely 
expressing their own desires. In considering all of these factors, the woman does not sign 
the requisite papers for removing her life support systems. 
According to traditional autonomy theorists, the woman has made an autonomous 
choice. Her decision has not been impeded by external factors, such as being coerced or 
manipulated by others or not being able to carry out her choice due to sexism. Traditional 
autonomy theorists would likely view the scenario as a woman who initially felt that 
terminating her life would be best but, after considering other things that are important to 
her, like her church community, changed her mind and decided not to terminate her life. 
It is important to note that traditional autonomy theorists would focus on whether 
there are any external restraints to autonomy. However, this is only part of the concern 
regarding restraints to autonomy. As will become apparent in my mapping the relational 
account of autonomy onto this same scenario in the next chapter, an account of autonomy 
must also to attend to possible internal restraints to autonomy. Because the traditional 
account of autonomy fails to recognize internal restraints to autonomy, it does not 
provide us with the correct interpretation of the scenario. Thus, we need to answer 
questions regarding whether the woman’s autonomy is impeded by internal restraints, 
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which include internalized oppression and not having fully developed some of the 
requisite skills for autonomy, before being able to correctly determine whether she has 
made an autonomous choice. 
2.8 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I introduced the notion of autonomy and presented the most 
popular example of a general account of autonomy. In doing so, I provided three 
necessary conditions for all theories of autonomy: (1) critical reflection, (2) agency, and 
(3) freedom from controlling influences. I also explained that the purpose of a theory of 
autonomy is to define what constitutes self-governed choices. In defining autonomous 
choices, theorists provide general categories for identifying those things that either 
impede or enhance autonomy. 
 Having introduced the reader to the notion of autonomy, I explained my 
categorization of autonomy theories into what I call general accounts. A general account 
of autonomy is defined by the account of the person that informs how a theorist defines 
self-governed choices. I ended the chapter by explaining how the atomistic account of the 
person informs the most popular general account of autonomy, what I call the traditional 
account, along with indicating possible shortcomings of this account.  
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Chapter 3: Embedded and Relational Autonomy Accounts 
In this chapter, I address the remaining two general accounts of personal autonomy, the 
embedded and relational accounts. In the process of presenting these accounts, I argue for 
two conclusions. First, I argue that we should reject the embedded account of autonomy. 
Second, I provide good reason for favoring the relational account. 
As I explain, the primary reason for preferring the relational account of autonomy 
is that it attends to the ways in which dependency and social structures impede autonomy. 
In order to conclude that relational accounts are the best, I must explain why traditional 
accounts fail to adequately attend to the problems relating to dependency and social 
structures. This is the task of the next chapter. 
3.1 Clarifications 
Before proceeding, allow me to make two clarifications. First, although I refer to 
feminists as presenting the relational account of autonomy, I by no means intend to imply 
that all feminists present this account. For the sake of brevity, I will refer to feminists as 
arguing for the relational accounts of the person and of autonomy. The reader should 
understand this to mean that some feminists have done so. 
Second, although I refer to the account of personal autonomy that rests on the 
communitarian account of the embedded person as the embedded account, I do so for 
lack of a better term. There is a problem in relying on this term. As will become apparent, 
both the accounts of the embedded person and of the relational person rest on the idea 
that people‟s relationships inform their essential characteristics, such as their identities, 
beliefs, and values. Each agrees that people are embedded in their relationships to some 
inescapable degree. 
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Due to this similarity, some might assume that the accounts of personal autonomy 
that are informed by the embedded and relational accounts of the person should be 
similar. This is not the case. As I explain in my discussion of relational accounts, the two 
general accounts of personal autonomy differ with regards to the scope with which they 
attend to how relationships enhance or impede autonomy. 
3.2 The Embedded Account of Autonomy 
          Having made this clarification regarding embedded accounts, I now present the 
embedded account of personal autonomy. I begin by explaining the embedded account of 
the person that underlies the embedded account of autonomy. This account of the person 
was a response by communitarians to problems they found with liberalism‟s account of 
the atomistic individual. Because the communitarian response was in the context of 
political philosophy, I explain how the embedded account of the person that stemmed 
from political philosophy comes into play in the embedded account of personal 
autonomy. 
          After describing the embedded account of personal autonomy, I clarify how those 
who espouse this account would interpret the second necessary condition for autonomy, 
controlling influences by others. I then illustrate how the embedded account of personal 
autonomy works by applying it to the scenario that I presented in the previous chapter in 
my discussion of the atomistic account of autonomy. In the next section, I argue why we 
should reject the embedded account of personal autonomy. 
3.2.1 The Embedded Self 
Not surprisingly, communitarians disagree with the atomistic account of the 
person. Contrary to the belief that people‟s essential characteristics are not reliant on 
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society, communitarians insist that people are born embedded in a society that provides 
them with their identities, beliefs and values. Although, as I have explained, the account 
of the atomistic individual makes conceptual room for acknowledging that people may be 
born into particular roles and belief systems, recall that the atomistic individual is able to 
mentally isolate his essential characteristics from his social context. Communitarians 
disagree and insist that people are embedded in their social contexts to the extent that 
they cannot isolate their essential characteristics. For example, Alasdair MacIntyre 
explains, “I am brother, cousin and grandson, member of this household, that village, this 
tribe. These are not characteristics that belong to human beings accidentally, to be 
stripped away in order to discover „the real me‟.”1 Similarly, Michael Sandel asserts: 
[C]ommunity describes not just what [people] have as fellow citizens but 
also what they are, not a relationship they choose (as in voluntary 
association) but an attachment they discover, not merely an attribute but a 
constituent of their identity.
2
 
 
This insistence that people‟s essential characteristics are at least partly constituted by 
their membership in a community is a characteristic of communitarianism, in general. In 
emphasizing that people‟s essential characteristics are derived from their inescapable 
embeddedness in society, communitarians oftentimes refer to their account of the person 
as the embedded self. 
3.2.2 The Communitarian Account of Autonomy 
     Just as the atomistic account of the person stemmed from political theory, so has the 
communitarian account of the embedded self. With this in mind, I begin with a brief 
discussion of the communitarian account of political autonomy. 
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 MacIntyre 2007 (third edition), 33. 
2
 Sandel 1998 (second edition), 150. 
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          The difference between liberal and communitarian accounts of political autonomy 
can be understood better by examining differences in their approaches to the relationship 
between the right and the good. In insisting that individuals are able to independently 
formulate their own accounts of the good, liberals argue that the right is prior to the good; 
individuals have certain rights regardless of whether these align with and can be justified 
by any agreed upon account of the good. In contrast, communitarians insist that the good 
is prior to the right. Because they believe that individuals are inescapably born into a 
particular social context that provides them with an account of the good, communitarians 
insist that community values define what is just, including what rights individuals have.
3
 
          Oftentimes, the communitarian insistence that the good is prior to the right leads 
people to mistakenly conclude that communitarians valorize community values and 
disregard individual rights. However, this is not true. In the second edition of Liberalism 
and the Limits of Justice, Michael Sandel responds to this objection, explaining that 
communitarians respect individual rights. The difference between liberal and 
communitarian respect for individual rights lies in how they justify rights. Whereas 
liberals insist that rights are independently justified, communitarians assert that rights 
gain their moral force from “the values commonly espoused or widely shared in a 
particular community or tradition”.4 Communitarians also believe that their respect for 
individual rights is illustrated further by the fact that their theories make room for social 
criticism. As Sandel explains: 
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 Ibid, ix-x. 
4
 Ibid, x. 
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There can be disagreement, of course, about what rights the shared 
understandings of a particular tradition actually support; social critics and 
political reformers can interpret traditions in different ways that challenge 
prevailing practices. But these arguments always take the form of recalling 
a community to itself, of appealing to ideals implicit but unrealized in a 
common project or tradition.
5
 
 
Although communitarians insist that they respect individual rights, it is important to note 
that rights must operate within and be justified by community values, practices and 
traditions. Even in the case of social criticism, changes to current traditions are justified 
only when one can prove that the current traditions do not correctly reflect the 
community ideals that provided the basis for originating the practice.
6
 
          This last point, the ability for people to exercise social criticism, highlights what is 
often overlooked in communitarianism. Communitarians insist that individuals can and 
should critically reflect on the beliefs and values that they are born into. Even as 
embedded selves, individuals are able to reflect on the belief system that they have been 
given and decide which beliefs to retain and which to dispose of.
7
 
3.2.3 The Embedded Account of Personal Autonomy  
          This examination of the communitarian account of political autonomy helps us 
understand how a general account of personal autonomy would look that is informed by 
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 An example of an argument justifying changes to current community practices by 
referring to the belief system that informs these practices is Maysam J. Al-Faruqi‟s 
argument regarding the Qu‟ran and Muslim practices. According to Al-Faruqi, sexism in 
Muslim practices does not correctly reflect the Qu‟ran. Moreover, she insists that a 
correct reading of the Qu‟ran provides avenues for women to change these practices. (Al-
Faruqi 2000) 
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 Sandel admits that the individual is embedded to the extent that he cannot dispose of all 
beliefs and aspects of his identity. Rather than this being a detriment, he argues that this 
provides the necessary consistency of character upon which to ground one‟s identity and 
those things one values. (Sandel 1998, 180) 
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the embedded account of the person. As I previously mentioned, I refer to the account of 
personal autonomy that is informed by the embedded account of the person as the 
embedded account of autonomy. 
          There appear to be two main characteristics of the embedded account of autonomy. 
First, those who espouse this account insist that one who makes an autonomous choice 
critically reflects on aspects of his essential characteristics, such as his values and beliefs, 
to ensure that these stem from his self and not from blindly adopting other‟s beliefs and 
values. Second, those who believe in the embedded account of the person insist that an 
individual should be free to carry out his choices when respecting these choices aligns 
with community values. 
3.2.4 Interpreting the Three Necessary Conditions for Autonomy 
          Recall that, in the previous chapter, I explained that there are three necessary 
conditions for all theories of autonomy. Here, I briefly explain how those who espouse an 
embedded account of personal autonomy would interpret these conditions. As I have 
explained, the embedded account includes the first necessary condition of critical 
reflection of one‟s identities, beliefs, and values. Since I have dismissed discussing the 
second necessary condition, intentionality, suffice it to say that the embedded account 
also requires this. That leaves us with the third necessary condition, freedom from 
controlling influences by others. Based on their insistence that community practices and 
traditions provide the justification for individual rights and social criticism, those who 
espouse an embedded account do not consider community practices and traditions as 
controlling influences that impede people‟s autonomy. 
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3.2.5 Applying the Embedded Account of Autonomy to a Particular Case 
To better understand the embedded account of personal autonomy, let us examine 
how those who advance this account would interpret the case that I presented in the 
previous chapter in my discussion of the traditional account of autonomy. Recall that the 
case is one in which a terminally ill patient, an avid runner, believes that it is in her best 
interest to terminate her life support system. Her church community members disagree 
and have expressed their disappointment and sadness in her desire, though they have not 
coerced nor manipulated her. With this in mind, the woman decides to remain on life 
support. 
 In what follows, I begin by providing a simple interpretation that most might 
assign to those that advance the embedded account. Yet, as I later explain, interpreting 
whether respecting a person‟s choice is justified by community values turns out to be a 
more complicated task than one might imagine. This points to problems with the 
embedded account. In the next section, I explain why, even if we grant that we are able to 
overcome this problem, we have good reason to reject the embedded account of 
autonomy. 
Initial Interpretation 
Upon first glance, it might appear that those who espouse an embedded account of 
autonomy would respect the woman‟s choice as an autonomous one. Recall that the 
embedded account of personal autonomy justifies respect for autonomy based on whether 
doing so aligns with community values. As a member of the church community, the 
woman‟s choice to remain on life support aligns with her church community‟s value of 
not interfering with God‟s plan. Notably, had the woman decided to terminate her life, 
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her decision would not be respected, since this choice flies in the face of the community‟s 
highest value, not interfering with what they believe is Divine will. 
Problems with Interpreting Community Membership 
At this point, some might correctly object that it is not at all clear whose 
community values should define whether to respect the woman‟s decision since she is a 
member of more than one community. In addition to being a member of the church 
community, recall that the woman also is a member of the running community. 
Moreover, these communities have conflicting values with regards to terminating life 
support. One of the church community‟s highest values is not to interfere with God‟s 
plan. According to church members, terminating one‟s life amounts to interfering with 
God‟s plan. In contrast, the running community values the quality of a person‟s life, 
which might include terminating one‟s life if one will suffer a poor quality of life. 
The woman‟s multiple community membership and the resultant conflicting 
values point to problems with the embedded account of personal autonomy.  Recall that 
those who espouse an embedded account of personal autonomy insist that respect for 
individual autonomy is justified by how well it aligns with community values. When a 
person belongs to various communities whose values conflict, it is unclear to which 
community values we should turn to determine whether her choice should be respected. 
Communitarians do not appear to address the concern that a person‟s identity can 
be constituted by multiple communities whose values might conflict.
 
Nonetheless, the 
most likely communitarian response would be to insist that, in cases in which a person is 
a member of multiple communities, which is oftentimes the case, she prioritizes one 
community over the others. Thus, for example, communitarians might insist that the 
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woman in our previous case identifies more as a church member than as a runner (as 
supposedly exemplified by her final decision not to terminate her life). 
Although I agree that some who belong to multiple communities most identify 
with a particular community above the others, I disagree that this must always be the 
case. I see no reason why a person‟s identity cannot be equally constituted by a number 
of communities to which she belongs. For example, the woman in our previous case may 
equally identify as an athlete and as a church member. She might consider it a primary 
part of her identity, meaning it is one of the most important aspects of herself, to be a 
Christian. In doing so, she embraces many of the primary tenants of the church, such as 
the belief that God exists, the belief that Jesus was His son, and the belief that the Bible 
provides general guidelines for morally good behavior. We also can imagine that she is a 
professional runner; as such, she considers it part of her primary identity to be a runner. 
In doing so, she embraces many of the primary beliefs of the running community, such as 
eating healthy, running on a regular basis, and valuing an active lifestyle.
8
 Once we 
understand the previous case in this way, it becomes apparent that, at least in some cases, 
a person‟s membership in multiple communities makes it difficult to determine which 
community values should determine whether her choice should be respected. This 
ambiguity provides us with a good reason to reject the embedded account of autonomy. 
 
                                                 
8
 Notably, in identifying both as a Christian and as an athlete, the woman need not 
embrace all of the beliefs of these communities. While she embraces many of the primary 
tenants of each, she may disagree with some beliefs. For example, she might embrace the 
primary beliefs of her church community that God exists and that Jesus is His son, but 
she may disagree with the belief that she should not interfere with what some construe as 
God‟s plan. 
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3.3 Further Reason to Reject the Embedded Account of Autonomy 
 
         Notably, even if we grant that we can identify a clear cut set of community values 
and are able to determine whether respecting a person‟s choices aligns with these, we 
have further reason to reject an embedded account of autonomy. In asserting that respect 
for personal autonomy must be justified by community values and traditions, those who 
espouse an embedded account of autonomy fail to recognize that some traditions are 
oppressive. For example, consider a community value that champions the traditional 
family, comprised of a heterosexual man and woman joined together for the purpose of 
procreating. This fails to provide a basis for respecting homosexuals, polygamists, those 
wishing to have a poly-amorous marriage, and those not wishing to have children. Of 
course, those who embrace an embedded account of autonomy would not consider it 
problematic to have community values trump individual autonomy.
9
 Regardless of their 
acceptance, however, we have good reason to reject a foundation for respecting 
individual choice that is so exclusionary. Some choices demand that individual choice be 
prioritized. 
          This points to an additional reason to be concerned with the embedded account. 
Although this account does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that community values 
trump respect for individual choice, respect for personal autonomy is precariously 
perched on how well it aligns with community values. This depletes the moral force of 
                                                 
9
 To overcome the problem of oppressive community values, one might suggest limiting 
the application of embedded autonomy to non-oppressive communities. Even if we grant 
that this might overcome the problem of oppressive community values, the limited scope 
of the embedded account makes it inapplicable in the global context of international 
informed consent guidelines for research on human subjects. 
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respect for autonomy, making it possible for community values to take priority over 
respect for people‟s self-governed choices. 
3.4 The Relational Account of Autonomy 
          Having rejected the embedded account of autonomy, I now examine the third 
general account of autonomy that appears in the philosophical literature, the relational 
account. Since this account rests on the relational account of the person, I devote this 
section to explaining the relational account of the person that feminists presented in 
response to the atomistic account of the person. I further clarify the relational account of 
the person by explaining how it differs from the embedded account. After doing so, I 
explain the relational account of personal autonomy that rests on the relational account of 
the person. Because I am concerned with how general accounts of autonomy interpret 
what influences by others negatively impact autonomy, I end this section by explaining 
which factors a relational autonomy theorist would consider to be controlling influences 
by others.  
          Because the relational accounts of the person and of autonomy were responses by 
feminists to problems that they insisted traditional autonomy accounts encountered, I 
address the feminist objections to the traditional account in the next section. I begin by 
dismissing what I believe is a non-problematic objection, the egoism objection. I then 
address the remaining two objections, namely, that such accounts fail to attend to the 
ways in which dependency and social structures, or differences in race, class, and gender, 
can impede autonomy. In my discussion of dependency and social structures, I explain 
why it is important for an account of personal autonomy to attend to these concerns. This 
sets the stage for being able to analyze traditional accounts of autonomy in the next 
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chapter in order to determine whether they address these problems. 
          Having presented the relational account of autonomy and explained how it attends 
to the ways that dependency and social structures impede autonomy, I end the chapter 
with a final section in which I map the relational autonomy account onto the same 
scenario that I used to help illustrate the traditional and embedded accounts. 
3.4.1 The Relational Self 
Based on the popularity of the Western ideal of independence and self-sufficiency 
that I spoke about in Chapter 2, many feminists responded with what they argue is a more 
accurate account of the person. While those who espouse an atomistic account of the 
person insist that a person‟s essential characteristics are not dependent on society, those 
who espouse a relational account of the person disagree. They insist that a person‟s 
essential characteristics are constituted, at least in part, by society. A person‟s social 
context, including her relationships, social institutions, social practices, and so forth, 
directly affect and inform a person‟s essential characteristics, including her identity, 
values, and beliefs. As a means of emphasizing the relational aspect of the person, 
feminists refer to their account of the person as the relational self. 
3.4.2 Differences Between the Relational and Embedded Accounts of the Person 
At this point, it may appear that the relational and embedded accounts of the 
person are the same since both assert that a person cannot abstract his essential 
characteristics from his relationships with others. However, these accounts differ. 
Specifically, they differ in the way they address a person‟s positioning in the 
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communities and relationships in which he is embedded.
10
 Communitarians approach 
communities in broad brushstrokes. For example, Sandel addresses the “particular people 
we are – as members of this family or that community or nation or people, as bearers of 
this history, as sons and daughters of the revolution, as citizens of this republic”.11 In 
attending to communities in general, communitarians overlook important differences 
between members based on race, class, sexuality, and gender. In doing so, they overlook 
how some members of communities are oppressed. Consider how Sandel refers to people 
as sons and daughters of a particular revolution. In doing so, he fails to provide a more 
in-depth analysis and uncover differences between the ways that men and women have 
been able to reap the benefits from revolutions.
12
 
In comparison, feminists insist on examining differences between people in 
relationships, especially differences that can decrease some people‟s autonomy. As I will 
explain, they are specifically concerned with differences resulting from dependency and 
social structures, such as race, class, sexuality and gender. 
3.4.3 The Relational Account of Autonomy 
        In recognizing that a person‟s essential characteristics are constituted, at least in 
part, by a person‟s relationships with others, feminists insist that an account of autonomy 
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 See Friedman 1995, 193 & Weiss 1995, 197. 
11
 Sandel 1998, 179. Similarly, as the previous quote from MacIntyre illustrates (see 
p.13), he addresses individuals as members of households, villages and tribes. Despite his 
reference to our being sons and daughters of these communities, nowhere does he address 
the different impact that gender socialization has (MacIntyre 2007, 33). 
12
 As is well known, the Constitution – one of the proclaimed victories of the sons and 
daughters of America‟s revolution – established voting rights for its citizens (Article I). 
Notably, it wasn‟t until 1920 that women were granted the right to vote throughout the 
nation. 
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should attend to the ways that relationships either enhance or impede one‟s autonomy.  
Their emphasis on the role of relationships in autonomy led feminists to refer to their 
account of autonomy as relational autonomy. 
         Just as there are several traditional theories of autonomy, there are several theories 
of relational autonomy. In 1989, Jennifer Nedelsky introduced the notion of relational 
autonomy from a feminist perspective, arguing against the atomistic account of the 
person and the individualistic account of autonomy that stemmed from this.
13
 Since then, 
autonomy theorists have presented various versions of relational autonomy. For example, 
Lorraine Code argues that autonomy theorists must recognize the extent that the self is 
embedded in society to the extent that they are “second persons”, or only come to be 
persons through their relationships with others.
14
 Other relational autonomy theorists 
have focused on the ways in which a person‟s relations with others impacts specific 
aspects of their autonomy skills. For example, Trudy Govier, Susan Sherwin, Carolyn 
McLeod, and Marina Oshana explain that oppressive socialization causes people from 
oppressed groups to not fully develop some of the necessary skills for autonomy, such as 
self-trust and self-respect.
15
 Some argue that the way that society is structured along race, 
class, and gender lines negatively impacts autonomy. Relational autonomy theorists, such 
as Marina Osh, emphasize that having access to a range of relevant options is among the 
necessary conditions for autonomy.
16
 Eva Kittay, in her discussion of the ways that 
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 Nedelsky 1989. 
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 Code 1991. 
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 Govier 1993; McLeod and Sherwin 2005; Oshana 2006, Chapter 4. 
16
 Oshana 2006, Chapter 4. 
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disability can negatively impact both disabled people and caregivers, points out the need 
to recognize dependency relationships and how these impact autonomy.
17,18
 
          Despite differences between their theories, relational autonomy theorists share 
common commitments. In highlighting the constitutive aspect of autonomy, they point 
out that people‟s relationships function within a larger social context. In doing so, they 
insist that an account of autonomy should attend to the impact that social structures, such 
as race, disability, class, and gender, can have on autonomy. In addition to being 
concerned with social structures, relational autonomy theorists insist on recognizing that 
all people are dependent on others at least during some part of their lives. In recognizing 
people‟s dependency on others, they insist that a theory of autonomy should address how 
dependency affects a person‟s autonomy. 
          I will have more to say about the ways that dependency and social structures 
impede autonomy in my discussion of the feminist objections to traditional accounts of 
autonomy. For now, I wish to leave the reader with the overall picture that relational 
accounts of personal autonomy attend to the ways that dependency and social structures, 
or differences in race, disability, gender, and class, can affect autonomy. 
3.4.4 Interpreting the Three Necessary Conditions for Autonomy 
          Having described the relational account of autonomy, I briefly explain how 
relational autonomy theorists would interpret the three necessary conditions for autonomy 
that I introduced in Chapter 2: critical reflection, intentionality, and freedom from 
controlling influences. This will help the reader better understand how relational 
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 Kittay 1997. 
18
 For other examples of relational autonomy theories, see Meyers 1989; Donchin 1995; 
Minow and Shanley 1996; Friedman 1997; Sherwin, 1998; Lindemann and Nelson 2007. 
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autonomy accounts fulfill the necessary conditions that theorists agree upon. It also 
illustrates how relational autonomy theorists differently define controlling influences by 
others than embedded and traditional autonomy theorists do. 
          Similar to the traditional and embedded accounts of autonomy, relational autonomy 
theorists insist that an individual must critically reflect on her beliefs and values when 
making a self-governed choice. Also, just as I dismissed discussing the necessary 
condition of intentionality in my discussion of the previous accounts, I do so here. Suffice 
it to say, like embedded and traditional autonomy theorists, relational autonomy theorists 
also insist that an individual must intentionally formulate and carry out her self-governed 
choices.  
          Relational autonomy theorists‟ emphasis on attending to dependency and social 
structures illustrates how they would interpret the third condition, freedom from 
controlling influences. Recall that, in addressing this question, I am focusing on 
differences in scope, or what each includes in their analysis of what they believe 
constitutes controlling influences. 
         Because relational autonomy theorists recognize that a person is embedded in 
society, they broaden the scope of what constitutes controlling influences to include both 
the internal and external ways that society can enhance or impede autonomy. Recall from 
Chapter 2 that the atomistic account of the person overlooks the ways in which others can 
internally restrain a person‟s ability to make an autonomous decision due to their 
insistence that a person can isolate his essential characteristics, such as his beliefs and 
values, from others. Unlike those who espouse an atomistic account of the person, those 
who advance a relational account do not insist that a person can isolate his essential 
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characteristics from society. This enables relational autonomy theorists to recognize the 
ways that others can negatively impact one‟s overall constitution, including her mental 
processes and autonomy skills. 
          I will have more to say about this in the following section wherein I discuss 
relational autonomy theorists‟ objections to traditional accounts. For now, it suffices for 
the reader to note that relational accounts of autonomy approach the problem of 
controlling influences by others with a broader scope than traditional autonomy theorists. 
Whereas traditional theorists attend to external restraints, relational theorists attend to 
internal and external restraints. 
3.5 Feminist Objections to the Traditional Account of Autonomy 
Not surprisingly, many feminists objected to the traditional account of autonomy. 
Although many of their objections shed light on problems with this account, not all of 
their objections are problematic. In order to focus on the strongest objections, I begin by 
dismissing what I believe is an unproblematic objection, the egoism objection. I then 
discuss what I believe are stronger objections, those pertaining to the ways that 
dependency and social structures can impede autonomy. 
3.5.1 Dismissing the Egoism Objection 
To begin, we should dismiss the objection that the atomistic account of the person 
espouses egoism, or the idea that people not only are inclined to act from self interest but 
that they should do so.
19
 Feminists, such as Penny A. Weiss, Virginia Held, Seyla 
Benhabib, and Eva Kittay, have argued that the insistence that people always act from 
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63 
 
self-interest overlooks the way that many women act in relationships.
20 
They point out 
that, as a result of gender socialization, many women are raised to make sacrifices for 
others and prioritize others‟ needs. Moreover, Eva Kittay argues that it excludes 
caregivers, who prioritize others‟ interests. Notably, women are oftentimes the primary 
caregivers in society.
21
 
In all fairness, their interpretation is not unsubstantiated.
22
 The traditional 
philosophical literature contains many theorists who have asserted that people act from 
self-interest. Among the more obvious is Hobbes, who argued that people‟s reasons for 
forming society are to formulate government and construct laws in order to protect 
themselves from harm by others.
23
 Yet, even those who insist that people can be 
motivated by altruism paint a picture of people as needing to overcome their egoistic 
tendencies in order to attain this ideal, thereby  reinforcing the belief that human beings 
are naturally inclined to be egoistic.
24
 
Rather than attempt to establish whether human beings are motivated by self-
interest, I believe that we can grant that people act from self-interest while at the same 
time acknowledging that self-interest can be framed to accommodate others‟ interests. 
For example, individuals can desire to be held in high esteem for acts that benefit others, 
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 Rather than debate the validity of the egoism claim, Lorraine Code argues that the 
picture of the self-interested person has become part of the Western ideal of the 
autonomous man as one who “is – and should be – self-sufficient, independent, and self-
reliant, a self-realizing individual who directs his efforts towards maximizing his personal 
gains (1991, 78)”. Due to the normative, rather than the descriptive, implications of this 
ideal, Code argues that we need to address its underlying mistaken assumptions. 
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 Hobbes 1962/1651. 
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 For example, refer to Alison Jaggar‟s discussion of Rawls (Jaggar 1983, 31). 
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such as being generous. Although I am neither condoning nor condemning this type of 
motivation, it is important to note that acting from self-interest can include others‟ 
interests. With this in mind, we can dismiss the egoism objection. 
3.5.2 Dependency 
While some have objected to traditional accounts of autonomy based on the 
egoism objection, others have objected that these accounts fail to address dependency. 
There appear to be two objections that feminists present with regards to dependency. 
Although both deal with dependency, I believe that the second objection belongs under 
discussions of the ways in which social structures impede autonomy. For this reason, I 
describe the first objection in this section and address the second in the next section when 
I address the feminist objections regarding social structures. 
The first objection deals with the failure to acknowledge dependency 
relationships. According to relational autonomy theorists, traditional autonomy theorists 
mistakenly assume that individuals, once they have matured, can voluntarily enter and 
exit their relationships. Feminists object that this valorization of independence overlooks 
those who necessarily depend on others due to disabilities or disease and, as a result, 
cannot exit their relationships. Because all of us at some and, often, several points, 
throughout our lives are dependent on others, feminists insist that an account of 
autonomy should recognize that not all our relationships are voluntary.25 
In presenting examples of traditional accounts of autonomy, I address the 
objection that these theories fail to acknowledge that some relationships are dependency 
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ones. I do so to illustrate that the feminist objection is mistaken; traditional theories often 
account for dependency relationships. 
The second objection builds on the first. Once autonomy theorists recognize 
dependency relationships, the next step is for them to attend to the ways that dependency 
can impede a person‟s autonomy. Although many traditional autonomy theorists 
acknowledge dependency, they fail to attend adequately to how it affects autonomy. 
Because, as I have already mentioned, I believe that this further objection belongs in 
discussions about the impact that social structures have on autonomy, I now turn to 
explaining why feminists insist that autonomy theorists should attend to the problem of 
social structures. 
3.5.3 Social Structures 
In addition to objecting that traditional autonomy accounts fail to acknowledge 
dependency relationships, feminists also insist that these accounts do not attend to the 
ways in which social structures, or differences in race, class, gender, and so forth, can 
impede autonomy. Recall, from Chapter 1, that „social structures‟ refers to patterned 
social arrangements in society and the ways that these arrangements influence the actions 
of the people who are socialized into this structure.
26
 Also recall that I am concerned with 
social structures in the form of how people are categorized into oppressive groups within 
society, based on their race, class, and gender, and how they are differently socialized as 
a result of their group membership. 
In addressing the impact that social structures have on autonomy, it is necessary 
to clarify that I am not asserting that membership in a particular race, class, or gender 
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necessarily decreases autonomy. Some members of oppressed groups manage to escape 
the problems of racism, classism or sexism.27 However, because membership in an 
oppressed group often impedes autonomy, it is necessary to attend to its possible impact. 
Although I do not address the increased impact that membership in multiple oppressed 
groups can have, such as being a woman of color, an account of autonomy also should 
attend to the complexities surrounding multiple group membership.28 
The problems regarding social structures can be categorized into two general 
types of problems, internal and external restraints. Recall that I first introduced the 
distinction between internal and external restraints in the previous chapter in my 
discussion of how traditional autonomy theorists would interpret what constitutes 
controlling influences by others. In doing so, I explained that internal restraints deal with 
the ways in which others‟ influence affects a person‟s constitution or what she brings to 
the table at the point at which she makes a self-governed choice. 
Here, I explain the types of internal restraints that can arise from the way that one 
has been socialized as a member of an oppressed race, class, disability, or gender. After 
doing so, I explain how the ways that dependency impacts autonomy belongs in 
discussions of social structures. After discussing these aspects of internal restraints, I 
explain the ways in which social structures result in external restraints, or restraints that 
exist out in the world that impede a person‟s ability to carry out the choices she has made. 
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Internal Restraints Arising from Social Structures 
Within the area of oppressive socialization that results in internal restraints, 
people‟s autonomy can be impeded by either internalized oppression or by not fully 
developing some of the necessary skills for autonomy. In the latter case, the way in which 
an individual is socialized based on his or her membership in a certain race, class, gender, 
or disability can result in him or her not fully developing certain necessary skills for 
autonomy. For example, Meyers explains how women are encouraged not to develop 
fully the autonomy skills of self-direction and self-definition.
29
 
In the former case, the case of internalized oppression, members of an oppressed 
race, class, gender, or disability internalize oppressive societal beliefs. When they 
internalize these mistaken beliefs to the extent that they allow these to condition their 
desires, they end up further perpetuating their oppression through the choices they 
make.
30, 31
 For example, Diana Teitjens Meyers points out how gender socialization can 
cause women to overlook their own needs in order to be good wives, mothers, and 
daughters (what Weiss refers to as self-abnegation).
32 
Others have pointed out how 
members of certain races, classes, or genders internalize mistaken beliefs about their 
being less competent and not worthy of respect, which, in turn, results in decreased self-
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 Ibid.  
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trust and self-worth.33 Because one must respect oneself and learn to trust one‟s ability to 
make self-governed choices, self-distrust and internalized beliefs about incompetence 
decrease autonomy. 
Internal Restraints and Dependency 
Prior to proceeding, allow me to explain why I believe some aspects of 
dependency belong in discussions of how social structures impede autonomy. It is 
important to note that, in addressing those who are disabled, I am concerned with 
disabled people who have the requisite mental capabilities for autonomy but must rely on 
others to provide care to meet their basic needs, either due to physical disabilities or 
mental disabilities that are not related to the requisite mental skills for making self-
governed choices.  
Disabled people within society are grouped into a patterned social arrangement of 
being „disabled‟, as opposed to those who are categorized as not disabled or as able-
bodied. As a result of being a member of the social group we call „disabled people‟, they 
oftentimes are socialized differently than able-bodied people. In these instances, those 
who are disabled encounter similar internal and external restraints as those who are 
members of other social structures, such as race and gender. 
With regards to internal restraints, a disabled individual may internalize mistaken 
societal beliefs about his disability, such as being less competent or less worthy. He also 
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might have been socialized to not develop fully some of the requisite skills for autonomy, 
such as self-assertion. In introducing the external restraints to autonomy in the next 
subsection, I explain how disability can lead to these restraints. 
External Restraints Arising from Social Structures 
In addition to internal restraints that arise from oppressive socialization, social 
structures also can result in external restraints to autonomy. In referring to external 
restraints, recall that I am referring to restraints that we can identify out in the world at 
the time at which a person attempts to exercise her choices. These restraints relate to 
social structures, or race, class, gender, and disability, in that they arise from racism, 
sexism, classism, and ableism that is either practiced by individuals or has become a part 
of social practices or institutions. 
There are two ways in which social structures result in external restraints. First, 
racism, sexism, and so forth can unjustly decrease people‟s available options. Although 
some have argued that unjustly limited options do not impede autonomy,
34
 many 
autonomy theorists acknowledge that external restraints that arise from social structures, 
such as racism and sexism, can impede autonomy. As will become apparent in my 
discussion of specific autonomy theories in Chapter 4, even traditional autonomy 
theorists acknowledge that unjustly limited options arising from social structures can 
impede autonomy. Because my purpose is to test the extent to which traditional 
autonomy theorists attend to problems arising from social structures and because I 
explain that they attend to problems arising from unjustly limited options that result from 
social structures, I believe it suffices to grant that this is a problem. 
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Sometimes the way that people‟s options are unjustly limited is apparent, as when 
a doctor, acting from racist or sexist beliefs, limits a patient‟s options. For example, a 
sexist doctor might assume that a female patient is incapable of handling the pain 
involved in a particular treatment and, consequently, does not offer this treatment as an 
option. 
Sometimes the ways that racism, sexism, and so forth unjustly limit people‟s 
options are not as obvious. As Susan Dodds points out: 
Decisions about medical research priorities and funding of the health-care 
system affect what alternatives are available for the physician to offer the 
patient. These decisions may reflect discriminatory or biased practices that 
affect the particular patient‟s autonomy, and yet in most bioethical 
discussions these alternatives are thought of as a given set that does not 
require ethical scrutiny.35 
 
The fact that racism, sexism, and so forth limit a patient‟s available choices can be 
obscured by the fact that the patient is free to consent whether to choose among the 
unjustly limited options available to her. 
The ways that disability, as a social structure, can impede autonomy oftentimes 
are less apparent. The way that society is structured for able-bodied people might force 
one to make choices that he otherwise wouldn‟t make if these societal limitations were 
not present. For example, a disabled person who must use a wheelchair to get around may 
be unable to go to a voting booth to cast his vote because there is no handicap accessible 
entrance and the hallways and booths are too narrow for a wheelchair. When this occurs, 
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structural restraints impede his ability to make a self-governed choice, or in this case, cast 
his vote. 
The second way that racism, sexism, classism, and ableism impede autonomy is 
that these often result in oppressed people having far less power in a relationship.36 Social 
structures can lead to disparate power between those who are oppressed and those who 
are not, as when doctors are racist or sexist in their interactions with patients and fail to 
allow them to exercise their autonomy in the doctor/patient relationship. Similarly, 
dependency can result in disparate power in relationships.
37
 Because disabled people 
oftentimes depend on others to provide life‟s necessities, they are vulnerable and have far 
less power. 
Much of the concern regarding disparate power is that it makes it easier for others 
to manipulate or coerce those who are less powerful. However, concerns about disparate 
power are not always concerns about coercion and manipulation. In some cases, the mere 
fear of no longer receiving necessary care (even when based on mistaken beliefs) can 
cause vulnerable people to not make autonomous choices. Also, power differences can 
cause less powerful people to feel intimidated and not provide necessary input regarding 
their treatment. For example, they may fail to ask questions about their treatment options. 
They also may feel uncomfortable offering information about what may be in their best 
interest, beyond what medical professionals explicitly ask about. 
                                                 
36
 Although racism, sexism and classism can enhance autonomy for members of the 
privileged group, the concern is that those with less power are less able to exercise 
autonomy. 
37
 For example, see Sherwin 1998, Donchin 2000, and F. Baylis, J. Downie and S. 
Sherwin, Reframing Research Involving Humans” in The Politics of Women’s Health: 
Exploring Agency and Autonomy (ed.) The Feminist Health Care Ethics Research 
Network (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998): 234-259. 
72 
 
3.6 Applying the Relational Account of Autonomy to a Particular Case 
Having explained the relational account of autonomy and how it focuses on 
internal and external restraints that arise from social structures and dependency, I 
illustrate how relational autonomy theorists would interpret the particular scenario that I 
have been using to illustrate the general accounts of autonomy. Once again, recall that the 
case is one in which an athletic woman decides not to terminate her life support. 
Although she believes that it is in her best interest to terminate her life due to a drastic 
decrease in quality of life, her church community has expressed their sadness over her 
desire based on their value of respecting God‟s will, though they have not coerced nor 
manipulated her. 
Based on the apparent external conditions, such as a lack of coercion and 
manipulation, it might appear that the woman‟s decision is an autonomous one. However, 
relational autonomy theorists also would be concerned whether the woman‟s ability to 
make an autonomous choice has been impeded by internal restraints. As a result, they 
would need to gather additional information. For example, they would be concerned 
whether the woman has made her choice based on internalized oppressive beliefs.  They 
might ask if she believed that her desires are not as important as others. Relational 
autonomy theorists would also ask questions directed towards understanding whether the 
woman is operating from decreased levels of autonomy skills due to her gender 
socialization. Given that the woman believes that it is in her best interest to end her life 
because she does not want to be inescapably confined to a hospital bed, they would 
question the extent to which oppressive socialization might have impeded her ability to 
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express this choice as a result of her not having fully developed self-worth, self-trust or 
self-assertion. 
3.7 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have explained the embedded and relational accounts of 
autonomy. In doing so, I concluded that we should reject the embedded account. In cases 
in which a person belongs to multiple communities whose values conflict, it is not clear 
whose community values determine whether to respect an individual‟s personal choice. 
Moreover, even if we can identify which community values come into play, there is a 
larger problem. Insisting that respect for personal autonomy must be justified by how 
well it aligns with community values opens the door for community values to trump 
respect for autonomy. Although those who espouse an embedded account of the person 
do not find this problematic, we have good reason to be concerned, especially when it 
comes to respect for a person‟s choice whether to participate in a research trial on human 
subjects (which, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, is my larger focus). 
 Having argued against the embedded account of personal autonomy, I presented 
the relational account. The benefit of relational accounts is that they attend to the internal 
and external restraints to autonomy that arise from dependency and social structures, or 
differences in race, class, gender, and disability. Given the need to attend to these 
problems, I devote the next chapter to examining the extent to which traditional 
autonomy theorists address these concerns. 
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Chapter 4: Traditional Autonomy Theorists Respond 
In this chapter, I examine whether traditional accounts of autonomy overcome the 
two objections that I presented in the previous chapter, failure to acknowledge 
dependency and failure to adequately attend to how social structures, or differences in 
race, class, gender, and disability, impede autonomy. In doing so, I conclude that 
traditional autonomy theorists recognize dependency but fail to adequately attend to 
problems relating to social structures. As I explain, this failure is due to the fact that 
traditional accounts rest on the atomistic account of the person, which makes it 
impossible for them to adequately attend to the ways that social structures affect 
autonomy. 
Because traditional accounts fail to adequately address social structures’ impact 
on autonomy, I draw the further conclusion that we should reject such accounts. Notably, 
this conclusion combines with the conclusions from Chapter 3 to result in the overall 
conclusion that the relational account of autonomy is best. Recall that, in Chapter 3, I 
concluded that we should reject the embedded account of autonomy. This left us with the 
traditional and relational autonomy accounts. Having argued against traditional accounts 
of autonomy in this chapter, we are left with relational accounts. As I explained in the 
previous chapter, only relational autonomy accounts adequately attend to social 
structures. Consequently, relational accounts of autonomy are the best general accounts. 
This conclusion will come into play in the next few chapters, where I explain how the 
relational account of autonomy is the best philosophical foundation for international 
informed consent guidelines for research on human subjects. 
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4.1 Chapter Overview 
As a means of analyzing how well traditional autonomy theorists recognize 
dependency and attend to social structures, I analyze three contemporary autonomy 
theories, not all of which turn out to be traditional accounts. My reason for addressing 
contemporary theories that represent both traditional accounts and contemporary 
accounts is to help highlight important differences between these accounts. A further 
benefit is that this demonstrates that, contrary to popular belief, not all contemporary 
autonomy theories are traditional accounts that rely on the atomistic account of the 
person.  
Among the contemporary theories that I examine, I begin with a contemporary 
theory by Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress that is a traditional account. Their 
principle of autonomy is part of their principlist approach to addressing biomedical 
ethical issues in their well-known book, Principles of Biomedical Ethics.1 Because their 
approach is one of the most influential within the biomedical context, I have chosen to 
address it here. 
In response to their account, Ann Donchin has attacked their contractarian 
approach to autonomy and informed consent in biomedical cases, arguing that it 
overlooks interdependent relationships in the medical context.2 In what follows, I take a 
different approach and analyze how well they attend to dependency and the ways in 
                                                 
1
 Beauchamp and Childress 2009. 
2
 Anne Donchin, “Reworking Autonomy: Toward a Feminist Perspective”, Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (1995): 46-7 and “Autonomy and Interdependence: 
Quandaries in Genetic Decision Making”, in Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives 
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Oxford University Press., 2000): 236-7. 
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which social structures impede autonomy. In doing so, I conclude that theirs’ is a 
traditional account of autonomy, and, as such, does not adequately address problems 
relating to social structures. 
I also analyze two other prominent contemporary autonomy theorists, Thomas E. 
Hill and Gerald Dworkin. I conclude that Hill presents a traditional account, while 
Dworkin provides a relational one. In “Autonomy and Social Relationships: Rethinking 
the Feminist Critique”, Marilyn Friedman addresses these theories. Her reason for doing 
so is to show that many autonomy theories in mainstream philosophy overcome relying 
on the stark independence that oftentimes has been attributed to them.
3
 My critique 
differs in that I analyze the extent that mainstream theorists who specifically attend to the 
role of relationships in autonomy attend to how social structures impact autonomy. 
 Although I examine specific theories in this chapter, I do so to demonstrate an 
overall problem with traditional accounts of autonomy. Namely, their reliance on the 
atomistic account of the person makes it impossible for their theories to adequately attend 
to the ways that social structures impede autonomy. In comparing contemporary 
traditional accounts with a relational one, I explain why relational autonomy theorists’ 
reliance on the relational account of the person enables them to overcome this problem.
4
 
4.2 Social Structures 
Since my conclusion in this chapter is that traditional autonomy theorists fail to 
adequately attend to the ways in which social structures, or differences in race, class, 
                                                 
3
 Friedman 1997. 
4
 For examples of other contemporary traditional autonomy theories, see Feinberg (1989) 
and Benn (1982). For examples of contemporary relational autonomy theories, see 
Oshana (2006) and Christman (1995).  
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gender, and disability, impede autonomy, allow me to address and dismiss a possible 
response at this point. There are two ways in which traditional autonomy theorists can 
respond to this objection. They can deny that social structures are a problem for 
autonomy. Or they can argue that their theories attend to this problem. My analysis of 
traditional autonomy theories demonstrates that traditional theorists indicate that social 
structures are a problem. Given that some traditional autonomy theorists recognize some 
of the problems for autonomy that result from social structures, I will grant that they wish 
to attend to these problems. 
4.3 Examining Contemporary Autonomy Theories 
 At this point, we are able to analyze how well traditional autonomy theorists 
attend to the two objections: recognizing dependency relationships and attending to the 
external and internal restraints that arise from social structures. I begin by analyzing 
Beauchamp and Childress’ account, followed by Hill and Dworkin’s theories. 
4.3.1 Beauchamp and Childress 
In analyzing Beauchamp and Childress’ principle of autonomy, I draw two 
conclusions. First, they acknowledge dependency relationships. Second, they attend to 
external restraints to autonomy but fail to attend to internal restraints. I explain how their 
reliance on the atomistic account of the person explains their inability to attend to internal 
restraints, or the ways that oppressive socialization can impede autonomy. Because all 
traditional autonomy accounts rest on an atomistic account of the person, the inability to 
overcome this problem is characteristic of all traditional accounts. 
 
78 
 
Beauchamp and Childress’ Theory 
In Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp and Childress present a principlist 
approach to addressing ethical issues in the medical context.
5
 Simply put, a principlist 
approach posits moral principles as the framework for guiding ethical behavior. 
According to Beauchamp and Childress, biomedical behavior should adhere to four 
principles: respect for autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice.
6
 They derive 
these principles from common morality, meaning that these principles represent ethical 
norms that people agree come into play in the biomedical context.
7
 Because they 
represent common morality, the principles are universal, meaning that they apply to all 
people at all times within the biomedical context.
8
 
Moreover, the principles are intended to be content-thin, and abstract.
9
 Their lack 
of specificity provides the flexibility for addressing the diverse ethical issues that arise in 
the biomedical context. Whereas the principles provide the general framework for ethical 
behavior in the biomedical context, they gain specificity through rules that come into play 
in particular medical contexts. For example, the principle of respect for autonomy 
contains the general provision that doctors must respect a patient’s self-governed choices 
about his medical care. This principle lacks specific guidance for how to respect a 
                                                 
5
 Beauchamp and Childress 2009, sixth edition. 
6
 Although they present four general principles, there is good reason to address their 
theory in my discussion of traditional accounts of autonomy – not only because their 
theory is well known, but also because their theory of respect for autonomy highlights 
problems with traditional theories of autonomy that specifically attempt to address 
relationships. 
7
 For a more detailed discussion of how common morality informs their principlist 
approach, refer to Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 2-5. 
8
 Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 3. 
9
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patient’s choices when the patient is in a coma and cannot express his choice. In this case, 
the rule to “[r]espect the autonomy of incompetent patients by following all clear and 
relevant formulations in their advance directives” provides specific guidance on how 
doctors can respect the patient’s autonomy.10 
Addressing Feminist Concerns 
Having briefly spelled out Beauchamp and Childress’ theory, we can now ask 
whether they adequately respond to the feminist concerns that I previously mentioned. 
Recall that I am concerned with the extent to which traditional theorists respond to two 
objections: (1) that such theorists mistakenly overlook dependency relationships; and (2) 
that they fail to address the impact that social structures, including dependency, can have 
on autonomy. Also, with regards to social structures, recall that I drew a distinction 
between internal and external restraints, arguing that an account of autonomy should 
address both. In what follows, I address these types of restraints separately in order to 
highlight differences in how Beauchamp and Childress deal with each. I begin by 
addressing concerns about dependency, followed by my analysis of how well they attend 
to internal and external restraints that arise from social structures. 
Dependency 
Recall that a common feminist objection is that traditional autonomy theorists 
overlook dependency relationships. In discussing this objection, recall that I stated that it 
rests on the mistaken assumption that traditional autonomy theorists rely on an account of 
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the person which valorizes supreme self-sufficiency. Here, I provide support for this 
claim by illustrating how Beauchamp and Childress overcome this objection.  
In their most recent edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp and 
Childress acknowledge that dependency relationships exist. Throughout their discussion 
of autonomy, they oftentimes refer to problems that arise from patients’ dependency on 
medical professionals. For instance, in their discussion of controlling influences, they 
explain, “Influences that ordinarily are resistible can become controlling for abnormally 
weak, dependent, and surrender-prone patients”.11 In addition, in their discussion of 
authority and community, they point out, “We encounter many problems of autonomy in 
medical contexts because of the patients’ dependent condition and the medical 
professional’s authoritative position”.12 In acknowledging dependency, Beauchamp and 
Childress overcome the first feminist objection that traditional autonomy theorists ignore 
such relationships. 
External Restraints 
Although Beauchamp and Childress overcome the first objection, they attend only 
to part of the second objection. Recall that the second objection dealt with traditional 
autonomy theorists’ failure to attend adequately to the ways that internal and external 
restraints arising from social structures impede autonomy. In this section, I explain how 
they attend to external restraints. In the next section, I explain how they fail to attend to 
internal restraints. 
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Recall that external restraints are restraints to autonomy that result from racism, 
sexism, classism and ableism. These –isms result in two types of external restraints, 
unjustly limited options and disparate power. As I will explain, Beauchamp and Childress 
attend to both kinds of external restraints. 
Recall that, in my discussion of social structures in Chapter 3, I explained that 
dependency, as it relates to impeding people’s autonomy, is a type of social structure. In 
their discussion of the principle of autonomy, Beauchamp and Childress attend to the 
external restraint of disparate power by acknowledging that a patient’s dependency on her 
doctor can impede autonomy. As they explain: 
Conflict arises because authority has not been properly delegated or 
accepted. In these circumstances, the patient’s autonomy is sometimes 
compromised because the physician has assumed an unwarranted degree 
of authority.
13
 
 
Notably, the fact that they address how one of the social structures, dependency, can lead 
to disparate power makes it consistent for them to incorporate discussions of the 
remaining ways in which other social structures, such as race, class, and gender, also lead 
to this problem. 
Whereas they adequately attend to disparate power in their principle of autonomy, 
they do not address the other type of external restraint, unjustly limited options, in their 
discussion of autonomy. Instead, they deal with unjustly limited options in their principle 
of justice. The principle of justice deals with the fair distribution of goods. According to 
Beauchamp and Childress, part of the purpose of this principle is to attend to the ways 
that discrimination based on race and gender can unjustly limit patients’ access to health 
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care.
14
 
Although they do not address unjustly limited options in the context of respect for 
autonomy, it appears that they would attend to this problem by combining the principle of 
autonomy with the principle of justice. Recall that Beauchamp and Childress’ principles 
are meant to work together; the way they combine will depend on the particular 
biomedical context. To attend to the ways that unjustly limited options limit autonomy in 
a specific context, one might rely on the principle of justice to identify the unjustly 
limited options. One can then apply this to the principle of autonomy to determine 
whether and to what extent the unjustly limited options decrease autonomy.
15
 
Internal Restraints 
Notably, Beauchamp and Childress’ approach of combining principles does not 
enable them to attend to the ways that internal restraints impede autonomy. Recall that 
internal restraints to autonomy, both internalized oppression and not fully developed 
autonomy skills, arise from oppressive socialization. As with the external restraint of 
unjustly limited options, Beauchamp and Childress do not discuss the ways that 
oppressive socialization might impede autonomy by resulting in either decreased 
autonomy skills or internalized oppression in their principle of autonomy. Moreover, 
acknowledging this problem is inconsistent with the way that they have formulated the 
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addressing issues of social justice under the principle of justice, we also must address 
these under the principle of autonomy. Only in this way can the principle of autonomy 
acknowledge that social injustices inescapably bear on autonomy as a result of people 
being constituted, at least in part, by their social relationships. 
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remaining principles. (Recall that one combines the principles in attending to various 
biomedical problems.) 
Recall that, in addition to the principle of respect for autonomy, Beauchamp and 
Childress promote the principles of justice, beneficence, and nonmaleficence. Recall that 
the principle of justice deals with the fair distribution of goods, such as health care. In 
focusing on the distribution of goods, it does not attend to the ways that internal 
restraints, such as internalized oppression and underdeveloped autonomy skills, impede 
autonomy.  
Similarly, the principle of beneficence also is not directed towards internal 
restraints. According to Beauchamp and Childress, beneficent actions are those that are 
intended to benefit others. Beneficent acts may be either general or specific. General 
beneficence is those actions meant to benefit people in general who may need help. 
According to Beauchamp and Childress, general beneficence, in most cases, is 
impractical and demands too much of people.
16
 Most biomedical issues deal with specific 
beneficence, or beneficence that is directed towards specific individuals. Specific 
beneficence usually relates to special relationships (such as family) or role 
responsibilities (such as contracted medical providers).
17
 Given the confines of the 
principle of beneficence as focusing on providing benefits for others, whether general or 
specific, this principle does not apply to internal restraints that impede autonomy. 
Whereas the principle of beneficence deals with performing certain actions, the 
principle of nonmalificence deals with refraining from certain actions. This principle 
requires medical practitioners to refrain from inflicting harm. Beauchamp and Childress 
                                                 
16
 Beauchamp and Childress 2009 (sixth edition), 200. 
17
 Ibid, 199. 
84 
 
define harm as “thwarting, defeating, or setting back some party’s interests”.18 The 
atrocities at Nuremberg, where physicians performed harmful, invasive procedures on 
human subjects without their consent that were not in the patients’ best interests represent 
violations of the principle of nonmaleficence. 
Because the internal restraints of internalized oppression and underdeveloped 
autonomy skills relate to a person’s ability to formulate self-governed choices that reflect 
her best interest, it might at first appear that these concerns could be addressed under the 
principle of nonmaleficence. However, doing so would be inconsistent with how 
Beauchamp and Childress have framed the principle. The reason for this is that they limit 
the principle to individual actions by parties engaged in medical services, much like a 
contract. Throughout their discussion of nonmaleficence, they refer to parties or agents 
that engage with each other and are bound by the principle. For example, in their 
discussion of the physical harms to which the principle of nonmaleficence is directed, 
Beauchamp and Childress refer to actions that the physician should abstain, such as 
killing, causing pain and suffering, incapacitating, causing offense and depriving others 
of the goods of life.
19
 
In focusing on individual actions isolated to a particular time at which medical 
services are provided, Beauchamp and Childress fail to make room for the ways in which 
internal restraints from social structures can harm people. Internalized oppression occurs 
over time as a result of oppressive socialization. Hence, it goes beyond particular 
individuals and is incorporated into social practices and traditions. In addition, oppressive 
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socialization occurs over time and is not something that results from one person’s 
interaction with another in a specified time in which services are provided. 
Reliance on Atomistic Individual 
To understand which general account of autonomy Beauchamp and Childress’ 
account is, let us briefly review the conclusions I drew in my analysis. First, I concluded 
that their account acknowledges dependency and attends to the external restraints of 
disparate power and unjustly limited options. Second, I concluded that they overlook 
internal restraints and make no room in their principlist approach for correcting this. 
Recall from Chapters 2 and 3 that it is consistent with the account of the person 
that informs both relational and traditional autonomy accounts to recognize dependency 
relationships. Hence, we are unable to determine how to classify Beauchamp and 
Childress’ account of the person by looking to how they address dependency. 
In comparison, the second conclusion indicates that Beauchamp and Childress’ 
theory is a traditional autonomy account. Based on the second conclusion, Beauchamp 
and Childress fail to attend to internal restraints that arise from social structures. Once 
again, the failure to recognize how oppressive socialization can impede autonomy speaks 
to their oversight of how embedded people are in their social context and how this affects 
autonomy. In positing individuals as conceptually isolated from their social context, those 
who espouse an account of the atomistic individual fail to recognize how social structures 
inform people’s essential characteristics, such as their identities, beliefs, and values. As a 
result, they are unable to recognize, and thus attend to, the ways in which oppressive 
socialization leads to internalized oppression and differences in the development of 
autonomy skills. 
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It is important to note that Beauchamp and Childress’ failure to discuss internal 
restraints amounts to more than a mere oversight. Given their reliance on the atomistic 
account of the person, which insists that people are able isolate their essential 
characteristics in order to formulate self-governed choices, they are unable to 
acknowledge how a person’s essential characteristics can be impeded by their social 
context. 
4.3.2 Thomas E. Hill, Jr. 
In “The Importance of Autonomy”, Thomas E. Hill, Jr. presents a modified 
Kantian account of autonomy.
20
 According to Hill, respect for autonomy is “a right to 
make otherwise morally permissible decisions about matters deeply affecting one’s own 
life without interference by controlling threats and bribes, manipulations, and willful 
distortion of relevant information”.21 In other words, a person acts autonomously if her 
choice does not result from coercion, manipulation, threats, or lies. Although Hill does 
not place restrictions on the content of individuals’ choices, he insists that an individual 
must critically reflect on her choices. Also, a person’s choices must align with her other 
values, such as compassion.
22
 
Like Kant, Hill asserts that a person’s capacity for formulating and following his 
self-governed choices provides the reasons for respecting human dignity. However, he 
modifies Kant’s account of autonomy. Specifically, he disagrees with the Kantian 
assertion that autonomy requires people to be self sufficient, independent, and 
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emotionally detached.
23
 According to Hill, respect for self-governed choices must include 
respecting people’s choices to depend on others, to prioritize others’ interests, and to 
incorporate emotions into their reasoning. 
In presenting an account of autonomy that avoids asserting the starkly 
independent individualism oftentimes attributed to Kant, Hill acknowledges that 
dependency relationships exist. Thus, he overcomes the first objection towards traditional 
autonomy theories, which deals with the need to acknowledge dependency relationships.  
However, he fails to attend to the second objection regarding how dependency 
and other social structures impede autonomy. To understand why this is, let us examine 
Hill’s discussion of the ways in which others can impede a person’s autonomy. 
According to Hill, physical coercion, threats, manipulation, and concealing or distorting 
relevant information can impede autonomy.
24
 In examining these categories of undue 
influence by others, it becomes apparent that incorporating concerns about internal 
restraints to autonomy is inconsistent with how he has structured his categories. 
Physical threats and coercion deal with a person’s specific intent to alter another’s 
choices, such as when a person threatens to slander someone if she does not vote as the 
person who threatens wishes.
25
 In contrast, internal restraints to autonomy that arise from 
oppressive socialization need not involve intent. For example, it may be the case that a 
parent, in unwittingly perpetuating harmful societal stereotypes, raises her daughter to not 
fully develop self-trust. Although the parent does not intend to negatively impact the 
daughter’s ability to make an autonomous choice, her actions have this effect. 
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Similarly, the category of manipulation, as Hill defines it, deals with intentional 
acts directed towards altering another’s choices. According to Hill, manipulation is 
intended to control a person’s choice that should rightfully be hers to freely make.26 Just 
as in the case of physical threats and coercion, manipulation cannot account for the ways 
in which oppressive socialization, which is not usually directed towards altering another’s 
choices, impedes autonomy. 
Finally, Hill’s category of concealing or withholding relevant information does 
not pertain to oppressive socialization. Instead, it deals with the fact that, when others 
conceal or distort information for the purpose of altering a decision that a person has a 
right to make, this impedes autonomy. As such, Hill’s category of concealing or 
withholding information fails to accommodate concerns about oppressive socialization in 
two ways. First, oppressive socialization does not deal with the requirement to provide 
relevant information for the purpose of making an informed, self-governed choice. 
Second, and similar to his other categories of undue influence, an agent who conceals or 
distorts information does so with the intent to alter another’s choice. As I have explained, 
intent need not be present for oppressive socialization to impede autonomy. 
The shared feature of all of Hill’s categories of undue influences by others 
indicates that his theory represents a traditional autonomy account. Each of his categories 
focuses on specific agents who intend to change a person’s choice that the person should 
be free to make. In focusing on the interaction between two parties, Hill overlooks the 
effects of the larger setting in which the interaction occurs. Namely, he overlooks the 
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ways that social structures, or differences in race, class, gender, and disability, can have 
on a person’s autonomy. 
To illustrate, consider his example regarding how manipulation, even when 
stemming from good intentions, impedes autonomy. As he explains: 
For example, a father, however well intentioned, might unduly interfere 
with his shy daughter’s important life choices if, to comfort her, he tried to 
persuade her that women in law and other competitive professions are 
always unattractive.
27
 
 
In this example, Hill recognizes how the father’s intentional manipulation of his daughter 
influences her choice. However, in focusing on the father’s direct affect on the daughter, 
he overlooks the larger social picture in which their interaction occurs. Specifically, he 
fails to attend to how the daughter’s oppressive gender socialization throughout her life 
has resulted in her emphasizing attractiveness and how this inhibits her desire to become 
a lawyer. 
4.3.3 Gerald Dworkin 
Having presented my analysis of two contemporary autonomy theories that 
represent traditional autonomy accounts, I now present my analysis of a contemporary 
theory by Gerald Dworkin, which I believe is a relational account of autonomy. The 
contrast between these contemporary theories helps illustrate subtle, but important, 
differences between traditional and relational autonomy accounts. In comparison with 
Hill, Beauchamp and Childress’ reliance on an atomistic account of the person that makes 
it impossible to adequately attend to the ways that social structures impede autonomy, 
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Dworkin’s reliance on a relational account of the person enables him to incorporate both 
internal and external restraints that can result from social structures. 
Dworkin’s Theory of Autonomy 
In The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Dworkin argues for a content neutral, 
otherwise known as procedural, account of autonomy.
28
 In doing so, he places a few 
conditions on the procedure a person uses to make an autonomous choice. First, an 
individual must not be coerced or manipulated in formulating her self-governed choices. 
Second, she must critically reflect on her beliefs, values, etc. And third, she must be 
capable of changing these if she so chooses.
29
 
In general, Dworkin argues that a person acts autonomously when she critically 
reflects on her second order preferences, or her particular choices, to determine whether 
these align with her first order preferences, or the life she desires to live. In cases in 
which these do not align, the autonomous person can change either her first order or her 
second order preferences. For example, I may have a first order preference to be thin and 
a second order preference to eat rich foods and drink a lot of wine. I can change either my 
second order preference and choose to eat a healthy diet, or I can change my first order 
preference and desire to be someone who enjoys fine food and wine and is not thin. 
How Dworkin Addresses the Feminist Concerns 
In presenting his theory, Dworkin aims to present an account of autonomy that 
does not require people to be starkly independent. As he explains, this requirement runs 
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contrary to many self-governed choices that people may wish to make. For example, “To 
be committed to a friend or cause is to accept the fact that one’s actions, and even desires, 
are to some extent determined by the desires and needs of others”.30 In acknowledging 
people’s interdependency, Dworkin rejects the idea that autonomy equates with stark 
self-sufficiency. This, in turn, makes it consistent for him to acknowledge dependency 
relationships, thereby overcoming the first feminist concern. 
With regard to the second objection regarding how social structures impede 
autonomy, Dworkin does not mention all of the external and internal restraints that I have 
presented. However, unlike the other contemporary autonomy theorists that I have 
addressed, it would be consistent for him to do so. 
The difference lies in differences in the account of the person that underlies each 
autonomy account. Unlike Hill, Beauchamp and Childress, Dworkin recognizes that 
people are embedded in their relationships with others and that these relationships inform 
people’s identities, beliefs, values, and choices. For example, he realizes that individuals 
formulate their self-governed choices from within a culture that informs their beliefs and 
values.
31
 As he explains: 
Our dispositions, attitudes, values, wants are affected by the economic 
institutions, by the mass media, by the force of public opinion, by social 
class, and so forth. To a large extent these institutions are not chosen by 
us; we simply find ourselves faced with them.
32
 
 
In acknowledging the extent to which social structures, such as social class, can affect 
one’s essential characteristics, Dworkin acknowledges the embeddedness that is part of 
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the relational account of the person. The fact that he does not rely on an atomistic account 
of the person is further substantiated by his statement, “If the notion of self-determination 
is given a very strong definition – the unchosen chooser, the uninfluenced influencer – 
then it seems as if autonomy is impossible.”33 In rejecting the completely unaffected 
chooser, Dworkin seems to recognize that a person cannot isolate her essential 
characteristics from her relationships with others. In other words, he does not rely on an 
atomistic account of the person. Thus, although his theory appears in mainstream 
philosophy, I believe that it represents a relational account of autonomy. 
In concluding that Dworkin’s theory makes conceptual room for attending to 
oppressive socialization, I am not arguing that it is the best type of account for doing so. 
Dworkin provides a procedural account of autonomy. Although I think that there are 
problems with such accounts, I do not discuss differences between procedural and 
substantive autonomy theories. This is due primarily to my larger concern of examining 
accounts of autonomy that serve as a philosophical foundation for public policy. Within 
this particular context, I believe that it is acceptable to rely on a general account of 
autonomy that makes conceptual room for attending to problems and to leave the details 
of how to attend to these problems to the specific policies. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have analyzed three popular mainstream autonomy theories, those 
by Beauchamp and Childress, Hill, and Dworkin, which are directed at overcoming the 
reliance on stark individualism that is oftentimes attributed to traditional accounts. In 
doing so, I have examined whether they: (1) acknowledge that some people are 
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necessarily dependent on others, and (2) recognize the ways in which social structures, or 
differences in race, class, gender, and disability, impede autonomy. I concluded that all 
attended to (1), while only Dworkin’s theory is consistent with attending to (2). 
Beauchamp, Childress and Hill isolate their concerns for restraints to autonomy to 
individuals’ interactions and intentions, thereby overlooking the ways that oppressive 
socialization can impede autonomy. In comparison, Dworkin acknowledges people’s 
embeddedness in society, which enables his theory to make room for restraints that arise 
from oppressive socialization. 
I then explained why I believe that the difference lies in differences in the account of 
the person that underlies each theory. I provided reasons to believe that Beauchamp, 
Childress, and Hill rely on an account of the atomistic individual and Dworkin relies on a 
relational account. Although I have not presented a thorough examination of all 
traditional accounts of autonomy, my analysis points to a general problem with all 
traditional accounts. The reason for this is that such accounts rest on an atomistic account 
of the person, which insists that individuals’ identities, values, and beliefs are not reliant 
on society. In isolating individuals’ essential attributes in this way, traditional theories 
focus on people’s essential characteristics as essentially separable from the social context 
in which they live. Consequently, it is inconsistent to both hold that people’s essential 
characteristics are essentially separable and to acknowledge that their essential 
characteristics can be altered to the extent that they suffer internal restraints to autonomy, 
such as internalized oppression and not fully developed autonomy skills. 
Because traditional autonomy accounts are unable to adequately attend to the ways in 
which social structures impede autonomy and because relational accounts are able to 
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attend to these problems, we have good reason to prefer relational accounts of autonomy.  
In the next chapter, I strengthen my arguments in support of the conclusion that relational 
autonomy accounts are best by explaining why these best respect important cross cultural 
differences and how they best attend to particular problems that arise in international 
research on human subjects. 
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Chapter 5: Relational Autonomy in the Context of International Research on 
Human Subjects 
 
Having concluded in the previous chapter that relational autonomy is the best general 
account of autonomy, I explain the benefits of relying on relational autonomy in the 
context of informed consent in international research on human subjects, especially those 
from less developed countries. First, I illustrate the global applicability of relational 
autonomy by explaining how it is best suited to address people who insist on including 
community in the informed consent process. To do so, I once again turn to the 
relationship between accounts of the person and accounts of autonomy. This time, I 
introduce a fourth account of the person that is popular in a less developed country in 
which researchers conduct a lot of research on human subjects. Due to the current AIDS 
epidemic in Africa and the resultant increase in research there, I have chosen an African 
account of the person called the Akan. 
After explaining why relational autonomy is best suited for respecting important 
cross cultural differences in accounts of the person, I emphasize the benefits of relying on 
an account of autonomy that attends to social structures by explaining the ways that 
social structures impact autonomy in the context of international research on human 
subjects, especially those from less developed countries. In doing so, I explain how 
dependency, class, gender, and liberalism‟s influence negatively affect subjects‟ 
autonomy. In the next chapter, I argue for ethical conditions for remedying these 
problems in the context of informed consent in international research on human subjects. 
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5.1 Cross-Cultural Applicability 
 In Chapters 2 and 3, I examined the three accounts of the person that are popular 
in the philosophical literature, the liberal, communitarian, and feminist accounts. In what 
follows, I describe a fourth account of the person, one that has more recently appeared in 
the literature.
1
 Due to the current AIDS epidemic in Africa, I have chosen to examine an 
account of the person that is popular among the Akan. The Akan refers to a particular 
ethnic group of persons within West Africa and includes people in Zambia, Ghana and 
the Cote d‟Ivoire; the Ibos of Nigeria; and the Nso of Cameroon.2 As I explain, due to the 
value that the Akan place on community, they would be among those wishing to involve 
community in the informed consent process. Because involving community often 
increases problems that arise from differences in race, class, and gender, community 
involvement magnifies the need to attend to the ways in which social structures impede 
autonomy.  
After describing the Akan account of the person, I explain the particular ways in 
which social structures impede autonomy within the context of research on human 
subjects, especially those from less developed countries. Together, the need to respect the 
cultural difference of involving community in the informed consent process and the many 
problems that arise in the research setting that result from social structures illustrate the 
importance of relying on an account of respect for autonomy that attends to the impact 
that social structures, such as race, class, gender, and dependency, can have on autonomy. 
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2
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5.1.1 The Akan Account of the Person 
           The Akan word for person (onipa) has a dual meaning. First, it refers to the 
biological fact that one is a human being. This biological basis accords all persons a 
minimum level of respect. At the same time, onipa also refers to the moral aspect of a 
person–the degree to which one provides for family and helps within the community (all 
of which are considered to be virtues). In cases in which one fulfills one‟s social 
responsibilities to the fullest, one receives the highest compliment of oye onipa paa (a 
“real person”).3,4 
It is important to note that both aspects of the Akan account of the person rely on 
the individual‟s relation to community. It is one‟s membership in the human community 
that grants one the minimum respect owed to all persons. In addition, it is the way in 
which one chooses to interact with others in the community that determines the degree to 
which one achieves greater levels of respect within society. 
While the Akan emphasize community, it is also important to note that respect for 
individual choice is not lost. The Akan emphasize individual responsibility and freedom 
of choice, including critical reflection of one‟s beliefs, values and choices.5 Moreover, 
they recognize that individuals also must be able to exercise their choices. Consequently, 
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 The suggestion that personhood can occur in varying degrees may seem metaphysically 
troubling for some. It is important to note that, within the context of the cross cultural 
applicability of international policy, I am concerned with deeply held societal beliefs 
about the person. This is not to say that I condone all possible interpretations of what 
constitutes the moral category of „person‟. Instead, I believe that there a range of 
acceptable definitions, ones that are restrained by other moral constraints. For example, I 
would reject a definition that places value on vicious actions. 
5
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each person retains the right to criticize community values.
6
 In “Person and Community: 
Ghanaian Philosophical Studies”, Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye explain: 
[I]ndividual persons as participants in the shared values and practices, and 
enmeshed in the web of communal relationships, may find that aspects of 
those cultural givens are inelegant, undignifying or unenlightening and 
can thoughtfully be questioned and evaluated. The evaluation may result 
in individual's affirming or amending or refining existing communal 
goals, values and practices; but it may or could also result in the 
individual's total rejection of them. The possibility of reevaluation means, 
surely that the person cannot be absorbed by the communal or cultural 
apparatuses.
7
 
  
In placing the value of the person in her relationship to her community, along with 
valuing her ability to formulate and exercise self-governed choices, the Akan emphasize 
the importance of community and of individual autonomy. 
5.1.2 Relational Autonomy as Globally Applicable 
Given their emphasis on community, it appears that those who embrace an Akan 
account of the person would wish to include community in the informed consent process. 
This inclusion may at first seem counterintuitive based on the fact that I previously 
pointed out how the Akan encourage critical reflection of social practices. Because social 
criticism entails disagreement with community, it may seem odd to insist that the Akan 
would want to include community in an important life decision. However, it is important 
to note that the desire to include community does not rest on the desire to have others 
reinforce one‟s decision. Instead, it reflects the importance that community has for the 
Akan. Whether community agrees with one or not, an Akan individual cannot conceive of 
making important life decisions without involving community, much like some life 
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partners would not fathom making an important life decision without input from his/her 
significant other. 
Including community in the informed consent process brings the individual 
subjects‟ relationship with others to the forefront, giving us all the more reason to rely on 
a relational account of autonomy that recognizes the negative impact that social structures 
can have on the relationship between researchers, subjects and the community. Although 
the Akan insist that individuals should exercise critical reflection as well as be able to 
exercise their dissenting choices, there is no guarantee that they will recognize and attend 
to the problems that arise from social structures. For example, although they might 
respect an individual‟s choice, they may fail to attend to the ways in which race, class, 
and gender can create power disparities that can impede a person‟s ability to formulate 
and exercise self-governed choices. 
5.1.3 Where to Draw the Line 
Although I have argued that the current informed consent guidelines should be 
revised to reflect relational autonomy, I do so with the realization that this account of 
autonomy will not be applicable to all cultures. Admittedly, no account of autonomy is 
applicable to cultures whose beliefs and practices prioritize community values at the 
expense of individual autonomy. When this occurs, international guidelines for research 
on human subjects must draw the line in respecting cross-cultural differences. In other 
words, in communities that do not provide a place for respecting individual autonomy, 
informed consent guidelines for research on human subjects must forgo respecting 
cultural differences and protect research subjects‟ ability to make an autonomous choice 
regarding medical interventions that directly impact them. I will have more to say about 
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this in Chapter 6, when I discuss the need to implement a specific safeguard for 
protecting subjects‟ autonomy in the research context. 
5.2 Social Structures 
 In the previous chapter, I concluded that only relational autonomy attends 
adequately to the ways that social structures, such as race, class, gender, and disability, 
impede autonomy. In what follows, I explain some of the restraints that result from social 
structures when it comes to international medical research on human subjects. Doing so 
illustrates the need to rely on an account of relational autonomy in this context. 
5.2.1 Dependency 
 Many who participate in research trials have a particular illness or disease. In 
research in less developed countries, those who suffer from disease and illness live in 
areas with inadequate (if any) healthcare. Even though research may not be directed 
towards treatment, participation becomes a means by which the unhealthy can get better 
healthcare than they would otherwise be able to obtain had they not participated. The 
need for medical attention increases subjects‟ reliance on researchers. This dependency 
increases subjects‟ vulnerability, making it easier for others to manipulate or coerce 
them.
8
 Although dependency and the disparate power that results from it oftentimes raise 
concerns about possible manipulation or coercion, recall from Chapter 3 that this is not 
the only way that disparate power can impede autonomy. Even in the absence of 
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manipulation or coercion, subjects may fear making certain choices if they believe that 
such choices would result in researchers providing less or no care.
9
 
In cases of research in less developed countries, the incidence of disease and 
illness are even greater. For this reason, an account of autonomy that serves to guide 
informed consent guidelines should recognize and address the negative impact that the 
combination of poor health and poor healthcare systems have on subjects‟ ability to 
exercise autonomy in the informed consent process. 
Even in cases in which subjects are not ill, they may require medical benefits 
from services that only medical professionals can provide. Again, due to the lack of 
health care resources in less developed countries, subjects may rely on medical 
professionals to monitor their well-being. For example, general health check-ups are 
oftentimes included in research protocols. 
5.2.2  Class 
Differences in levels of education and social status between researchers and 
subjects can increase the power disparity in the researcher/subject relationship. Similar to 
dependency, power disparities resulting from class differences can impede autonomy by 
increasing the ability of those with more power to manipulate or coerce those with less 
power. Also, those who are dependent on those with more power might refrain from 
making self-governed choices because they mistakenly believe that doing so will result in 
their not getting the care they need.  
                                                 
9
 In response, some might insist that the belief that researchers will not provide care if 
one makes certain decisions has a coercive effect. However, a coercive effect differs from 
coercion and manipulation. In cases of coercion and manipulation, the agent has the 
intent to alter another‟s decision. 
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Notably, power disparities resulting from differences in class oftentimes are 
present in the relationship between medical practitioners and recipients. As Sherwin 
explains: 
In most cases, the relevant interactions are between patients and 
physicians [and we could add, researchers and subjects], where, typically, 
patients have less social power than their physicians: doctors are well 
educated and they tend to be (relatively) healthy and affluent, while the 
patients they care for are often poor, and lacking in education and social 
authority. In fact, according to most of the standard dichotomies 
supporting dominance in our culture – gender, class, race, ability status – 
odds are that if there is a difference between the status of the physician 
and the patient, the physician is likely to fall on the dominant side of that 
distinction and the patient on the subordinate side.
10
 
 
In less developed countries, power differences are even greater due to subjects‟ lack of 
adequate education and healthcare. Given that research oftentimes requires subjects to 
voice concerns, questions, and objections, respect for autonomy should attend to power 
disparities that can impede subjects‟ ability to make autonomous choices in the 
researcher/subject relationship. 
When community becomes involved in the informed consent process, an account 
of autonomy must be careful to attend to differences in class between researchers and 
community and between community members and subjects. Due to the drastic differences 
in class between researchers and those in less developed countries, researchers have 
greater power in their relationship with community members. Thus, additional concerns 
come into play once we involve community in the informed consent process. In these 
cases, respect for autonomy should also include ensuring that community members are 
able to voice their concerns and questions in the informed consent process and that 
research subjects are able to voice their concerns to other community members. 
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5.2.3 Gender 
Another social structure that can negatively impact autonomy is gender. As will 
become apparent in my discussion of gender and autonomy, these problems are relevant 
to any research involving women, whether national or international. Although gender‟s 
impact is not unique to international research, it is of particular importance in the context 
of AIDS research in Africa. According to the 2008/2009 UNIFEM report, The Progress 
of the World’s Women, sub-Saharan Africa has the greatest percentage of women who 
suffer from AIDS (sixty-one percent).
11
 Not only does sub-Saharan Africa have the 
greatest percentage of women infected with AIDS, but women in that region suffer from 
AIDS much more than men. In 2007 in sub-Saharan Africa, 12 million women had HIV 
or AIDS, compared to 8.3 million men.
12
 
Despite women being more affected by AIDS than men, less women than men 
participate in AIDS research in Africa. According to a study by the International Center 
for Research on Women regarding AIDS research in East Africa, the ratio of female to 
male participants in 2007 and 2008 was 1:8.
13
 This discrepancy is due to women 
encountering gender specific barriers, which I discuss shortly. 
The smaller numbers of women in AIDS research is problematic, given that there 
are good reasons for involving (at least) an equal amount of women as men in AIDS 
research. First, due to the biological differences between men and women, it is necessary 
to test the specific ways in which AIDS and any possible treatments specifically affect 
women. Second, among the two million children affected by AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa 
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in 2007, most contracted the disease from their mothers, either in vitro, during childbirth 
or by breastfeeding.
14
 Mother-to-child-transmission (MTCT) provides additional reasons 
to want to involve more women in research. In order to better ensure women‟s autonomy 
regarding research participation, an account of autonomy that informs informed consent 
guidelines should attend to how gender can impede autonomy. 
In examining the extent to which gender influences the informed consent 
relationship, it is necessary to briefly define what I mean by gender. Whereas „sex‟ refers 
to one‟s biological constitution (male or female), „gender‟ refers to differences between 
men and women resulting from social factors, such as social role, social position, 
behavior, or identity.
15
 As a result of differences in education, socialization, and 
treatment, women are oftentimes in positions of less power in their relationships. In 
arguing that gender can negatively impact autonomy, it is important to note that I am not 
arguing that women necessarily share inherent characteristics that make them less 
capable of making autonomous choices. Instead, I am here concerned with identifying the 
results of differences in education, socialization, and so forth that oftentimes impede 
women‟s autonomy in the informed consent process, whether women are research 
subjects or are acting as part of the community that may be involved. 
In examining the effects of the social structure of gender on women, it becomes 
clear that a number of relevant factors affect women‟s autonomy. First, because gender 
maps onto poverty, women feel the negative impact of class more so than men. 
According to the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), women 
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comprise a greater percentage of the world‟s poor than men do.16 Part of this is due to the 
fact that fewer women than men are employed. In sub-Saharan Africa in 2007, fifty-four 
percent of working-age women were employed, compared to seventy-seven percent 
men.
17
 Among the women who are employed, more often than not, they do not hold 
secure employment. Eighty-one percent of women who were employed in 2007 in sub-
Saharan Africa held vulnerable employment (meaning temporary or non-contracted 
employment), compared to sixty-four percent of men.
18
 These differences in employment 
result in differences in class, which, in turn, enhance power disparities between 
researchers and women subjects, as well as between women subjects and male 
community members. 
Recall from my previous discussion of how class impedes autonomy that this 
difference in power raises two concerns with regards to subjects‟ autonomy. First, it 
makes it easier for a researcher or community members to manipulate or coerce a subject, 
thereby impeding the subject‟s autonomy. Second, a subject may refrain from making 
autonomous choices based on mistaken beliefs that the researcher (or community) will 
not act in the subject‟s best interest. Thus, based on the effects of gender, women 
oftentimes are more vulnerable to the ways that power disparities can impede autonomy 
in the research context. 
 Another impact of gender that can impede women‟s autonomy is the fact that many 
women are in relationships in which men control them. A majority of abuse victims are 
women. According to the UNIFEM report, Violence against Women: Facts and Figures: 
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In no country in the world are women safe from this type of [domestic] 
violence. Out of ten counties surveyed in a 2005 study by the World 
Health Organization (WHO), more than 50 percent of women in 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Peru and Tanzania reported having been subjected 
to physical or sexual violence by intimate partners, with figures reaching 
staggering 71 percent in rural Ethiopia.
19
 
 
In addition to domestic violence, women suffer from additional forms of violence: rape, 
trafficking, and violence that have become part of social practices, such as dowry 
murders, genital mutilation, and honour killings.
20
 This cycle of abuse oftentimes leaves 
women less able to determine and exercise their own choices, diminishing their ability to 
exercise autonomy. 
 Moreover, instances in which women report a decreased ability to exercise 
autonomy are not limited to overtly abusive relationships. In a study of women infected 
with HIV, Pulerwitz, Gortmaker, and DeJong noted that there was an increased incidence 
of HIV infection among women who reported being controlled by their male partners.
21
 
This is due to the fact that women in relationships in which men control them do not feel 
empowered to ask their partners to use condoms. 
In addition to altering the power dynamics between researchers and subjects, 
gender also impacts women in relation to community. Because many communities are 
patriarchal ones, including community in the informed consent process raises additional 
concerns about the extent to which women‟s voices are heard, either as research subjects 
or non-subject community members who are participating in the informed consent 
process. This concern is exemplified by a research study supported by the United Nations 
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Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) that studied the perinatal AIDS transmission in 
developing countries, including Thailand, the Ivory Coast, and Uganda. In an attempt to 
be sensitive to community values, researchers consulted community leaders. The 
resultant research protocol included measuring a placebo group of pregnant women with 
HIV/AIDS against a group who were given levels of AZT (zidovudin) that were below 
the standard level of care in the United States. After the details of the research were made 
public, concerns arose regarding the exploitation of the women who comprised the pool 
of research subjects. In response to these concerns, spokespersons from the nations and 
agencies involved in the research defended the researchers‟ actions by pointing out that 
they had consulted local community leaders prior to constructing the protocol. 
Regardless whether community leaders were consulted, we have good reason to 
question the extent to which the women in the community would have chosen a trial in 
which subjects received no AZT. Because AZT is a proven treatment for fetal AIDS 
transmission,
22
 some objected to researchers‟ use of placebos.23 They insisted that it was 
in the women‟s best interest to compare lower level doses of AZT to the higher doses that 
were given in previous studies in order to determine the effectiveness of lower level 
doses. Thus, many concluded that community leaders did not choose what was in the 
research subjects‟ best interest.24 Regardless of how one thinks the female research 
subjects would have chosen, it is important to note that the only way to ensure that the 
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women subjects would have made the same choice as community leaders is to structure 
informed consent guidelines so that they include mechanisms by which women‟s voices 
can be heard. 
Even when women do not suffer from an illness or disease that is being 
researched, the diseases and illnesses that plague a community oftentimes have more of 
an affect on women than men in the community. As the UNIFEM report, Care-giving in 
the Context of HIV/AIDS, explains, “Around the world, gender norms assign women the 
primary role in caring for people who are ill and dying from HIV and AIDS, along with 
the orphans left behind”.25 Due to lack of adequate health care, UNIFEM estimates that 
ninety percent of the care for those suffering from HIV/AIDS occurs in the home, where 
women are the primary care providers.
26
 In 2003 in South Africa, women headed 
seventy-one percent of the households with orphaned children.
27
 This additional 
caregiving burden results in women having less time and energy to participate in the 
informed consent process. Because they are most affected by the diseases to which the 
majority of research is directed and because their voices are oftentimes not heard within 
communities, it is extremely important that informed consent guidelines make provisions 
for women to have a powerful voice in the informed consent process when community is 
involved. 
 As I have explained, gender oftentimes can impede women‟s autonomy in the 
informed consent process in research on human subjects. To summarize, gender can 
negatively impact women‟s autonomy due to: (1) differences in education and wealth; (2) 
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abusive or controlling relationships; (3) patriarchal practices and traditions within the 
community; and (4) bearing the burden for caring for the ill and diseased within the 
community. The concern is that these can decrease women‟s ability to exercise autonomy 
in the informed consent process, whether as a research subject or as a community 
member. As I have explained, these problems are prominent in AIDS research on women 
in Africa, the specific context with which I am concerned. With this in mind, we have 
good reason to insist that an account of respect for autonomy should attend to how gender 
can impede autonomy in the context of research on human subjects. 
5.2.4 Liberalism‟s Impact 
Although relational autonomy theorists have focused on the impact of social 
structures within particular societies, it is important also to take into account the fact that 
we are part of a global community. Consequently, respect for autonomy in international 
contexts requires an examination of the negative impact that global social structures can 
have on autonomy. In the context of international policy, the West‟s adherence to 
liberalism influences how policy is formulated. My arguments regarding how the 
majority of the current informed consent guidelines for international research on human 
subjects reflect a philosophical foundation of a traditional autonomy account are meant to 
illustrate the overall effect that the West‟s influence has had on international policy.  
Specifically, the West‟s adherence to liberalism is reflected in informed consent 
being framed as a contract between researchers and subjects. Recall, from Chapter 2, that 
the tenants of liberalism ontologically prioritize the individual over the community, 
insisting that respect for individual liberty should be prioritized. The contract model of 
informed consent focuses on the individual and emphasizes the need to respect individual 
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liberty. Based on this model, subjects should be free to either consent or dissent to 
participate in research once they have received the relevant information. Many have 
argued that the framing of informed consent as a contract mistakenly assumes that 
medical practitioners and patients are “comparably situated independent contractors”.28 
Yet, as I have explained, researchers and subjects are not equally situated due to 
differences in race, class, gender, and disability. Recall that I presented two primary 
reasons for being concerned with disparate power as it affects autonomy. First, disparate 
power enables the more powerful party, such as researchers or physicians, to coerce or 
manipulate those who are dependent on their care. Second, disparate power can impede 
autonomy in the absence of coercion, as when subjects operate from fear and mistaken 
beliefs that certain choices might result in researchers terminating their care. In Chapter 
9, I explain which current informed consent guidelines reflect the Western liberal framing 
of informed consent as a contract. For now, I am introducing the notion that framing 
informed consent according to the contract model reflects the impact of global social 
structures and harms subjects because it overlooks the ways that disparate power can 
impede autonomy. 
In response to problems with the contract model of consent, some have proposed 
addressing interactions involving disparate power from an ethic of care. Virginia Held 
and Sarah Ruddick propose a model that reflects a mothering/parenting relationship, 
wherein the more powerful person is motivated to protect or advance the less powerful 
person‟s best interest.29 Joan Tronto‟s consent-as-authority, which I address in Chapter 8, 
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represents a model of consent that relies on an ethic of care. As I explain, her proposal is 
problematic and ends up harming vulnerable persons. 
As an alternative to relying on an ethic of care model, I suggest a model that 
differs from both the contract and care models. Rather than posit the parties as equally 
positioned (as the contract model does) and rather than resting the relationship on the 
subject‟s trust in the researcher (as the care model does), I propose making the research 
process more participatory by identifying and attending to power disparities between 
researchers, subjects, and communities. 
5.3 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I explained why relational autonomy is the best account of 
autonomy in the context of international research on human subjects. To do so, I 
presented two arguments regarding why we should rely on an account of relational 
autonomy in this context. First, I highlighted the global applicability of relational 
autonomy by explaining how it best addresses an African account of the person, called 
the Akan. After explaining why the Akan would be among those who wish to include 
community in the informed consent process, I argued that involving community 
highlights the need to attend to how social structures affect autonomy. Given the fact that 
only relational autonomy adequately addresses the ways that social structures impede 
autonomy, I concluded that it is the best general account of autonomy for addressing the 
Akan account of the person. 
 To further emphasize the benefits of relying on an account of autonomy that 
adequately attends to the ways in which social structures impede autonomy, I presented a 
second line of argument in which I described the particular social structures that come 
112 
 
into play in the context of international research on human subjects, focusing especially 
on those from less developed countries. In doing so, I explained how dependency, class, 
gender, and Western liberalism‟s influence on how informed consent has been framed as 
a contract negatively impact subjects‟ autonomy. Once again, because only relational 
autonomy adequately attends to these problems, I concluded that it is the best general 
account of autonomy as this relates to informed consent in international research on 
human subjects. 
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Chapter 6: Ethical Conditions for Respecting Autonomy 
My aim in this chapter is to arrive at a set of minimally sufficient conditions of a practice 
for promoting subjects‟ autonomy in research on human subjects. No set of ethical 
conditions can completely ensure subjects‟ autonomy. Some of the problems regarding 
social structures require more than ethical guidelines to remedy. Remedying inequalities, 
such as scarce health care resources, may require aid from other countries and 
restructuring within less developed countries at the government level. Due to the AIDS 
pandemic in Africa, however, researchers should continue research while doing their best 
to ensure subjects‟ autonomy. The fact that some of the problems that deal with social 
inequalities and poverty will take a long time to resolve provides further reason to 
construct a set of ethical conditions that can guide researchers in working as ethically as 
possible within the constraints of a hierarchical and impoverished society. 
In comprising a set of ethical conditions, I aim to arrive at a set of minimally 
sufficient conditions that leave enough flexibility for adapting informed consent 
guidelines to particular cultural contexts. To arrive at this list, I analyze the following 
ethical conditions to determine how well they ensure respect for autonomy in 
international research on human subjects: critical reflection, support mechanisms, and 
participation.  
I begin by examining critical reflection, which, you may recall from Chapter 2, all 
autonomy theorists agree is necessary for autonomy. I briefly explain the need for all 
those in the research process to reflect critically on their beliefs, values, and choices as 
these relate to the research process.  
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Next, I address the ethical conditions that others have introduced, implementing 
support mechanisms and including research subjects and community in various aspects of 
the research process, or what I am calling participation. In analyzing each, I address the 
extent to which each attends to the internal and external restraints that arise from social 
structures, or differences in race, class, gender, and disability, which I previously 
introduced in Chapter 3. Since the ethical conditions I will examine have been introduced 
in the general medical context, I analyze the extent to which each might be useful in the 
context of international research on human subjects. In doing so, I argue that neither is 
sufficient in itself for respecting autonomy in the research context. I also explain why 
relying on critical reflection alone is problematic.  
Having argued against relying on just one of the previously proposed ethical 
conditions, I explain why combining critical reflection, support mechanisms, and 
participation also fails to adequately respect autonomy in international research on human 
subjects. With this in mind, I end the chapter by arguing that we must supplement these 
conditions with additional ones in order to arrive at a list of minimally sufficient ethical 
conditions for ensuring subjects‟ autonomy in medical research. 
6.1 Requiring Critical Reflection 
As I mentioned in Chapter 2, most autonomy theorists, regardless of what general 
type of account they present, agree that autonomous choice necessarily involves some 
degree of critical reflection of one‟s beliefs, values, and choices. Given the importance of 
critical reflection, one might assume that informed consent guidelines for research on 
human subjects include guidelines for this. However, even the most progressive 
guidelines, the CIOMS Ethical Guidelines, only briefly refer to the need for subjects to 
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consider their choices.
1
 Notably, there is no mention of the need for researchers and 
community members to reflect critically on their beliefs, values, and choices, including 
how their failure to do so can impede autonomy in the research context. As a result, we 
must add guidelines that require and guide critical reflection for all those involved in the 
research process. This is a task I attend to in Chapter 10. Prior to doing so, it is necessary 
for me to briefly explain what already may be apparent to most, the need for critical 
reflection in the context of research on human subjects.
2
 After doing so, I lay out the 
ethical condition that deals with critical reflection, which provides the basis for my 
proposed guideline in Chapter 10. 
Because I am concerned with cultures in which subjects wish to include 
community in the research process, an account of critical reflection is of utmost 
importance. Given the emphasis on community, we must be wary that the choices that a 
research subject makes are ones that she has critically reflected on and not ones that she 
follows as a result of being pressured to blindly adopt the values and beliefs that society 
has provided her. In addition, if community members are involved, they too should 
reflect critically on their beliefs, values, and choices as a means of reflecting on how their 
mistaken beliefs might impede others‟ autonomy and in order to better ensure that their 
own choices are self-governed ones. So as to better ensure that subjects and community 
have reflected critically on their choices, they should be allotted a reasonable amount of 
time in which to critically think about their beliefs, values, and desires prior to making a 
decision. 
                                                 
1
 CIOMS 2002, Commentary on Guideline 4. 
2
 This most likely is already apparent given my explanation in Chapter 2 regarding why 
autonomy requires critical reflection. 
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In addition to requiring the research subject and, when applicable, community 
members to reflect critically on their choices, it is important for the researcher also to 
exercise critical reflection. Prior to presenting research subjects with the relevant 
information to be able to make an informed decision regarding their participation in a 
research trial, researchers have already chosen the particular medical issue, formulated 
the research protocol, and calculated the type of information that they deem to be 
adequate for obtaining subjects‟ informed consent. The common belief is that, in order 
for research to be untainted and equitable, researchers can, and should, address these 
issues as unemotional, disinterested persons. Given this common belief, it is important to 
acknowledge that researchers may be influenced by their emotions and biases.
3
 
Consequently, they should deliberatively reflect on their choices, being especially wary 
to identify the ways in which they might have allowed biases regarding race, class, 
gender, and disability to influence their structuring of the research protocol. In doing so, 
they should ask to what extent possible stereotypes impede their ability to recognize 
subjects‟ competency. For example, Susan Sherwin points out that women, racial 
minorities, indigenous people, those with disabilities, welfare recipients, and people from 
developing countries oftentimes are presumed to lack the requisite rationality for making 
autonomous decisions.
4
 In addition, researchers should ask if possible stereotypes have 
negatively influenced their determination of what constitutes relevant and adequate 
information that must be provided in obtaining subjects‟ informed consent to participate 
                                                 
3
 Baylis, Downie, Sherwin 1998, 236. 
4
 Sherwin 1998, 26. 
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in the research trial by, for example, mistakenly underestimating the level of 
understanding that subjects may have of the relevant information.
5
  
As with the ethical condition regarding subjects‟ critical reflection, an ethical 
condition regarding researchers would state the importance of critical reflection and 
require researchers to implement this. In doing so, it can provide suggestions for things 
on which researchers should deliberate, such as how possible stereotypes might have 
influenced how they structure the research protocol or how they have determined what 
constitutes adequate information for the purpose of obtaining informed consent. 
6.2 Previously Proposed Ethical Conditions 
In this section, I explain the ethical conditions that relational autonomy theorists 
have proposed for respecting autonomy, support mechanisms and participation. In cases 
in which the condition has been introduced in a medical context other than the research 
setting, I first explain how the theorist intended its use in the initial medical context. I 
then analyze the extent to which it might be useful for promoting subjects‟ autonomy in 
the research setting. 
6.2.1 Support Mechanisms 
As a means of ensuring respect for autonomy, some have proposed providing 
support systems for those who are less powerful in medical relationships, such as patients 
or research subjects. Although they have presented this as a solution for remedying power 
disparities (which, recall, raises concerns about coercion), I believe that support 
mechanisms also attend to two other problems regarding subjects‟ autonomy. Providing 
                                                 
5
 Ibid, 26 and 44. 
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subjects with support can help them identify internalized oppressive beliefs and desires 
that impede their ability to make self-governed choices. It also can benefit subjects by 
helping them develop some of the requisite autonomy skills they may be lacking as a 
result of how they have been socialized based on their race, class, gender, or disability. 
After explaining the various proposals that others have made regarding providing support 
for less powerful individuals in medical decision-making contexts, I explain how 
implementing this condition in the research setting attends to these three problems. 
Support as an Ethical Condition 
 
In order to ensure respect for autonomy in the medical context, Susan Sherwin 
recommends providing patients support in the form of counseling. Notably, her focus is 
on patients from oppressed groups. As she explains, such patients oftentimes have not 
had the opportunity to make autonomous choices in other areas of their lives due to their 
oppressed positions in society. As a result, they may require more counseling than other 
patients. Counselors can assist patients from vulnerable populations in understanding that 
medical decisions are theirs to make and help them more fully develop some of the 
necessary skills for autonomy, such as self-assertion.
6
 Although her focus is on oppressed 
populations, she also believes that counseling can help patients in general. Because there 
oftentimes is a power disparity between patients and doctors, counseling can help patients 
identify and voice their concerns and choices. 
Allow me to add that, in all cases, support should be offered as an option for 
patients and should never be forced on someone simply because she is a member of an 
oppressed group. Requiring those from oppressed populations to participate in counseling 
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 Sherwin 1998, 42-3. 
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or support groups as a necessary condition for providing valid consent further perpetuates 
their oppression by mistakenly assuming that all members are unable to provide valid 
consent without the help of support groups. Although people from oppressed populations 
are predisposed to suffer from internal restraints, such as internalized oppression and not 
fully developed autonomy skills, not all members suffer this fate. Moreover, among those 
who experience internalized oppression and not fully developed autonomy skills, some 
will be able to provide valid consent while others cannot. For this reason, it is best to 
offer patients the opportunity for counseling or to participate in support groups rather 
than mandate that they do so. 
Support in the Research Setting 
 Notably, the need for, and the benefits derived from, providing support 
mechanisms is as relevant to the research context as it is to the doctor/patient 
relationship. As I explained in Chapter 3, differences in gender and class between 
researchers and subjects oftentimes result in subjects having less power. In addition, the 
way that subjects have been socialized as members of vulnerable populations can mean 
that they have difficulty making self-governed decisions. As I explained, this can be due 
to their adopting mistaken beliefs about themselves based on their group membership, 
which can lead to what I referred to as internalized oppression. It also can result from not 
having been raised to develop fully some of the requisite autonomy skills due to their 
socialization as members of an oppressed race, class, gender, or disability. 
Counselors or support groups can assist research subjects from vulnerable 
populations in addressing these problems. First, they can help them in reflecting critically 
on their identities and beliefs to identify internalized oppressive beliefs. They also can 
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help subjects to more fully develop autonomy skills, such as self-assertion, self-trust, and 
self-worth. So as to respect the autonomy of members of oppressed groups, counselors 
should not assume to be able to speak for others. Instead, their role is to assist people in 
more fully developing skills that they might not have fully developed due to oppressive 
socialization. Finally, having counselors or support groups back subjects‟ choices can 
help balance the power difference between subjects and researchers or community.
7
 
Addressing an Objection 
Although support systems can better promote subjects‟ autonomy, some might 
object to their use on practical grounds. Some of the support systems, such as hiring 
counselors, cost money. Some might insist that requiring researchers to pay for these 
services will discourage them from conducting research on vulnerable populations. Given 
the benefits of research, such as health monitoring and benefit sharing,
8
 the concern is 
that requiring researchers to pay for support systems might end up being 
counterproductive. 
Prior to presenting a possible solution to this problem, I wish to emphasize the 
extent to which current policy and practice reflects the need to conduct research in less 
developed countries. This allows us to see the larger context of support that underlies 
                                                 
7
 Notably, some of the current guidelines emphasize the need for researchers to hire 
professionals to provide support for subjects as a means of attending to the fact that 
people from vulnerable populations have more difficulty making self-governed choices in 
the research context. For example, the Federal Code of Regulations (otherwise known as 
the Common Rule) authorizes Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) to appoint third parties 
to oversee the consent process. (HHS 2005, Title 45, Part 46.109[e].) 
8
 Benefit sharing refers to sharing the results of research, such as drugs to treat disease, 
with the community at large. 
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further pleas for increasing research expenditures in order to better ensure respect for 
subjects‟ autonomy in research in less developed countries. 
First, many of the guidelines for international research include provisions that 
declare that researchers have an ethical obligation to conduct research in less developed 
countries. For example, the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights states 
that part of researchers‟ ethical obligation is to conduct research in less developed 
countries as a means of “promot[ing] equitable access to medical.. technologies… with 
particular attention to the needs of developing countries.”9 Similarly, the CIOMS Ethical 
Guidelines state that justice calls for researchers to “be responsive to the health 
conditions or needs of vulnerable subjects”, 10 including those from underdeveloped 
countries.
11
 
Second, researchers already conduct a lot of research in less developed countries. 
In fact, their interest in doing so has increased over the years. From 1998 to 2000, 
research on human subjects in less developed countries tripled.
12
 Although this reflects 
researchers‟ current desire to conduct research in less developed countries, it is difficult 
to determine whether the additional cost of providing support mechanisms would cause a 
decrease in the amount of research in less developed countries. 
This brings me to my proposed solution. If it turned out that the additional cost of 
support mechanisms would deter researchers, a possible solution is to revise current 
policy to redirect money that is spent on unnecessary policy requirements. Although it is 
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 UNESCO 2005, Article 2 (f). 
10
 CIOMS 2002, General Ethical Principles, 18. 
11
 Ibid, Background, 8. 
12
 Carpentier 2000. 
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beyond the scope of this dissertation to perform a budgetary analysis of research 
expenditures, some have insisted that many of the current IRB requirements are 
redundant, adding unnecessary additional expenses for researchers.
13
 With this in mind, 
one possible solution would be to revise IRB requirements to avoid this redundancy. This 
then would make funds available for support mechanisms for vulnerable subjects. 
6.2.2 Participation 
Another ethical condition that others have presented as a means of ensuring 
subjects‟ autonomy in research is to include subjects and community in various stages of 
research.
14
 I will refer to this ethical condition as „participation‟. Although those who 
have proposed this condition oftentimes refer to their proposal as implementing a 
democratic process, I explain how their proposals fail to ensure that research is a 
successful democratic process. In other words, despite their insistence that having 
subjects and community participate in various stages of research enables them to have an 
equal say in research decisions, I explain how this fails in practice. As I explain in the 
next section, we need more than just declaring that subjects and community should be 
involved in order to ensure their active participation in the research process. 
Consequently, the proposal to involve subjects and community in various research stages 
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ensuring that the research process is 
democratic in practice. 
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 Gilman and Garcia 2004. 
14
 For arguments regarding the need to have patients more involved in the various stages 
of decision-making in areas of Medicine beyond medical research, see Sherwin 1998; 
Donchin 1998 and 2000; and Eckenwiler, et. al. 2008. In addition to the medical context, 
relational autonomy theorists have argued for making aspects of the legal process more 
participatory. (See Minow and Shanley 2001 and Nedelsky 1989.) 
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A primary problem that increasing participation is intended to address is the 
disparate power between researchers and subjects. Recall from Chapter 3 that, among all 
of the dichotomies regarding power, education, class, race, gender, and disability, 
researchers are most often on the dominant side. Subjects‟ less powerful position in the 
researcher/subject relationship raises concerns that vulnerable subjects are more easily 
coerced or manipulated. Yet, also recall not all concerns about disparate power deal with 
coercion and manipulation. Vulnerable subjects may feel intimidated to provide valuable 
input in the research process. For example, subjects with little education may feel 
uncomfortable asking questions regarding details of the protocol that they need in order 
to make an informed choice. When subjects wish to include community in their decisions 
regarding research participation, subjects with less power than community members are 
more open to coercion and to feeling that they cannot or should not provide their input. 
In addition to involving subjects and community during the research trial, some 
argue that they also should be involved in the pre-trial stages of research. Notably, 
“subjects” in this stage differ from the subjects involved during the research trial itself. In 
the pre-trial stage, researchers do not know which individuals will participate in the 
research trial. However, the specific illness, disease, or disability towards which the 
research is directed narrows down the pool of possible participants. In referring to subject 
participation in the pre-trial stage, I am referring to this group of potential participants. 
One of the problems that including subjects in the pre-trial stages of research is 
intended to overcome is the problem of unjustly limited options that can impede subjects‟ 
autonomy. Recall from Chapter 3 that what makes unjustly limited options problematic 
for autonomy is not that they limit a person‟s choices per se but that the limitations result 
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from unfair discriminatory practices in society. When a person‟s options are unjustly 
limited in this way, she is unable to choose among options that she otherwise would be 
able to which reflect her values and what she believes is in her best interest. 
Some might insist that problems relating to unjustly limited options fall under the 
domain of social justice and the ways in which this can affect autonomy. However, 
relational autonomy theorists insist that issues of social injustices that bear on autonomy 
also should be addressed within a principle of respect for autonomy. While relational 
autonomy theorists acknowledge that the principle of justice should attend to problems 
regarding unjustly limited options, they also insist that these issues should be attended to 
within the principle of autonomy as a means of recognizing and attending to how one‟s 
social context inescapably bears on one‟s autonomy. 
Notably, problems regarding unjustly limited options can occur as early as the 
pre-trial stages of research. Prior to beginning the research trial, researchers determine 
which options they will make available to subjects. Recall from Chapter 3 that this raises 
concerns regarding researchers failing to reflect critically on possible mistaken beliefs, 
such as racist, sexist or classist beliefs, which can result in their providing research 
options that are unjustly limited for certain populations.
15
 Involving subjects in the pre-
trial stages of research enables them to act as a checks and balances against unjustly 
limited options by identifying and providing valuable input regarding mistaken beliefs 
about the characteristics of potential research subjects. 
                                                 
15
 Although some of the options include post-trial activities that directly affect the 
subject, such as continued monitoring and support, the decision whether and to what 
extent to make this option available is determined prior to beginning the research. 
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In addition, some add that the traditional approach of having researchers 
formulate the agenda and present it to subjects for their approval or disapproval 
problematically posits researchers as active agents and subjects as passive agents, further 
perpetuating power differences between them.
16
 Baylis, Downie and Sherwin suggest a 
model of “pursuing research as a collegial activity; under this model, subject-participants 
and researcher-participants collectively negotiate the terms of participation and the goals 
of the activity”.17 Having subjects actively participate in the formulation of the research 
protocol is  intended to make the research process more democratic by having subjects 
and researchers work together to balance the relevant needs of all participants. For 
example, subjects can provide input regarding their beliefs and values and how these 
might best be respected while balancing these considerations with researchers‟ interests 
regarding budgetary restraints and testing the efficacy of particular treatment 
alternatives.
18,19
 
In addition to involving subjects, some insist that community should be involved 
in the formulation stage. According to Eckenwiler, Feinholz, Ells, and Schonfeld, lay 
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 Baylis, Downie and Sherwin 1998. 
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 Ibid. 
18
 As I previously pointed out in Chapter 3, given the differences in race, class, gender, 
and disability that oftentimes exist between researchers and subjects, researchers are 
unlikely to understand what may be in subjects‟ best interest (see Sherwin 1998, 42). 
Subjects who are involved in the pre-trial stage can assist researchers by providing this 
necessary information. 
19
 Because the aim of research is to acquire generalizable knowledge about a particular 
disease, some might insist that researchers are not concerned with looking out for the 
subjects‟ best interest. However, the current guidelines attend to the concern that 
researchers must balance their goal of acquiring generalizable knowledge with the 
obligation to look out for the subjects‟ best interest, oftentimes insisting that the latter 
take priority. (See, for example, the Declaration of Helsinki (A:6); the CIOMS Ethical 
Guidelines (GL8); and the Belmont Report (C:2). 
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people in the community “often have rich perspectives when it comes to important 
research questions and to the values that might be at stake in a proposed project”.20 Thus, 
obtaining community input in the pre-trial stage can help researchers better understand 
values and concerns that may be important to potential subjects. 
Despite the purported benefits of involving subjects and community in the pre-
trial stages of research, some might object. There appear to be two primary arguments 
against involving subjects and community in the early stages of research. First, doing so 
involves additional expenditures of time and money. My response here is similar to my 
response to those who object to paying for support mechanisms for vulnerable 
populations that I presented earlier in this chapter. We can change current guidelines to 
remove current unnecessary redundancies. This would enable researchers to use this 
money to implement guidelines that reflect more productive ethical conditions that ensure 
respect for autonomy in research on human subjects, such as funding support groups and 
paying for the additional time and effort required to make research more participatory. 
Aside from the additional time and money it would take to involve subjects and 
community in the pre-trial stages, some might object in the name of science, so to speak. 
They may be concerned that involving lay people in the planning stages of research taints 
the scientific structuring of the research trial. Researchers have the medical training to 
understand how to structure a research trial, while subjects and community members 
most likely do not. 
Although researchers have the medical knowledge that is needed to structure 
certain aspects of the research protocol, they may be ill-equipped to deal with other 
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 Eckenwiler, et. al. 2008,163. 
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aspects that go into formulating a research trial that respects subjects‟ autonomy. Recall 
that current guidelines require researchers to act in the subjects‟ best interest. Yet, given 
the differences in race, class, gender, and disability between researchers and subjects that 
I pointed out in Chapter 5, researchers may be unable to adequately determine what is in 
subjects‟ best interest. This holds true with regards to differences between researchers 
and community too. Having subjects and community involved in the pre-trial stage to 
provide this information can assist researchers in formulating more equitable 
compensation and care. Thus, involving subjects and community in the pre-trial stage 
does not taint the research process; in fact, it enhances the overall process by providing 
necessary, albeit non-medical, information for formulating the research protocol. 
Involving subjects and community in the pre-trial stage also helps researchers 
arrive at a research trial that respects subjects‟ autonomy by providing a checks and 
balances against racist, sexist, etc. tendencies. Recall from my discussion earlier in this 
chapter that involving subjects and community in the pre-trial stages of research can help 
identify racist, sexist, and classist beliefs from which the researcher may be operating and 
to correct for these. Hence, contrary to the concern that involving lay people in the pre-
trial stages of research will impede the formulation of the research trial, doing so brings 
many benefits that can lead to a research trial that better ensures respect for subjects‟ 
autonomy. 
6.3 Problems with Relying on Just One of the Proposed Conditions 
Having explained the ethical conditions that others have proposed, I am now in a 
position to be able to analyze the extent to which relying on any one of these adequately 
attends to critical reflection and to the negative influences of social structures. Recall that 
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critical reflection is important because it helps people identify mistaken beliefs that 
impact their choices. In addition, social structures can negatively impact subjects‟ 
autonomy in many ways. The way in which one is socialized based on their race, class, or 
gender can result in internalized oppression and in not developing fully some of the 
requisite skills for autonomy. Also, racism, sexism, and classism can result in subjects 
having far less power in relation to researchers and community members. It can also 
result in unjustly limited options, which affect subjects‟ choices. 
Although the proposals for requiring critical reflection, incorporating support 
groups, and increasing subject and community participation attend to these to some 
degree, none adequately attends to these problems on its own. In what follows, I explain 
how relying on any one these conditions fails. In the next section, I consider whether a 
combination of the previously proposed conditions adequately attends to these concerns. 
6.3.1 Critical Reflection 
As I previously mentioned in my discussion of critical reflection, this is an 
important condition of autonomous choice. However, critical reflection in itself is 
insufficient for promoting that subjects‟ choices regarding research participation are self-
governed ones. Due to problems that arise from social structures, subjects may not be 
able to adequately reflect on their beliefs, values, and choices to determine whether these 
are in their best interest. For example, problems arising from oppressive socialization, 
such as internalized oppression or not having fully developed some of the skills necessary 
for autonomy, can impede their critical reflection. Consequently, additional ethical 
conditions are needed to attend to the problems that arise from social structures. 
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6.3.2 Support Mechanisms 
 Recall that support mechanisms include support groups and counselors. These are 
intended to remedy several of the problems that arise from social structures. First, support 
groups and counselors can assist subjects in identifying internalized oppressive beliefs. 
Second, they can help subjects develop some of the requisite skills for autonomy that 
they may be lacking as a result of having been socialized as members of oppressed 
groups. Third, support can strengthen subjects‟ ability to voice their concerns and express 
their choices in what otherwise is an imbalanced relationship with researchers and 
community members. 
Despite these many attributes, support mechanisms are too limited when relied on 
as the only ethical condition to ensure respect for autonomy. The reason is that these 
mechanisms are bound by the current structure of research; if research only invites 
subjects‟ input during the research trial stage, then support mechanisms cannot come into 
play to assist with problems that arise in the pre-trial stages of research. Yet, as I have 
explained, subjects‟ input is needed in the pre-trial stage in order to assist researchers in 
understanding what may be in the subjects‟ best interest when formulating the research 
protocol and in identifying racist, sexist, etc. beliefs that might unjustly limit the options 
offered as part of the research. 
6.3.3 Participation 
Whereas support fails to attend to unjustly limited options and inadequate 
information, recall that these are two of the problems that participation is supposed to 
address. In addition, the proposal to increase subject and community participation also is 
directed towards remedying power disparities between subjects, researchers, and 
130 
 
community. Recall that what I have been referring to as the ethical condition of 
participation refers to the recommendation to include subjects and community in the pre-
trial and research trial stages of research. The degree to which this condition addresses 
the problems to which it is directed (gathering adequate information, addressing power 
disparities, and attending to unjustly limited options) depends on whether subjects and 
community are able to provide input in the various research stages in practice. 
Notably, inviting subjects and community to participate in the pre-trial and trial 
stages of research does not necessarily mean that they will become active participants. As 
Jennifer Nedelsky points out: 
Stipulating these requirements does not make them a reality. In particular, 
it does not mean that [participants] actually take an active part, that they 
are listened to, or that they feel as though they are actors in the decision-
making rather than (indirect) subjects of it.
21
 
 
To illustrate these problems, Nedelsky examines the efficacy of implementing a federal 
law that is aimed at protecting handicapped children and respecting parents‟ autonomy 
regarding decisions about their children‟s education (Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act, P.L. 94-142). Part of the provisions of the law includes fostering a 
democratic process for making educational decisions about handicapped children in state 
funded schools, including “requiring ongoing participation by the parents in the decision-
making, flexibility, individual tailoring of programs, hearings, and full rights of 
appeal”.22 Despite these provisions, a case study by Joseph A. Handler shows that 
attempts to have parents actively participate in the decision-making process failed in 
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many of the schools.
23
 The measure of success for making the decision-making process 
more democratic was the degree of parental involvement in discussions regarding how to 
structure educational programs for their children. The most common reason cited for the 
failure to meet this goal was that parents were unable to exercise their autonomy due to 
power differences between them and members of the educational community. Hence, 
despite specific provisions for including parent participation, power disparities continued 
to impede parents‟ autonomy. This illustrates that relying on formal provisions for 
increasing participation is insufficient for addressing disparate power in the informed 
consent relationship. 
In addition to encountering problems in practice with regards to remedying power 
disparities, inviting subjects and community to provide input in the pre-trial and research 
stage does not attend to problems arising from oppressive socialization. Recall that 
oppressive socialization impedes autonomy when it results in internalized oppression and 
in not fully developed autonomy skills. Even if subjects get to provide input in the 
various stages of research, there is no guarantee that their input will not reflect 
internalized oppressive beliefs. Also, they may be provided the opportunity to provide 
input but may fail to do so due to their not having fully developed some of the skills for 
autonomy, such as self-trust and self-assertiveness. Similar problems regarding 
internalized oppression and not fully developed autonomy skills arise with community 
members who are members of oppressed groups. Thus, the ethical condition of insisting 
that subjects and community provide input in the pre-trial and research stages does not, in 
itself, ensure respect for their autonomy. 
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 Nedelsky utilizes information from Joseph A. Handler, The Conditions of Discretions: 
Autonomy, Community, Bureaucracy (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986). 
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6.4 Arriving at a List of Minimally Sufficient Ethical Conditions 
Although none of the conditions is sufficient in itself for respecting relational 
autonomy, some might argue that a combination adequately promotes subjects‟ autonomy 
as it relates to informed consent in research. Recall that the various conditions that 
relational theorists have proposed are critical reflection, support, and participation. 
Let us examine how these might work together to promote autonomy. First, those 
involved in the research process would reflect critically on their beliefs and values in 
order to identify mistaken beliefs that can impede autonomy. Researchers would check 
that they were not unjustly limiting subjects‟ option based on mistaken stereotypes. 
Subjects would reflect on their beliefs and values as a means of checking that these are 
self-chosen and do not result from coercion or manipulation. 
Support mechanisms would assist subjects in their critical reflection. Support 
groups and counselors would help subjects identify oppressive beliefs that they may have 
internalized. In addition, these support mechanisms would help subjects more fully 
develop some of the requisite skills for making an autonomous choice, such as self-
worth, feelings of competency, self-assertion, and self-trust. 
Finally, the ethical condition, participation, would enable subjects, and in some 
cases community, to be involved in the pre-trial stage of research, providing researchers 
with information regarding the values and concerns of subjects and community so as to 
arrive at a more equitable research protocol. In addition, subjects would continue to 
provide their input throughout the duration of the trial, so as to balance power disparities. 
Support mechanisms would be available during these times to further assist subjects in 
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identifying oppressive beliefs and nurturing autonomy skills to assist them in providing 
their input. 
Initially, combining the three ethical conditions seems to attend to the various 
problems that can impede autonomy. Critical reflection enables people to reflect on their 
beliefs, values, and choices as a means of making them one‟s own, so to speak. Although 
critical reflection fails to attend to problems that arise from social structures, support 
mechanisms and participation are directed towards remedying these problems. Adding 
support mechanisms attends to problems that arise from oppressive socialization, such as 
internalized oppression and not fully developing necessary autonomy skills, which can 
impede autonomy. Including subjects and community in various stages of the research 
process is directed towards the remaining problems that arise from social structures, 
unjustly limited options and disparate power. Recall that including input from subjects, 
and when applicable community, helps reduce the likelihood of unjustly limited options. 
Including subjects and community in the pre-trial stage and during the trial aims to 
remedy power differences between them and researchers, thereby addressing the problem 
of disparate power. With this in mind, it appears that combining these ethical conditions 
promotes subjects‟ autonomy in the context of research on human subjects. 
Despite the initial appeal, however, this combination is still insufficient.  
Recall from Handler‟s analysis of implementing the federal law for educating 
handicapped children that formal requirements for participation do not ensure the actual 
inclusion of all participants. Therefore, what we need are conditions that can better 
promote subjects, and when applicable, community participation. 
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6.4.1 The Need for an Additional Condition 
In order to understand what else is required for respecting people‟s relational 
autonomy, it will help to examine a case in which people were able to make autonomous 
choices amidst many of the impediments to autonomy that I have been discussing. In the 
previous section, I referred to Handler‟s analysis of implementing a federal law meant to 
respect parents‟ autonomy in the educational decision-making process for their handicap 
children. Among the different school systems that Handler surveyed, the schools in 
Madison, Wisconsin were the only ones who created an environment that fostered 
parents‟ autonomy in the decision-making process.24 Their success can be attributed to 
specific methodological differences. Some aspects of their method include conditions 
already presented, while others provide insight into what additions we can make to our 
list. 
Recall that the ethical condition of participation included having participants 
provide input in the pre-trial stage. Schools in Madison incorporated this condition by 
inviting parents to participate “in the earliest stages of assessing the child‟s needs and 
planning a program, rather than being called in merely to consent to a diagnosis and plan 
already formulated (as was generally the case in the other schools)”.25 In addition, 
Madison also incorporated support systems to help alleviate power imbalances between 
teachers and parents. Parent advocates were appointed to assist parents in understanding 
the information and supporting them in voicing their concerns. Notably, these parent 
advocates fulfilled a role similar to Sherwin‟s proposed counselors. 
                                                 
24
 Nedelsky 1989, 29-31. 
25
 Ibid, 29. 
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In addition to implementing measures much like those encompassed by the ethical 
conditions of support and participation, teachers in Madison implemented other 
conditions aimed at encouraging parental involvement in the decision-making process. 
First, when conflict arose, teachers and parents addressed the conflict, using it as a 
constructive tool for arriving at a better decision. Second, “the decision-making process 
was ongoing and open-ended with room for readjustment”.26 In addition, Madison‟s 
success can be attributed to the way in which they framed their overall objective. As 
Nedelsky summarizes: 
Throughout the Madison approach, there is a recognition that the parents 
are in a continuing relationship with the school. The objective is not 
simply to arrive at a decision to which the parents will not object, but to 
sustain a relationship such that the necessary ongoing decisions can be 
collectively made in the best interests of the child.
27
 
 
The Madison schools‟ framing of the decision-making process as dynamic and flexible 
with an overall commitment to gathering the input of all participants explains their 
unique success. 
Although those involved in the Madison schools accomplished this on their own, 
it is possible to translate this requirement into an ethical condition. For example, an 
external review board could monitor the process. Among their goals, they could gauge 
and encourage participation, as well as assist participants in working through conflict. 
Adding an external board for monitoring the decision-making process to our previous 
three ethical conditions would address the problem of decreased participation. 
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 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid, 30 (italics added). 
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6.4.2 The Need for a Specific Safeguard 
At this point, it might appear that our list is complete. First, we have an ethical 
condition that requires critical reflection to assist in autonomous decision-making. In 
addition, we have two ethical conditions that attend to the various problems that arise 
from social structures, providing support systems and participation. As a means of 
attending to problems regarding participation in practice, we added a fourth condition of 
having an external review board monitor and encourage subject and community 
participation. 
Yet, our list is not quite complete. Although these provisions ensure that each 
individual involved in the research process has equal input, not all aspects of the research 
process should be decided by equally weighting input from subjects and community. In 
decisions regarding research that directly impact the research subject, such as whether to 
participate in or withdraw from research, the subject‟s input must necessarily trump input 
by community members and researchers. This is due to the fact that, in these cases, the 
research subject bears the greatest burden. To protect the subject, we must add the 
safeguard of prioritizing her input in decisions in which she bears the greatest risk of 
harm. 
Although this safeguard appears in many current international guidelines for 
research on human subjects, it needs further specifications. I propose that prioritizing the 
subject‟s decisions should be limited to the time during which the subject is a direct 
participant of the research. My reason for this insistence is the research subject does not 
bear the greatest burden in decisions regarding the early and late stages of research, such 
as formulating the protocol and post trial benefits. In such cases, this burden is shared 
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between subjects and community. Consequently, I propose including a limited but 
necessary safeguard of prioritizing subjects‟ choices in the stages of the informed consent 
process in which they bear the greatest burden. 
6.5 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have argued for a list of minimally sufficient ethical conditions 
for promoting subjects‟ autonomous decision-making with regard to participation in 
research. To do so, I began by addressing the ethical condition, critical reflection. In 
addition, I presented two previously proposed conditions directed towards promoting 
relational autonomy in the medical context, support mechanisms and participation. 
After explaining why none of these is sufficient in itself for promoting autonomy, 
I examined whether the combination of critical reflection, support, and participation 
adequately attend to the problems relating to respecting autonomy in the research setting. 
Due to problems that arise with regard to getting subjects to participate in the research 
process, I argued for a fourth ethical condition, an external review board for monitoring 
and encouraging participation during the pre-trial period and throughout the research 
trial. Lastly, I insisted we should add a fifth condition to ensure that subjects‟ choices 
trump community members‟ input in aspects of research in which subjects bear the 
greatest risk. 
To summarize, I concluded this chapter with a list of five ethical conditions 
intended to promote autonomy as it relates to informed consent in research on human 
subjects: critical reflection, support mechanisms, participation, external monitoring, and 
prioritizing subjects‟ choices. I intentionally arrived at a list of minimally sufficient 
conditions as a means of leaving enough flexibility for different cultural contexts. I will 
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return to this list in the final chapter, where I provide an example of how these conditions 
can be implemented in current informed consent guidelines. 
Prior to doing so, however, it is necessary to highlight the relationship between 
autonomy and informed consent (Chapter 7) and explain how this is reflected in the 
current guidelines for informed consent in research on human subjects (Chapter 9). This 
will enable us to better understand the extent to which the various guidelines incorporate 
the ethical conditions I have presented for promoting respect for relational autonomy as it 
relates to informed consent in research. 
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Chapter 7: Informed Consent & Autonomy 
Having spent the previous chapters focusing primarily on autonomy, I now broaden my 
focus to include informed consent in research on human subjects. In this chapter, I 
discuss informed consent and how it is commonly justified by the principle of respect for 
autonomy within the medical context. I also explain how the principle of respect for 
autonomy has taken on this role in international informed consent guidelines for research 
on human subjects. After providing this background information, I end the chapter by 
addressing primary objections to relying on the principle of respect for autonomy to 
justify informed consent. 
          In doing so, I address what I believe are the strongest objections to insisting that 
respect for autonomy justifies informed consent. The first objection I address is by Neil 
C. Manson and Onora O’Neill. 1 They insist that the principle of autonomy does not 
justify informed consent in practice. If it did, Manson and O’Neill insist that relying on 
autonomy would justify too much in some ways and too little in other ways. In response, 
I explain that their objections rest on a mistaken interpretation of what it means to justify 
informed consent by the principle of autonomy. 
          The second objection I address is by Joan Tronto.
2
 She insists that the way that the 
principle of autonomy has come to justify informed consent results in structuring consent 
so that it overlooks the ways that social injustices can impede a person’s ability to make a 
self-governed choice. She also insists that this reliance results in structuring informed 
consent so that it fails to remedy problems that arise with regards to power disparities. In 
                                                 
1
 Manson and O’Neill 2007. 
2
 Tronto 2009. 
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responding to her objections, I explain how an account of informed consent that is 
justified by respect for relational autonomy attends to these problems.
3
 
7.1 Informed Consent 
As one can well imagine, the literature on informed consent is vast and 
controversial. There is no universally agreed upon theory that spells out the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for valid informed consent. Although each theory differs with regard 
to specifics, there appears to be a general definition from which each theory builds. In 
general, informed consent deals with a person’s choice to either participate in or abstain 
from something, for example, a medical procedure or a research study. 
There are two minimal conditions of informed consent, disclosure and consent. 
Medical practitioners are under an obligation to disclose an adequate amount of 
information to patients regarding possible treatment. Various accounts of informed 
consent will differ with regards to what constitutes an adequate amount of information. 
For example, as will become apparent later in this chapter, Manson and O’Neill insist that 
the common account of informed consent requires practitioners to disclose as much 
information as possible to patients. 
Upon receiving this information, patients either choose a particular treatment or 
not; this is the consent component for informed consent. Admittedly, this amounts to 
consent in its most simplistic form. My reason for insisting that this simple definition of 
consent is one of two minimal conditions for informed consent is to be able to 
                                                 
3
 By an account of informed consent, I mean the way that we structure how we obtain 
informed consent. Our justification for informed consent will dictate how we structure an 
account of informed consent. My arguments regarding differences in informed consent 
accounts that result from justifying informed consent either by a traditional or a relational 
autonomy account illustrates this. 
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incorporate differences in how theorists define consent. For example, many argue that 
patients must understand the information that they receive in order to provide valid 
consent. In insisting that we should focus on informed consent as a communicative 
process, Manson and O’Neill emphasize the importance of comprehension.4 Yet, others, 
such as Gopal Sreenivasan, argue that disclosure is enough; comprehension is not 
required for valid informed consent.
5
 A simplistic definition of consent as approving or 
disapproving of a particular treatment allows for both of these definitions of consent. 
Of course, we can argue that certain accounts are better than others. In defending 
an account of informed consent that is justified and guided by the principle of respect for 
relational autonomy, I address this issue. Prior to doing so, it is necessary first to explain 
how informed consent currently rests on the principle of autonomy within the context of 
research on human subjects. 
7.2 The Emergence of Informed Consent in Research 
The importance of obtaining research subjects’ informed consent came into the 
public eye during the Nuremberg Trials of the 1940s, wherein the military court at 
Nuremberg tried Nazi doctors for mistreatment of concentration camp victims who 
served as research subjects. In order to determine whether this treatment amounted to 
torture, the courts sought the advice of expert witnesses to determine the ethical standards 
that should guide research. In clarifying and elaborating on the physician witnesses’ 
recommendations, the court arrived at a set of ethical standards for protecting research 
                                                 
4
 Examples of others who also insist that valid informed consent requires understanding, 
see Berg, Appelbaum, Lidz and Parker 2001, c.3; Dodds 2000. 
5
 Screenivasan 2003. 
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subjects. The standards that were included in the court’s statement have become known 
as the Nuremberg Code.
6
 
Among the ten guidelines contained in the Nuremberg Code, Guideline 1 deals 
with informed consent. It begins with the statement, “The voluntary consent of the human 
subject is absolutely essential”.7 Because the Code was derived from the military court’s 
brief, it lacked enforceability.8 However, it set the stage for focusing on the need to 
promote subjects’ informed consent in research. 
In 1966, the United States took the lead with regards to passing the first 
administrative regulatory guidelines for research on human subjects. At this time, the 
Public Health Service issued a policy statement, which spelled out the requirements for 
research funded by the National Institutes of Health. Included in the requirements was the 
obligation for researchers to obtain research subjects’ informed consent.9 To date, 
informed consent continues to be mandatory in the various regulatory guidelines for 
research on human subjects. This will become more apparent in my discussion of these 
guidelines in Chapter 9. 
7.3 Autonomy as the Philosophical Foundation for Informed Consent Guidelines 
Although the Public Health Service 1966 policy statement spelled out guidelines 
                                                 
6
 Nuremberg Code  1949.  
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Although the World Medical Association created the Declaration of Helsinki in 1974 as 
a means of clarifying the ethical guidelines set out in the Nuremberg Code, the 
Declaration also was not legally binding. However, the Declaration continues to be 
referred to as the guiding document on which many current ethical guidelines for 
research on human subjects were constructed. I explain more about the Declaration in 
Chapter 9. 
9
 Berg, Appelbaum, Lidz, and Parker 2001, 255. 
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for research funded by the NIH, it did not address the justification for informed consent. 
Discussions of the justification for informed consent officially began in 1974, when the 
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research was created. One of its first tasks was to identify the ethical 
principles that should guide research on human subjects and explain how these are linked 
to specific guidelines. The need to clarify the ethical guidelines for research on human 
subjects was a response to the discovery of numerous unethical research trials that had 
occurred. For example, in 1973, it was discovered that researchers at the Jewish Chronic 
Disease Hospital had injected elderly patients with live cancer cells without informing 
them of this.
10
 In 1971, it was discovered that researchers had failed to inform African 
American research subjects enrolled in what has become known as the Tuskegee Trials 
that penicillin was an available treatment for the last two decades of this trial.
11
 
Unethical research practices like these provided the impetus for setting up the 
Commission to determine what principles should guide ethical research. In 1978, the 
Commission arrived at the Belmont Report. Based on this report, the requirement to 
obtain subjects’ informed consent stems from the need to respect subjects’ autonomy.12 
The connection between autonomy and informed consent in the research context 
is not surprising. Insisting that research subjects must consent to participating in a 
research trial is a means of recognizing and respecting that they can be harmed by 
research. Insisting that protection come in the form of requiring that researches obtain 
                                                 
10
 Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital 1965. 
11
 Jones 1993. 
12
 Department of Health, Education and Welfare. National Commission for the Protection 
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979, Part B:1. 
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subjects’ informed consent in order to enroll them in a research trial is a means of 
recognizing and respecting subjects’ right to make self-governed choices regarding 
important life choices, such as research participation. Additionally, requiring informed 
consent as a means of respecting subjects’ autonomy in the research context provides an 
important protection for subjects from oppressed populations who are in a more 
vulnerable position of being more easily coerced or manipulated.13 As I explained in 
Chapter 5, differences in race, class, gender, and disability oftentimes result in subjects 
having far less power than researchers. Since subjects are the ones most affected by 
interventions that are part of research trials, it is necessary to ensure that their decisions 
are self-governed. 
7.4 Objections to Autonomy as Justifying Informed Consent 
 Having discussed the relationship between informed consent and autonomy, I am 
now in a position to address what I believe are some of the strongest objections to relying 
on the principle of autonomy to justify informed consent. As I previously mentioned, I 
have chosen to address objections by Manson, O’Neill, and Tronto. 
Prior to addressing their objections, allow me to address a concern that the reader 
may have at this point. Some might wonder why I do not defend the principle of 
autonomy against other proposed justifications for informed consent. For example, 
informed consent could be justified by the principle of non-maleficence, or the duty of 
medical practitioners not to inflict evil or harm patients. When justified by this principle, 
                                                 
13
 For an argument in support of maintaining a reliance on autonomy as justifying 
informed consent in the medical context because it helps protect vulnerable subjects, 
refer to Donchin 1995, 50. 
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informed consent is meant to protect patients against harmful medical interventions.
14
 
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, my reason for not attending to other possible 
justifications for informed consent is that I prefer to attempt to work within the already 
existent framework of the principle of autonomy as justifying informed consent. 
Whenever problems can be resolved by working within an already existent framework, 
this provides a more feasible solution. Because I believe that my proposal to revise the 
principle of autonomy to reflect a relational autonomy account remedies the problems 
that the traditional autonomy account encounters, I do not feel the need to examine other 
possible justifications for consent. This is not to imply that these other justifications are 
not noteworthy; they simply go beyond the scope of this dissertation. Having explained 
my reasons for focusing on objections to relying on the principle of autonomy a justifying 
informed consent, I now turn to examining those objections. 
7.4.1 Autonomy Justifies Too Much and Too Little 
 
 In Rethinking Informed Consent, Neil C. Manson and Onora O’Neill argue that 
relying on the principle of autonomy to justify informed consent encounters 
insurmountable problems.
15
 Because their larger concern is with informed consent as a 
communication process, it is necessary to understand the model of communication that 
they believe underlies the common account of informed consent. This enables us to 
understand how they interpret the principle of autonomy and why they believe that 
relying on this principle to justify informed consent is problematic.  
According to Manson and O’Neill, the standard account of informed consent 
                                                 
14
 For an overview of justifications for informed consent other than the principle of 
autonomy, refer to Beauchamp and Childress 2009, and Levine 2003. 
15
 Manson and O’Neill 2007. 
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reflects what they refer to as the conduit-container model of communication.
16,17
 Based 
on the conduit-container model, information is something that is possessed by some 
people and is conveyed to others. Information is seen as quantifiable stuff that is neatly 
contained.
18
 For example, computer software contains bits of information, books contain 
chapters of information, and people contain (know) various details about things. In 
communication, those who hold the information convey it or transfer it to others, thereby 
acting as a conduit, while others, the recipients, receive the information. To illustrate, you 
might know a lot about car maintenance. I do not. In communicating this information to 
me, you act as a conduit that conveys the information to me, while I am the passive 
recipient who receives the information. 
Manson and O’Neill insist that the conduit-container model of communication 
underlies the standard account of informed consent, which they refer to as consent-as-
disclosure-for-decision-making or what I will refer to as consent-as-disclosure for short.
19
 
Based on this account of informed consent, researchers or doctors disclose information 
about research trials or medical treatments, at which point subjects or patients make a 
decision regarding their participation. The purpose of consent-as-disclosure is to provide 
people with information for the purpose of enabling them to make self-governed 
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 Manson and O’Neill derive the conduit-container label from Michael Reddy, “The 
Conduit Metaphor: A Case of Frame Conflict in Our Language about Language” in A. 
Ortony (ed) Metaphor and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
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 It is important to note that Manson and O’Neill are not arguing that the conduit-
container model of communication is mistaken; they point out that it correctly describes 
part of the communication process. However, as will become apparent in my discussion 
of their alternative informed consent account which relies on a different communication 
model, the conduit-container model fails to attend to all of the relevant aspects of 
successful communication. 
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 Manson and O’Neill 2007, 36-7. 
19
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decisions about their medical treatment or research participation. In other words, the 
reason for obtaining informed consent is to respect people’s ability to make autonomous 
choices. 
As Manson and O’Neill insist, the account of autonomy that justifies current 
informed consent practice is not respect for mere choice. Instead, it is respect for what 
they refer to as rational or reasoned choice, those choices that people make once they 
have reflected on them and have good reason for choosing them.
20
 According to them, the 
focus on rational choice emphasizes the content of the information. Thus, they insist that 
the quality of the consent that is provided is determined by the amount of information 
that is disclosed. In other words, they believe that those who espouse respect for rational 
autonomy believe the more information a person has, the more he will be able to 
determine whether he has good reason to make particular choices, and, consequently, the 
more rational his choice will be. Mapping this onto informed consent, then, they insist 
that consent-as-disclosure demands that practitioners should provide all the information 
about treatments or research to subjects in order for subjects to make a self-governed 
choice regarding their medical treatment. 
Manson and O’Neill argue that there are several problems with the standard 
approach of justifying informed consent by appealing to the principle of autonomy. In 
objecting to the justification of autonomy and how it informs consent, they begin by 
pointing out problems they believe would occur if informed consent ensured autonomy in 
practice. Recall that consent-as-disclosure is justified by respect for rational autonomy, 
which aims to ensure that people make the most reasoned choices regarding medical 
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treatment and research. Manson and O’Neill argue that using informed consent to ensure 
rational autonomy would justify too much in some ways, while justifying too little in 
others. 
First, they insist that ensuring respect for rational autonomy justifies too much 
because it justifies too many kinds of choices, including those entailing great risk.
21
 
According to Manson and O’Neill, respect for rational autonomy requires there be no 
restrictions on people’s choices so long as they reflected on and reasoned through their 
choices.
22
 Consequently, respect for autonomy would include respecting a person’s 
choice to participate in a risky drug trial (one with a high probability of harm and very 
little, if any, benefit to the subject) as long as she had reasoned through this decision. We 
can imagine how a person might decide to participate in risky research. Perhaps the 
subject has little regard for her own well-being and is not bothered by the harm and the 
lack of benefits. 
In responding to this objection, it is necessary to carefully reflect on what we find 
problematic in people choosing to enroll in risky research. When we do, I believe it will 
become apparent that concerns other than risk make these choices problematic. To 
illustrate, consider the fact that, though we might disagree with their decisions, we 
oftentimes do not interfere with people’s autonomous choices that entail great risk and 
are offset by the remote possibility of a benefit. For example, we allow a person to make 
an autonomous decision to invest in a business venture that has little or no chance of 
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 Manson and O’Neill 2007, 70. 
22
 Manson and O’Neill note that current regulations for informed consent in research on 
human subjects limit subjects’ choices. Later in this chapter, I address their arguments 
regarding how this indicates that principles other than respect for autonomy bear on 
informed consent, indicating problems with insisting that informed consent ensures 
autonomy. 
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success. We also allow people to make risky choices with regards to their physical well-
being, such as doing what is called a solo ascent, which entails vertically climbing 
hundreds of feet along the face of a rock formation without any safety mechanisms. 
Admittedly, we oftentimes are more concerned with people making choices that involve 
physical risk than those that involve financial risks. 
Since medical treatments and research entail physical risks, we tend to be more 
concerned about these decisions. However, I believe that when we stop to think about it, 
this concern stems from factors that come into play in these contexts that can impede 
autonomy. Consider the example of someone who is extremely sick and is unable to get 
medical care because she lives in a less developed country where healthcare is 
unavailable. In hopes of receiving some level of care for her illness, she enrolls in a risky 
research trial that offers a remote chance of benefit. In this case, we are concerned that 
the research subject’s dire circumstances have forced her hand, so to speak. When dire 
circumstances force one’s hand, we refer to this as a coercive offer.  Notably, it is not the 
risk that is problematic as much as it is the concern that a coercive offer might impede a 
research subject’s ability to make an autonomous decision regarding her research 
participation. 
Prior to addressing Manson and O’Neill’s other objections, allow me to briefly 
attend to a concern that the reader might have at this point. Some have insisted that dire 
circumstances are not coercive, and, thus, do not impede a person’s ability to make an 
autonomous choice. For example, Martin Wilkinson and Andrew Moore insist that a 
necessary condition for being a coercive offer is that the researcher “must be responsible 
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for at least one of the unacceptable options”.23 In the previous example, the subject has 
two options; she can participate in research and receive the necessary medical care, or she 
can choose not to, in which case she will not get the appropriate care. In this case, there is 
only one unacceptable option, not getting the necessary medical care. Because it appears 
that the researcher is not responsible for poor healthcare in less developed countries that 
result in this bad option, one might conclude that my previous example is not a coercive 
offer. 
Initially, this argument is convincing. After all, researchers do not seem to be 
causally responsible for the subject’s dire circumstances. Yet, some have argued that 
individuals that support social institutions that lead to dire circumstances are responsible 
for those circumstances. Thomas Pogge insists that social institutions in developed 
countries are responsible for the impoverished conditions in less developed countries, 
including ill health and poor healthcare.
24
 Researchers support these social institutions by 
receiving funding from corporations and government agencies. In supporting these social 
institutions that have caused poor healthcare in less developed countries, researchers 
become causally responsible for the dire circumstances. If Pogge is correct, then, contrary 
to Wilkinson and Moore’s insistence, researchers are causally responsible for the bad 
option of poor healthcare. Consequently, when ill health and poor healthcare force 
subjects to enroll in research trials, these amount to coercive offers that impede 
autonomy.
 25
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 Wilkinson and Moore 1997, 378. 
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 Pogge 2002. 
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 Whereas Wilkinson and Moore insist that the researcher must be causally responsible 
for at least one of the bad options, others have argued that a necessary condition for 
coercive offers is that the researcher must intend to use the bad circumstance to force 
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In addition to justifying too much, Manson and O’Neill insist that relying on 
respect for autonomy justifies too little.
26
 Recall that they believe that truly respecting 
autonomy requires providing people with as much information as possible as a means of 
enabling them to make as informed, or as reasoned, a choice as possible. It is important to 
clarify that the current practice of informed consent does not mandate providing all 
information, nor do Manson and O’Neill think it should. Instead, their point is that, if we 
were to take respect for autonomy as seriously as it should be taken were it to justify 
informed consent in practice, we would adopt this rigorous standard. 
Because very few people would be able to make an autonomous decision when 
provided with as much information as possible, Manson and O’Neill insist that 
implementing this rigorous standard would justify too little. Providing people with too 
much information oftentimes overwhelms their ability to comprehend the information 
necessary for making an informed choice. They also insist that relying on autonomy to 
justify informed consent would justify too little because it is fails to guide us in how to 
treat those who cannot meet the competency requirements for consent, such as severely 
mentally handicapped people or very young children.  
At this point, we should question why Manson and O’Neill insist that consent-as-
disclosure mandates providing all possible information. Recall that they explain that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
one’s hand (Wertheimer 1999, 269-71; Brody 2003, 127-8; Faden and Beauchamp 1986, 
344-46). Those who argue for this necessary condition do not believe that dire 
circumstances, in themselves, impede autonomy. So long as the subject is able to freely 
choose an option, she is considered to have made an autonomous choice. However, this 
objection frames subjects as making a sovereign choice regarding research participation. 
As such, it overlooks the ways that social structures can bear on consent, as I explained in 
Chapter 5. (Also see, Sample 2003). For an argument directed specifically towards the 
way in which dire circumstances in less developed countries amount to coercive offers, 
see Moodley 2002. 
26
 Manson and O’Neill 2007, 71. 
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purpose of consent-as-disclosure is to enable patients and research subjects to make 
informed decisions regarding treatments and research participation. It appears that they 
conclude that this necessarily entails providing all information based on their insistence 
that consent-as-disclosure rests on the conduit-container model of communication. 
Researchers and physicians have information that subjects and patients need to receive to 
make decisions. 
Yet, we have reason to question this assumption. The current guidelines for 
informed consent do not appear to rest on the linear conduit-container model of 
communication that posits practitioners as acting as a conduit to convey all information 
to the passive container we call the research subject or patient. Instead, guidelines for 
informed consent recognize and address the importance of subjects and patients 
understanding enough of the details of their options in order to make a self-governed 
choice. As the Belmont Report explains, it is generally accepted that there are three 
primary aspects to informed consent: “information, comprehension, and 
voluntariness”.27,28 
Although the current informed consent guidelines emphasize the need for subjects 
to comprehend the information about their research participation, there will still be those 
who lack the requisite capabilities to comprehend this information. Manson and O’Neill 
are correct that the severely mentally handicapped and very young children cannot 
provide informed consent. They also are correct in pointing out that informed consent 
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 Belmont Report 1979, Part C:1. 
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 Some insist that valid informed consent does not require comprehension; disclosure 
alone is sufficient. For example, refer to Screenivasan 2003. Although we can disagree 
about whether informed consent requires comprehension in theory, my point here is that 
the current practice of informed consent requires comprehension, as is illustrated by the 
current guidelines for informed consent in research on human subjects. 
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fails to inform us how to treat these people. However, this problem is not unique to 
consent-as-disclosure. As will become apparent in the next chapter in my explication of 
Manson and O’Neill’s alternative informed consent account, which frames informed 
consent as a means of temporarily waiving certain rights so that one can undergo medical 
interventions, the same people who lack the requisite skills for rational autonomy also 
lack the requisite skills for adequately understanding the relevant information and 
commitments entailed in temporarily waiving certain rights. In both cases, we must turn 
to principles other than respect for autonomy to guide us regarding how to treat those 
who cannot consent. 
This brings us to Manson and O’Neill’s final objection to justifying informed 
consent by the principle of autonomy.
 29
  If the principle of respect for autonomy justifies 
informed consent, then informed consent should be structured so as to ensure subjects’ 
autonomy. Yet, Manson and O’Neill insist that informed consent, in practice, does not 
ensure autonomy. Recall that they insist that respect for autonomy amounts to making 
sure that subjects have the opportunity to make any reasoned choice they wish with 
regards to research. In practice, a person’s ability to consent is limited by current 
regulations that prohibit certain choices. For example, current guidelines prohibit 
researchers from enrolling subjects in trials that have substantial risk to them and little or 
no benefit.
30,31 
Moreover, these limitations are justified by principles other than 
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autonomy; namely, they are justified by the principle of beneficence, or doing what is in 
the subjects’ best interest. 
In response, I disagree with Manson and O’Neill’s insistence that the fact that 
informed consent, in practice, does not entirely ensure subjects’ autonomy gives us 
reason to reject autonomy as the justification for informed consent. In stating that 
informed consent should ensure autonomy, we should set a realistic not an idealistic 
standard. Although I agree that the current way that informed consent is structured can be 
improved to better ensure autonomy, even a revised account of informed consent, such as 
a relational autonomy based account, is unable to attend to all of the restraints to 
autonomy. For example, no structuring of informed consent will be able to overcome the 
fact that some subjects live in areas where there is little or no healthcare. Consequently, 
we may need to place limits on the choices people make regarding research simply 
because the chances of their making an autonomous choice in such dire circumstances is 
questionable. Although Manson and O’Neill acknowledge this, it is unclear why they 
insist that it poses a problem for informed consent. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, 
informed consent procedures cannot be expected to remedy grave social injustices. 
Hence, while informed consent aims to ensure respect for autonomy to the greatest 
possible extent, the principle of beneficence steps in to protect subjects against currently 
irreparable social injustices that might impede autonomy. 
                                                                                                                                                 
from vulnerable populations to be able to participate in research. In fact, some guidelines 
encourage providing this option. For example, the CIOMS Ethical Guidelines, another 
international ethical guideline for research on human subjects, encourage research on 
vulnerable groups, stating, “Members of vulnerable groups also have the same 
entitlement to access to the benefits of investigational interventions that show promise of 
therapeutic benefit as persons not considered vulnerable, particularly when no superior or 
equivalent approaches to therapy are available (CIOMS 2002, Guideline 12) ”.  
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To summarize, Manson and O’Neill object to relying on autonomy to justify 
informed consent. First, they insist that doing so would justify too much and too little. 
Second, they argue that informed consent is not justified by autonomy, in practice, due to 
the fact that current informed consent guidelines place limitations on subjects’ choices 
with regards to research participation. In response, I explained how these two objections 
rest on the mistaken interpretation of what it means for the principle of autonomy to 
justify informed consent. Contrary to Manson and O’Neill’s insistence, relying on the 
principle of autonomy to justify informed consent does not seem problematic. Although 
this seems to reinforce relying on the common account of autonomy to justify informed 
consent, my arguments in response to Tronto’s objections and in response to the 
problems that I argue the alternative accounts encounter highlight the need to revise our 
reliance on autonomy as the justification for informed consent to reflect a relational 
autonomy account. 
7.4.2 Autonomy Fails to Adequately Attend to Social Injustices and Power Disparities 
In “Consent as a Grant of Authority: A Care Ethics Reading of Informed 
Consent”, Joan Tronto insists that relying on the principle of respect for autonomy to 
justify informed consent is problematic.32 According to her, it fails to attend to the ways 
that social injustices and disparate power can impede a subject’s ability to make a self-
governed choice. In other words, despite the insistence that informed consent ensures 
autonomous choice, Tronto argues that it fails to do so. 
In order to understand what she believes are the shortcomings of justifying 
informed consent by the principle of autonomy, we must first understand the 
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characteristics of informed consent that she believes arise from relying on the principle of 
autonomy. Tronto refers to the standard account of informed consent that is guided by the 
principle of respect for autonomy as consent-as-autonomy. Consent-as-autonomy frames 
medical decisions as a sovereign choice which patients make. As such, it treats medical 
decisions much like other consumer decisions that people make. Doctors disclose 
relevant information to patients so that they can decide whether or not to have a particular 
medical treatment or to participate in research. She insists that the common practice of 
consent-as-autonomy oftentimes amounts to a one-time occurrence, wherein practitioners 
disclose information and patients make a choice.  
Tronto argues that consent-as-autonomy encounters two problems. First, in 
isolating informed consent to a one-time occurrence and considering it to be a sovereign 
choice that patients make, consent-as-autonomy overlooks the larger social context and 
the relevant injustices that impede patients’ ability to provide valid consent. For example, 
it overlooks possible sexist or racist practices that can unjustly limit healthcare options 
prior to the physician presenting these options to patients. 
In addition, she argues that consent-as-autonomy fails to adequately address the 
ways that power disparities can impede a person’s ability to make a self-governed choice. 
Recall that consent-as-autonomy frames informed consent as a sovereign choice, which 
patients make, much like other consumer choices. Yet, patients are not situated like 
independent consumers. As a result of their illness or disease, they rely on their doctors. 
This dependency makes them more vulnerable to possible manipulation or coercion by 
doctors. 
To combat possible problems of coercion that can arise from power disparities, 
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consent-as-autonomy uses rights as a means of empowering patients in the doctor/patient 
relationship. Recall that consent-as-autonomy focuses on the need for the patient to be 
able to make a self-governed choice regarding her medical treatment. In doing so, it 
frames informed consent as a right that patient’s have. Tronto gives the example of New 
York’s Patient’s Bill of Rights, which lists informed consent as one of the patient’s 
rights.
33
 Corresponding to this right is the doctor’s duty not to act so as to restrict patients 
from being able to provide informed consent. When doctors coerce patients, they fail to 
fulfill this duty. The patient’s right to make a self-governed decision regarding her 
medical treatment is violated, and the patient has legal recourse against the physician. 
Thus, consent-as-autonomy uses informed consent to act as a “trump” card to keep the 
more powerful person, the doctor, from using his power to coerce a patient. 
Although rights might protect patients against coercion, Tronto points out that it is 
not a good tool for protecting against manipulation. Cases of manipulation are much 
more difficult to recognize. In support of this claim, she refers to Howard Brody’s work 
on how doctors are able to manipulate information in order to get patients to agree on a 
particular medical intervention.
34
 
To summarize, Tronto objects to using the principle of autonomy to justify 
informed consent. First, it overlooks the ways that social injustices can impede a person’s 
ability to make a self-governed choice regarding medical treatment or research 
participation. Second, it is ill equipped to deal with the possibility of medical 
practitioners or researchers using their position of greater power to manipulate patients or 
subjects. Because my solution to these problems is to rely on the principle of respect for 
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relational autonomy, allow me first to address Tronto’s argument against doing this. 
Although Tronto acknowledges the benefits of relying on relational autonomy, 
she rejects it as a possible solution to the problems that the standard principle of 
autonomy encounters. She acknowledges that relational autonomy attends to the 
problems relating to social injustice and power disparities that can impede valid informed 
consent. However, she insists that an account of relational autonomy fails to provide us 
with the details regarding how we ought to structure informed consent to overcome these 
problems.35 
In responding to Tronto’s objections, it is unclear why she insists that the specific 
solution to remedying these problems must be spelled out in the principle of respect for 
relational autonomy. An account of relational autonomy identifies the problems that can 
arise with regards to ensuring that people make self-governed choices. Recall from 
Chapter 3 that social injustices and disparate power are among the problems that 
relational autonomy theorists identify. Once we have identified these problems, we can 
construct a set of ethical conditions for attending to the problems that relational 
autonomy accounts identify, as I demonstrated in Chapter 6. Moreover, we can use these 
conditions to arrive at specific guidelines for how to structure informed consent so that it 
ensures respect for relational autonomy, as I explain in Chapter 10. For example, to 
attend to social injustices that can unjustly limit subjects’ options, I propose including 
subjects in the pre-trial stages of research to act as a checks and balances. As a means of 
remedying power disparities, I propose providing vulnerable subjects with support 
mechanisms, such as support groups and counselors, to ensure that they are able to make 
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autonomous decisions regarding their research participation. Thus, contrary to Tronto’s 
insistence, relational autonomy can provide the framework for how we ought to structure 
informed consent so as to ensure that subjects make self-governed choices regarding 
research participation. 
7.5 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I explained how informed consent became important in medical 
research and how it has come to rest on the philosophical foundation of autonomy. After 
doing so, I addressed objections to this common practice of justifying informed consent 
by the principle of respect for autonomy. The first set of objections I addressed was by 
Manson and O’Neill, who argued that the principle of autonomy both justifies too much 
and too little with regards to informed consent. In response, I argued that this is not the 
case. I then addressed objections by Joan Tronto, who insisted that justifying informed 
consent by appealing to the principle of autonomy overlooks the ways that social 
injustices and disparate power impede autonomy. In response, I explained how justifying 
informed consent by the principles of relational autonomy attends to these problems. 
 Having explained how we can maintain the current reliance on the principle of 
autonomy as justifying informed consent by revising our account of autonomy, I devote 
the next chapter to examining other possible solutions. Specifically, I examine proposed 
alternative accounts of informed consent that are directed at ensuring respect for subjects’ 
autonomy but that insist that we need more than the principle of respect for autonomy to 
achieve this. In my analysis, I conclude that revising the principle of autonomy to reflect 
a relational autonomy account provides a better solution for ensuring that people make 
self-governed choices regarding their medical treatment or research participation. 
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Chapter 8: Addressing Alternative Solutions 
In the previous chapter, I argued that relational autonomy provides us with an 
account of informed consent that overcomes the problems with the standard or traditional 
autonomy account as justifying informed consent. To further illustrate the benefits of 
relying on relational autonomy, I analyze the feasibility of other possible solutions to 
structuring informed consent so that it is still aimed at ensuring that people make self-
governed choices regarding medical treatment and research participation but does not 
rely on the traditional principle of autonomy to accomplish this. Because it is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation to examine all alternative accounts, I have chosen to present a 
brief analysis of alternative accounts of informed consent as a means of indicating how a 
relational account of informed consent fares better than some of the proposed 
alternatives. Due to the limited scope of my analysis, I am not claiming that an account of 
informed consent that is guided by a relational autonomy account is best; instead, I am 
arguing that it is preferable. 
To arrive at this conclusion, I examine and reject informed consent accounts by 
Manson, O’Neill, and Tronto.1 After pointing out insurmountable problems with their 
accounts, I explain how an account of informed consent that is based on respect for 
relational autonomy overcomes these problems, giving us good reason to favor this 
account. 
8.1 Consent-as-Waiver 
Recall, from Chapter 7, that Manson and O’Neill insist that the way that informed 
consent has been structured to rely on respect for autonomy fails to ensure that people 
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make self-governed choices regarding their medical care or research participation. Also 
recall that their reason for arguing against relying on the principle of respect for 
autonomy is that they believe that this principle is equated with respecting rational 
choice. According to them, the emphasis on rational choice justifies too much by 
allowing an individual to make a risky choice, so long as he has reflected on his reasons 
for making the choice. They also insist that it justifies too little, since not many people 
will meet the standard of being able to rationally reflect on their choices. Consequently, 
they conclude that the way that informed consent has been structured so as to respect the 
principle of autonomy actually fails to ensure that people make self-governed decisions. 
As a better way of accomplishing this goal, Manson and O’Neill insist on 
broadening the focus of informed consent beyond simple choice to focus on consent as a 
communicative process. They argue that attending to the ways that consent as a 
communication process affect a person’s ability to provide valid consent is a better 
solution for ensuring autonomous choice.
2,3
 
As with my explanation of their interpretation of the standard account of informed 
consent that is justified by the principle of autonomy, I begin by explaining the model of 
communication that underlies Manson and O’Neill’s alternative account of informed 
consent, a model that they call the agency model.
4
 The agency model highlights the ways 
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in which communication requires the agency of all those involved. Unlike the conduit-
container model that they insisted underlies the common account of informed consent, or 
consent-as-disclosure, the agency model does not think of patients and subjects solely as 
recipients of information. Instead, the agency model recognizes that patients and subjects 
exercise agency by doing such things as asking clarification questions and sharing 
relevant information.
5
 
According to Manson and O’Neill, highlighting the agency of all those involved 
in communication broadens the focus of informed consent to attend to the epistemic and 
ethical norms that impact how successful the communication process is. In general, 
epistemic norms deal with ensuring that participants understand and engage in the 
information being shared.
6
 Although Manson and O’Neill argue that some of the relevant 
epistemic norms that come into play will be specific to the context of a particular 
communication, they also insist that there are epistemic norms to which almost all 
successful communication must adhere. For example, participants should communicate 
information that is intelligible. In addition, they should share only information that is 
relevant. Providing too much information for a particular context is unnecessary and can 
overwhelm people’s comprehension. In order to determine what constitutes intelligible 
and relevant information, participants must be familiar with each other’s background 
knowledge. Doing so enables the participants to determine what others are capable of 
understanding and what others might already know, so as to avoid unnecessary repetition. 
Successful communication also requires more than sharing intelligible and relevant 
information. Participants must feel confident that the person who is sharing information 
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is communicating the information in an honest way, which Manson and O’Neill refer to 
as truthfulness. Also, it must be the case that the material itself is the true. Together, these 
universal epistemic norms, intelligibility, relevance, adequate accuracy, truth and 
truthfulness, assist in successful communication.
7
 
In addition to epistemic norms, Manson and O’Neill insist that ethical norms also 
come into play in successful communication.8 Simply put, ethical norms deal with 
commitments and obligations that relate to our communications. These obligations might 
arise out of a particular communication between two people.
9
 For example, a student and 
I might talk about meeting to discuss coursework. The result of this communication 
might be that both of us take on the commitment to meet at a particular place and time. 
In addition to ethical obligations that stem from a particular communication 
between people, there are universal obligations that direct the communication process.
10
 
For example, persons are prohibited from using duress, manipulation, and coercion in 
their communications with others. Thus, while I am communicating with a student about 
the possibility of meeting to discuss coursework, I cannot coerce or manipulate her to say 
that she will meet with me during office hours. 
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Manson and O’Neill use the agency model of communication to frame their 
revised account of informed consent, which they call consent-as-waiver.
11
 Consent-as-
waiver focuses on the role of consent as a waiver by which people temporarily waive 
rights that would otherwise be violated by research or medical treatments. When a 
research subject or patient exercises consent-as-waiver, they confer a special right to 
researchers and medical practitioners to perform actions that would otherwise be 
unacceptable. 
According to Manson and O’Neill, shifting the focus to consent as a waiver 
broadens the scope of how we think about informed consent so that we can attend to the 
multiple relationships that bear on consent, and not just on the need to disclose 
information. Consent-as-waiver highlights the graveness of temporarily lifting certain 
prohibitions. The fact that informed consent entails lifting certain prohibitions illustrates 
the need to ensure that consent results from good communication.
12
 To promote 
successful communication, consent-as-waiver incorporates the attention to epistemic 
norms that the agency model of communication highlights. Thus, for example, it 
emphasizes the need for all those involved to be trustworthy in their communication. A 
person should not deceptively present facts about a particular intervention, as this 
decreases the believability of such claims and impedes overall understanding. In addition, 
recall that epistemic norms also mandate that the information that participants share is 
truthful, intelligible and relevant. Part of determining what constitutes relevant 
information will depend on the particulars of the situation. The aim is to provide an 
adequate but not overwhelming amount of information by which one can determine 
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whether to provide consent-as-waiver. Thus, contrary to what they insist is the goal of 
consent-as-disclosure of providing all information about an intervention, consent-as-
waiver aims to provide adequately accurate information for the given context. For 
example, researchers might discuss possible risks, benefits, and compensation. They 
might also generally describe any interventions so that the subject understands the extent 
to which they are temporarily waiving certain rights and the cost and possible benefits of 
doing so. 
In addition to paying attention to epistemic norms, consent-as-waiver also attends 
to ethical norms that come into play.
13
 In consenting to temporarily waive certain rights, 
patients and subjects are committed to viewing as acceptable actions that would 
otherwise be wrongful without consent, such as invasive treatments. In doing so, they 
agree not to seek legal recourse when these actions are carried out. Those who seek 
consent commit themselves to fulfilling the actions under consideration if and only if 
they have obtained the requisite consent to do so. In this way, consent-as-waiver operates 
within broader ethical norms that are at play within the medical profession. These include 
prohibitions against coercion, force, manipulation, and fraud. A requisite of consent-as-
waiver is that those who consent realize that they are providing consent and are not being 
forced to waive their rights. 
8.2 Problems with Consent-as-Waiver 
Despite Manson and O’Neill’s insistence that consent-as-waiver adequately 
ensures that people make self-governed choices in the medical and research context, this 
revised account of informed consent fails to do so. The reason is that consent-as-waiver 
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fails to adequately attend to the ways that social structures impede autonomy. Recall, 
from Chapter 3, that social structures can limit people’s autonomy by disparate power, 
unjustly limited options, internalized oppression, and not fully developed skills for 
autonomy. Although consent-as-waiver attends to some of these problems, it fails to 
attend to all of them. 
Among the problems arising from social structures, consent-as-waiver specifically 
addresses disparate power. In being guided by the agency model of communication, 
consent-as-waiver is directed towards remedying power disparities that would impede 
subjects’ ability to be active participants in the communication process regarding 
informed consent. Additionally, epistemic norms, such as those that ensure that subjects 
comprehend the information they receive so that they can actively participate by asking 
questions, serve to put subjects on a more equal footing as researchers. 
While consent-as-waiver acknowledges the problem of disparate power, it may 
appear that it fails to recognize the problem of unjustly limited options. Manson and 
O’Neill do not specifically discuss unjustly limited options, which makes it seem as if 
consent-as-waiver fails to address this problem. However, recall that they insist that 
broader ethical norms can bear on the communication process wherein subjects decide 
whether to participate in a research trial. In the case of unjustly limited options that act as 
coercive offers, it appears that two broader ethical norms combine to attend to this 
problem.
14
 The universal ethical norm that it is wrong to unfairly limit a person’s choices 
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attends to the problem of unjustly limited options in general. When these options act as 
coercive offers, they violate the universal ethical norm that coercion is wrong. 
Understood in this way, it appears that consent-as-waiver is equipped to deal with the 
ways that unjustly limited options impede autonomy. 
Although consent-as-waiver attends to unjustly limited options and disparate 
power, it attends to only some of the ways that not fully developed autonomy skills can 
impede a person’s ability to make a self-governed choice regarding her research 
participation. Recall that self-assertion and self-worth are some of the requisite autonomy 
skills that those from vulnerable groups might not have fully developed due to their 
socialization. Consent-as-waiver is equipped to deal with problems relating to lack of 
self-assertion but not lack of self-worth. In emphasizing the need for subjects to be able 
to exercise their agency in the communication process, consent-as-waiver is directed 
towards ensuring that subjects are self-assertive. However, it does not address decreased 
self-worth. Neither the emphasis on agency nor the need to adhere to epistemic and 
ethical norms deals with how decreased self-worth might lead people to underestimate 
their needs in deciding to waive their rights. 
This is closely connected to the concern that oppressive socialization can lead to 
problems of internalized oppression. Notably, consent-as-waiver does not attend to the 
way in which a person’s decision to temporarily waive her rights might stem from 
mistaken oppressive beliefs. For example, a research subject might actively participate in 
the communication process, asking clarification questions about the intelligible and 
relevant information that the researcher shares. She might also feel that the researcher is 
trustworthy and that the material he presents is true. She understands the obligations that 
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arise from the consent process. However, she may choose to participate in a trial that is 
not in her best interest because she knows that her family wants her to and, due to her 
gender socialization, she has internalized the mistaken belief that others’ desires 
necessarily trump her own. 
To summarize, we have good reason to reject Manson and O’Neill’s proposed 
alternative account of informed consent, consent-as-waiver. As I have explained, it is not 
equipped to deal with some of the ways that people’s ability to make a self-governed 
choice regarding medical treatment or research participation can be impeded. Consent-as-
waiver is ill-equipped to address not fully developed autonomy skills. Although it is 
directed towards ensuring self-assertion, it is not structured to be able to attend to 
ensuring self-worth. In addition, consent-as-waiver cannot attend to the ways that 
internalized oppression impedes autonomy. 
8.3 How Consent-as-Relational-Autonomy Overcomes These Problems 
 While consent-as-waiver is unequipped to attend to internalized oppression and 
not fully developed autonomy skills, relational autonomy is specifically directed towards 
these problems. Recall that relational autonomy focuses on the ways in which 
relationships enhance or impede autonomy. In doing so, it recognizes the ways that 
oppressive socialization can result in internal restraints to autonomy. These include 
internalizing oppressive beliefs and not fully developing necessary skills for autonomy, 
such as self-assertion and self-worth. In Chapter 6, I indicated how a relational account of 
autonomy might inform a set of ethical conditions for ensuring respect for autonomy. As 
will become apparent in Chapter 10, these conditions can guide us in structuring 
informed consent, or consent-as-relational-autonomy, so that it attends to the problems of 
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internalized oppression and not fully developed autonomy skills. Because consent-as-
relational-autonomy attends to these problems and Manson and O’Neill’s consent-as-
waiver does not, we have good reason to prefer an account of informed consent that is 
justified and guided by respect for relational autonomy.  
8.4 Consent-as-Authority-and-Trust 
As a better alternative to consent-as-autonomy, Tronto argues for what she calls 
consent-as-authority-and-trust, or what I will refer to as consent-as-authority. Instead of 
resting informed consent on the principle of autonomy, she calls for framing consent as 
necessarily relying on authority. This draws on the role of authority that the medical 
practitioner has. In doing so, it shifts the focus of consent from mere agreement to 
focusing on the relationship between the practitioner and patient. Consent becomes an 
issue of the patient granting the practitioner the authority to provide medical services. 
In focusing on consent as the patient granting the doctor authority, Tronto insists 
that consent-as-authority attends to the ways that social injustices and disparate power 
impede a person’s ability to make self-governed choices regarding medical care and 
research participation. First, in focusing on the relationship between the doctor and the 
patient, consent-as-authority highlights the responsibility that the physician has to look 
out for the patient’s best interest. Because a necessary condition to granting this authority 
is that the patient must trust the doctor, Tronto insists that the doctor will be motivated to 
be beneficent as a means of ensuring this trust. Additionally, the requirement of trust also 
brings the principle of justice into consideration. A patient’s trust in her doctor not only 
relies on the patient trusting that the physician will do what is in her best interest. It also 
depends on the patient trusting the healthcare system in which the doctor operates. In 
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focusing on the need for patients to trust the healthcare system in which their physicians 
operate, consent-as-authority attends to the problem of how social injustices negatively 
affect the patient’s trust. When social injustices decrease the patient’s ability to trust her 
physician, then the patient is unable to grant authority. Because consent amounts to 
granting authority, consent-as-authority must attend to how social injustices impede the 
patient’s ability to provide consent. 
8.5 Problems with Consent-as-Authority-and-Trust 
Despite the initial appeal of Tronto’s proposal, there appear to be two problems 
with consent-as-authority. The first problem relates to the main component of her 
proposal, the patient’s trust in medical practitioners and the healthcare system in which 
they operate. The second deals with her insistence that granting authority incorporates the 
principle of justice. 
A problem arises when we consider the role of trust in Tronto’s proposal. Recall 
that much of what is entailed in the patient granting authority to the medical practitioner 
is the patient’s trust in the practitioner. Yet, too much trust can actually impede the 
consent process. To illustrate, recall the example from Chapter 6 regarding how a federal 
law regarding educating handicapped children failed in practice. The Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act included provisions for getting parents of handicapped 
children to engage in dialogue with educators as a means of gleaning what is in the 
children’s best interest. In many schools where parents began engaging in this dialogue, 
their trust in the educators began to increase. The result was that many ended up relying 
solely on the educators’ analysis and opting out the opportunity to provide valuable input. 
This ends up defeating the goal of determining what is in the children’s best interest. 
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Without the parents’ input regarding aspects of the children’s lives, educators were less 
able to accurately determine what is in the children’s best interest. 
Similar problems arise in many situations where the less powerful person in a 
relationship turns her decision over to the more powerful person, trusting that the more 
powerful person will do the right thing. Some of these cases are like the handicapped 
children case in that people opt out of providing information about third parties because 
they trust the more powerful person in the relationship. For example, parents may opt out 
of providing coaches, counselors, or teachers with valuable input regarding what may be 
in their young child’s best interest. In other cases, people may opt out of providing 
information about themselves because they trust that the more powerful party is better 
able to determine what is in their best interest. For example, patients might defer to their 
doctors regarding medical treatment. 
We can see how similar problems would result in the research setting. Of course, 
some level of trust is necessary due to differences in medical knowledge and the degree 
to which subjects may be reliant on clinical researchers to provide care. However, if this 
trust becomes so great that subjects no longer engage in on-going dialogue with 
researchers, it can impede the consent process. For example, without this communication, 
researchers will be unclear as to the extent to which subjects actually understand the 
information researchers disclose throughout the dynamic research process. 
This reliance on trust also illustrates problems with attending to issues of justice. 
Recall that Tronto insists that consent-as-authority highlights the need to attend to social 
injustices since it is necessary for patients to trust the healthcare system in order to grant 
authority to their doctors. While this may be true, it is also the case that too much trust 
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can overshadow, and in many cases, further perpetuate, problems arising from social 
injustices. To understand why this is, recall that there are two primary problems resulting 
from differences in race, class, gender, and disability – those arising from oppressive 
socialization and those resulting from external restraints. Focusing on the need to trust 
healthcare systems, or in our case, medical research in general, sheds light on external 
restraints such as unjustly limited healthcare resources. However, it does not attend to the 
problems that can arise from oppressive socialization which impede subjects’ ability to 
provide consent. This is due to the fact that Tronto is relying on a narrower scope of 
social justice, one that is limited to external restraints. As such, she does not recognize 
nor attend to the internal restraints that can arise from social structures. 
To summarize, I believe that there are two primary problems with Tronto’s 
consent-as-authority. First, her reliance on trust leads to concerns that too much trust can 
impede subjects’ ability to provide consent and may add to the power disparity between 
researchers and subjects. And second, her focus on a narrow definition of social justice 
overlooks the internal restraints to being able to provide valid consent that arise from 
differences in race, class, gender, and disability between researchers and subjects. 
8.6 How Consent-as-Relational-Autonomy Overcomes These Problems 
Fortunately, there is a better solution. As I have previously explained, I propose 
revising the current account of autonomy that underlies informed consent guidelines to 
reflect a relational account. Recall in Chapter 6 I explained how, contrary to Tronto’s 
insistence, a relational account of autonomy can guide us in how to structure informed 
consent so that it ensures that subjects make self-governed choices regarding research 
participation. The principle of respect for relational autonomy identifies the things that 
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impede autonomous decision-making, such as internalized oppression, not fully 
developed autonomy skills, unjustly limited options, and disparate power. From this list, 
we can construct a set of ethical conditions that specifically attend to these problems 
(Chapter 6). This set of ethical conditions then can guide us in how to structure the 
informed consent process in the research setting (Chapter 10). 
Because consent-as-relational-autonomy overcomes the problems that Tronto’s 
consent-as-authority encounters, we have good reason to prefer consent-as-relational-
autonomy. Not only does consent-as-relational autonomy identify and provide guidance 
for ensuring people’s consent, but I believe it is a better solution than Tronto’s consent-
as-authority. Recall that one of purported benefits of Tronto’s account is that it 
acknowledges power differences between doctors and patients. To attend to this problem, 
Tronto relies on trust. Yet, recall that I explained how this reliance on trust could result in 
subjects deciding not to provide their input in the informed consent process and, instead, 
preferring to turn their decisions over to the researcher. When this occurs, trust can 
magnify the power differences between subjects and researchers by giving researchers 
even more power, which they could use to manipulate or coerce subjects. 
While consent-as-relational-autonomy also recognizes the problems that arise 
from power differences, it does not hinge on the problematic condition of trust that 
consent-as-authority does. In my account of how relational autonomy can inform 
guidelines for informed consent in research, for example, I propose providing various 
support mechanisms for subjects in order to enable them to identify and address the 
disparate power between themselves and researchers. Rather than risk further 
perpetuating the power differences that might occur from a reliance on trust, support aims 
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to empower subjects, attempting to close the power gap and enable them to better 
exercise their autonomy. 
Consent-as-relational-autonomy also provides a better alternative because only it 
attends to internal restraints that arise from social structures. Recall that I explained how 
Tronto’s account fails to address problems relating to oppressive socialization. A further 
benefit of consent-as-relational-autonomy is that it highlights the need to address these 
problems. Due to the insurmountable problems that consent-as-authority encounters and 
the benefits derived from consent-as-relational-autonomy, we have good reason to revise 
the consent-as-autonomy model instead of shifting to Tronto’s consent-as-authority. 
8.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I strengthened my arguments in support of relying on relational 
autonomy to justify informed consent by explaining why we should prefer it to other 
proposed solutions. In doing so, I pointed out problems with Manson, O’Neill, and 
Tronto’s alternative accounts of informed consent and explained how an account of 
autonomy that is justified by relational autonomy overcomes these problems. Although I 
have not provided a thorough defense of relying on relational autonomy as the 
philosophical foundation for informed consent in this chapter, I have presented several 
good reasons for wanting to maintain the important relationship between autonomy and 
informed consent and for insisting that the best account of autonomy for doing this is a 
relational one. 
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Chapter 9: Current Informed Consent Guidelines 
In this chapter, I address the current international informed consent guidelines. I explain 
the extent to which each attends to the problems regarding social structures that I pointed 
out in Chapter 3 and how the extent to which they accomplish this illustrates the type of 
account of autonomy that informs each. While some of the guidelines rely on a traditional 
autonomy account, some of the more progressive ones rely on a relational account. 
However, even the most progressive guidelines require revisions in order to better 
promote subjects’ autonomous decision-making in the research context. 
           Because I am concerned with how current policy guides researchers’ conduct in 
obtaining informed consent, I address guidelines that carry some force, whether this is as 
the master document that guides other guidelines (i.e., Declaration of Helsinki) or as an 
enforceable guideline (i.e., The Federal Code of Regulations). Also, in addressing the 
guidelines, I attend to the most recent version of each, which includes the amendments 
and comments that were a response to ethical problems that became more apparent over 
time. 
          I do not address what is regarded as the originating document concerning ethical 
conduct in research on human subjects, the Nuremberg Code (1949).
1
 The Code consists 
of ten ethical guidelines that were derived from doctors’ testimony during the Nuremberg 
Trials, in which Nazi doctors were tried for war crimes pertaining to the atrocities that 
they performed in the name of medical experimentation on Nazi concentration camp 
prisoners. Two of these guidelines deal with informed consent, mandating that subjects 
make a voluntary and informed decision to participate in research (Point 1) and granting 
                                                 
1
 Nuremberg Code 1949. 
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subjects the right to withdraw from the research (Point 9). This document never gained 
legal force and was never implemented into American or German law.
2
 However, it 
served as the impetus for the Declaration of Helsinki, which I address. 
          In addressing the current guidelines on informed consent in international research 
on human subjects, I present these in chronological order. In doing so, one might 
anticipate a progression from guidelines that rely on vague traditional accounts to those 
that reflect more precise relational ones, which would indicate a gradual improvement. 
As will become apparent, this is not the case. For example, the CIOMS Guidelines, which 
were most recently revised in 2002, came before the UNESCO Declaration, which was 
enacted in 2005.
3
 Yet, the latter rely on a traditional account and the former reflect a 
relational one. As I explain, even the CIOMS Guidelines, which address the impact of 
social structures on subjects’ informed consent much more than the other guidelines, still 
requires revisions in order to better ensure subjects’ informed consent in research. 
9.1 Declaration of Helsinki 
          The Declaration of Helsinki provides international guidelines for research on 
human subjects. Although not legally binding, the Declaration provides the groundwork 
for many of the later international guidelines. The International Ethical Guidelines for 
Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (1993) states, “The Declaration of 
Helsinki… is the fundamental document in the field of ethics in biomedical research and 
                                                 
2
 Nuremberg Code: Background 2009. 
3
 Some might argue that the reason for this is due to the fact that the different guidelines 
stem from different organizations and, in some cases, attend to certain research funded by 
particular agencies. However, as I explained in Chapter 3, the problems regarding social 
structures to which only relational accounts adequately attend can arise in all research on 
human subjects. Consequently, they need to be addressed, regardless of who is 
conducting the research. 
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has considerable influence on the formulation of international, regional and national 
legislation and codes of conduct”.4 In addition, the International Guidelines for Ethical 
Review of Epidemiological Studies (CIOMS), the Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice 
for Trials on Pharmaceutical Products (CIOMS), and the Guidance Document on Ethical 
Considerations in HIV Preventive Vaccine Research (UNAIDS) cite the Declaration as 
the basic reference for ethical guidance on human research.
5
 Since its initial formulation 
in 1964 (Helsinki, Finland), the Declaration has been amended five times and clarified 
twice, each in response to unethical aspects of particular international research studies.
6
 
Today, the Declaration of Helsinki continues to be one of the primary guidelines for 
ethical decision-making in research.
7
 
9.1.1 Informed Consent 
           Among the amendments and clarifications, the only amendment to informed 
consent appears in Paragraph 31, which clarifies the type of information that researchers 
must share with current and prospective participants. Researchers’ obligation to obtain 
informed consent from subjects is included in the ethical guidelines spelled out in 
Paragraph 22: 
In any research on human beings, each potential subject must be 
adequately informed of the aims, methods, sources of funding, any 
possible conflicts of interest, institutional affiliations of the researcher, the 
anticipated benefits and potential risks of the study and the discomfort it 
may entail. The subject should be informed of the right to abstain from 
participation in the study or to withdraw consent to participate at any time 
                                                 
4
 Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), 1993. 
5
 World Medical Association, “Chapter 4: The Declaration of Helsinki”. 
6
 Amendments were made in 1975, 1983, 1989, 1996, and 2000. Clarifications were 
made to Paragraph 29 in 2002 and to Paragraph 30 in 2004. 
7
 Crawley and Hoet 1998. 
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without reprisal. After ensuring that the subject has understood the 
information, the physician should then obtain the subject's freely given 
informed consent, preferably in writing. If the consent cannot be obtained 
in writing, the non-written consent must be formally documented and 
witnessed.
8
 
 
Not all research subjects are able to exercise autonomous choice. To address problems of 
consent that can arise in these cases, the Declaration has special provisions for children, 
severely mentally disabled individuals, and persons in comas or emergency situations.
9
  
Although there are interesting ethical issues that arise regarding non-autonomous 
subjects, I have narrowed my focus to those who have the capacity to make informed 
decisions regarding their participation in research. 
9.1.2 How the Declaration Reflects a Traditional Account of Autonomy 
          As Paragraph 22 illustrates, the Declaration frames informed consent through the 
liberal framework of a contract in which researchers provide information and subjects 
provide consent. In addition, it fails to mention the possible inclusion of community. 
These characteristics point to the fact that the Declaration rests on a traditional account of 
autonomy. As I explained in Chapter 4, this type of account fails to adequately attend to 
the ways in which social structures, such as race, class, and gender, can impede a 
subjects’ ability to provide informed consent. 
          In failing to attend to possible community involvement, the Declaration permits 
harms that it should not permit. First, it fails to recognize and, thus, respect, that some 
individuals value community to the extent that they would want community to be 
                                                 
8
 World Medical Association 2004. 
9
 Ibid, Paragraphs 8, 24-26. 
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included in the informed consent process.
10
 Second, without mentioning community 
involvement, these guidelines are unable to attend to the further concern that social 
structures, such as race, class, and gender as these are expressed through the community 
interaction with subjects can impede subjects’ ability to provide informed consent. 
          In response, one might find the vagueness of the Declaration appealing, as this 
seems to make these guidelines more flexible with regard to particular cultural 
applications. Although the Declaration does not mention community, it also doesn’t 
explicitly prohibit community involvement. The individual remains free to determine to 
what extent to draw on her community when making important decisions. 
          However, leaving the possibility of community involvement open like this is not a 
good solution. In failing to spell out the specifics of how to obtain informed consent 
when communities are involved, international guidelines that were constructed to protect 
subjects’ autonomy ironically put many subjects in danger of having their individual 
human rights violated. Failure to implement specific safeguards for protecting subjects 
once communities become involved in the informed consent process increases the 
vulnerability of those who oftentimes already comprise the more vulnerable members of 
their communities. This danger is even more pronounced given that women, some of the 
most vulnerable persons within many societies, also tend to be the most likely candidates 
for international research. For example, pregnant women are the only possible research 
population for testing drugs for preventing fetal AIDS transmission. 
 
                                                 
10
 Notably, it is not enough to include community in the pre-trial stage of designing a 
research study. For those who value community in the way that the Akan do, community 
is so much a part of the value of the person that one would want community involved in 
all stages of the research process. 
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9.2 The Belmont Report 
 You may recall from Chapter 7 that the 1979 Belmont Report was written by the 
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research in an attempt to spell out the ethical principles for research on 
human subjects and the particular ethical guidelines that these principles inform. The 
moral force of the Report is its use as a common reference by internal review boards 
(IRBs) that review research trials that are either conducted by or funded by the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services. In addition, both the Code of Federal 
Regulations (otherwise known as the Common Rule) and the Guidelines for the Conduct 
of Research Involving Human Subjects at the National Institutes of Health incorporate 
many of the principles from the Belmont Report. According to the NIH Guidelines, “The 
NIH embraces The Belmont Report and holds IRP (Intramural Research Program) 
investigators responsible for conducting their research activities in keeping with its 
principles and guidelines”.11 
9.2.1 Informed Consent 
 In addressing informed consent, the Belmont Report states that there is “widespread 
agreement that the consent process can be analyzed as containing three elements: 
information, comprehension and voluntariness”.12 Notably, the Report acknowledges 
some of the ways in which social structures can result in disparate power between 
researchers and subjects. In regard to vulnerable populations, the Report warns: 
                                                 
11
 NIH 2004, 6. 
12
 Department of Health, Education and Welfare. National Commission for the Protection 
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979, Part C:1. 
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Given their dependent status and their frequently compromised capacity 
for free consent, they should be protected against the danger of being 
involved in research solely for administrative convenience, or because 
they are easy to manipulate as a result of their illness or socioeconomic 
condition.
13
 
 
In doing so, the Belmont Report acknowledges that the social structures of disability and 
class can result in subjects having far less power than researchers to the extent that they 
become easier prey for manipulation. 
9.2.2 How the Report Reflects a Traditional Account of Autonomy 
 Although the Belmont Report acknowledges some of the ways in which social 
structures impede autonomy, it reflects a traditional account rather than a relational one. 
Recall from Chapter 4 that I explained how a traditional account, in attending to coercion, 
might acknowledge the ways that racism, sexism, and so forth result in unjustly limited 
options or disparate power. However, also recall that I explained how reliance on the 
atomistic account of the individual resulted in their overlooking the ways that oppressive 
socialization also can affect a person’s ability to provide consent. While the Report 
recognizes the external restraints arising from social structures, it overlooks internal 
restraints, or restraints that result from oppressive socialization. In addition, it fails to 
acknowledge the importance that some subjects place on community. Nowhere in the 
Belmont Report are there ethical guidelines for addressing the possible involvement of 
community in informed consent. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Ibid, Part C:3. 
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9.3 CIOMS Ethical Guidelines 
The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) first 
presented the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human 
Subjects in 1982. Since then, the document has been amended twice, in 1993 and in 
2002.
14
 The CIOMS is comprised of a group of over 70 international biomedical science 
organizations put together by the World Health Organization and the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. The purpose of the guidelines is to 
provide a set of universally applicable ethical guidelines for research on human subjects. 
Three philosophical principles direct these ethical guidelines: respect for persons, which 
includes both respect for autonomy and respect for those who lack the requisite 
requirements for autonomy; the principle of beneficence, which requires medical 
professionals to maximize benefits and minimize harm; and the principle of justice, 
which primarily deals with “the equitable distribution of both the burdens and the 
benefits of participation in research”.15 
As I will explain, the guidelines pertaining to informed consent reflect a relational 
account of autonomy. Not only do they address problems with consent due to 
vulnerabilities arising from race, less education, poor economic conditions, and severe 
illness, but they also attend to the ways in which oppressive socialization can impede 
subjects’ autonomy. Despite their thoroughness, however, the CIOMS Guidelines fail to 
adequately promote respect for autonomy in informed consent in research on human 
subjects. 
                                                 
14
 CIOMS 2002. 
15
 Ibid, 10, General Ethical Principles. 
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In what follows, I analyze the CIOMS Guidelines as they relate to informed 
consent and respect for autonomy. I then illustrate the ways in which they reflect a 
relational account of autonomy. I end my discussion by providing some examples that 
illustrate ways in which the CIOMS Guidelines do not adequately promote respect for 
relational autonomy. In Chapter 10, I provide a lengthier discussion of the shortcomings 
of the CIOMS Guidelines. I also explain the specific changes that we should make so as 
to best promote subjects’ autonomy as it relates to informed consent in research on 
human subjects. 
9.3.1 Informed Consent 
Several provisions in the CIOMS Ethical Guidelines attend to many of the ways 
in which social structures can impede informed consent. First, the CIOMS Guidelines 
overcome the problem of relying on a liberal framing of informed consent. Recall from 
Chapter 5 that one of the problems that I argued results from social structures in the 
international research context is the liberal framing of informed consent as a one-time 
contractual exchange of information for consent. This framing leads to problems with 
ensuring autonomy. In structuring informed consent as a contract, the liberal framework 
mistakenly assumes that researchers and subjects are on equal footing with regards to 
power in the relationship. As a result, the liberal framing of informed consent fails to 
attend to the ways that disparate power can impede subjects’ ability to make an 
autonomous decision. Recall that one of the problems that could result from disparate 
184 
 
power is that subjects might refrain from making certain choices if they believed, even 
mistakenly, that this might cause researchers to terminate their care.
16
 
In framing informed consent as an on-going process in which researchers 
facilitate greater subject participation, the CIOMS Guidelines provide tools for attending 
to mistaken beliefs that might impede valid consent. Guideline 4: Individual Informed 
Consent states: 
Obtaining informed consent is a process that is begun when initial contact 
is made with a prospective subject and continues throughout the course of 
the study. By informing the prospective subjects, by repetition and 
explanation, by answering their questions as they arise, and by ensuring 
that each individual understands each procedure, investigators elicit their 
informed consent and in so doing manifest respect for their dignity and 
autonomy.
17
 
 
Encouraging researchers to have an on-going dialogue with subjects throughout the 
research trial, encouraging subjects to ask questions, and ensuring their comprehension 
are all tools that can help to address any mistaken beliefs subjects might have about 
researchers withdrawing care if they make a particular choice. 
Other problems that arise from social structures that the CIOMS Guidelines 
addresses are those that occur when subjects are vulnerable. Guideline 13: Research 
Involving Vulnerable Persons defines vulnerable persons as those who are unable to 
protect their own interests. This inability can arise from “insufficient power, intelligence, 
education, resources, strength, or other needed attributes to protect their own interests”. 
Among those who are vulnerable, the CIOMS Guidelines list those in subordinate 
positions within a professional setting (i.e. nurses, hospital personnel, and medical 
                                                 
16
 Notably, this is more problematic in cases of therapeutic research, where part of the 
research protocol specifically includes medical care. 
17
 Ibid, 20, Guideline 4. 
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students), the elderly, those in nursing homes, poor people, ethnic and racial minority 
groups, those unfamiliar with modern medicine, and those who suffer from severe illness 
or diseases.
18,19
 According to Guideline 13, researchers who wish to include vulnerable 
persons as research subjects must make sure that there is an equitable distribution of the 
risks and benefits involved in the research, meaning that vulnerable persons should not 
bear risks by participating in research that will benefit others more than themselves. 
In addressing vulnerable research subjects, the CIOMS Guidelines also address 
specific vulnerable populations, including women. In doing so, the Guidelines 
acknowledge problems that can arise from oppressive socialization. Because researchers 
have excluded women in the past due to concerns over their becoming pregnant, the 
CIOMS Guidelines encourage the involvement of women in research. In doing so, the 
Guidelines point out additional ethical concerns that can arise when women are research 
subjects: 
Although this general presumption favours the inclusion of women in 
research, it must be acknowledged that in some parts of the world women 
are vulnerable to neglect or harm in research because of their social 
conditioning to submit to authority, to ask no questions, and to tolerate 
pain and suffering. When women in such situations are potential subjects 
in research, investigators need to exercise special care in the informed 
consent process to promote that they have adequate time and a proper 
environment in which to make decisions on the basis of clearly given 
information.
20
 
 
Thus, the Guidelines recognize that oppressive socialization, or what they refer to as 
social conditioning, can impede women’s ability to provide informed consent. 
                                                 
18
 Ibid, 42, Guideline 13. 
19
 In addition to Guideline 13, the CIOMS Guidelines attend to more specific vulnerable 
populations, such as children (GL14), the mentally disabled (GL15), women (GL16), 
and, even more specifically, pregnant women (GL17). 
20
 CIOMS 2002, 48, Guideline 16. 
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 In addition to attending to the specific ways that social structures can impede 
autonomy in research on human subjects, the CIOMS Guidelines make room for the 
possible involvement of community in informed consent. For example, the Guidelines 
assert that researchers must respect cultural differences, including the practice of 
obtaining consent from community leaders to conduct research on community members. 
At the same time, however, they also include the safeguard that community leaders’ 
consent should never replace individual informed consent regarding research 
participation.
21
 
 To summarize, then, the CIOMS Guidelines that relate to autonomy and informed 
consent attend to many of the specific problems that arise in international research on 
human subjects. As I have explained, these include reframing consent as an on-going and 
more participatory process between researchers and subjects; acknowledging how 
differences in race, class, professional rank, and gender lead to disparate power between 
researchers and subjects; and recognizing that oppressive socialization can impede a 
subject’s ability to provide valid consent. In addition, the Guidelines include provisions 
that acknowledge the value that some subjects may place on community involvement. 
9.3.2 How the Guidelines Reflect a Relational Account of Autonomy 
 In comparison to the other guidelines we have discussed thus far, the CIOMS 
Ethical Guidelines reflect a relational account of autonomy. To illustrate, consider the 
difference between the Belmont Report, which reflects a traditional account of autonomy, 
and the CIOMS Guidelines. Recall that the Belmont Report attended to some of the 
problems arising from external restraints but overlooked the possible role of community 
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 Ibid, Guideline 4.  
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in informed consent and the problems that arise from oppressive socialization. This is not 
surprising given my explanation in Chapter 4 regarding how traditional accounts 
recognize problems relating to external restraints but not those relating to oppressive 
socialization. Also, recall that traditional accounts fail to attend adequately to the 
importance that many place on community. 
In contrast, the CIOMS Guidelines recognize that oppressive socialization can 
impede autonomy. Recall that the Guidelines acknowledge that gender socialization can 
impede a woman’s ability to provide valid consent. In addition, these guidelines also 
include provisions that recognize the value that some place on community. Because only 
relational accounts of autonomy attend to these issues, the CIOMS Guidelines reflect a 
relational account, as opposed to a traditional one.  
9.3.3 Why the Guidelines Fail to Respect Relational Autonomy 
Although the CIOMS Guidelines seem to be informed by a relational account of 
autonomy, further provisions are needed to address the ethical issues raised by the 
Guidelines. Because I will attend to these in Chapter 10, I here provide a few examples to 
illustrate that even the most progressive international informed consent guideline for 
research on human subjects needs to be revised in order to adequately promote respect for 
relational autonomy. For example, although the CIOMS espouses a more participatory 
research process, potential subjects are not involved in the formulating stages of research 
protocol. As we saw in Chapter 5, this leads to problems regarding unjustly limited 
options that come into play in the framing of the research trial. Also, despite its admirable 
recognition that gender socialization can impede autonomy, the Guidelines do not 
provide guidance for how to remedy this problem. 
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9.4 Code of Federal Regulations 
 The Code of Federal Regulations is the result of work that began by the United 
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) in 1979. It took two years to 
comprise the Code, during which time HEW was renamed the Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS). The Code is comprised of fifty sections that deal with various 
areas that are subject to Federal regulation. Among these fifty, Title 45, Code of Federal 
Regulations, Part 46, Protection of Human Subjects (45 CFR 46) provides rules and 
regulations for research on human subjects.
22
  
Initially, 45 CFR 46, otherwise known as the Common Rule, only applied to 
research that was funded by the DHHS. In June 1991, however, it was expanded to 
include all research involving human subjects that is conducted or funded by any federal 
agency. The most recent revision of 45 CFR 46 was in 2009. 
Because the Common Rule is administrative law, researchers must abide by its 
rules and regulations in order to get Federal approval for conducting research or receiving 
Federal funding. For example, the Common Rule is the primary document that the 
Deputy Director of Intramural Research (DDIR) uses to determine whether the requisite 
ethical requirements have been met in research conducted or funded by the National 
Institutes of Health.
23
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 DHHS 2009. 
23
 Guidelines for the Conduct of Research Involving Human Subjects at the National 
Institutions of Health (NIH 2004: fifth printing, 7). Because the NIH Guidelines defer to 
the Common Rule as providing the ethical guidelines for research on human subjects, I 
do not address separately the NIH document. 
189 
 
9.4.1 Informed Consent 
In 45 CFR 46, subsections 116 and 117 deal specifically with informed consent. 
Section 116 presents general guidelines for obtaining informed consent. As is common in 
all of the international guidelines for research on human subjects, Section 116 requires 
that researchers obtain the informed consent of subjects prior to enrolling them in a 
research trial. Researchers must also inform subjects that they have the right to withdraw 
from research. This section also includes provisions regarding the kind of information 
that researchers should disclose, such as the risks, benefits, compensation, and the 
purpose and duration of the trial. Section 117 provides specific guidelines for 
documenting that informed consent has been obtained. This amounts to a written 
document verifying that the requirements from Section 116 have been met. 
In addition to devoting two sections specifically to informed consent, the 
Common Rule acknowledges that vulnerabilities can impede consent. Rather than 
spelling out the possible problems arising from vulnerabilities, it assigns the task of 
identifying and attending to these problems to members of an Institutional Review Board 
(IRB). According to Section 111: Criteria for IRB Approval of Research: 
When some or all of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or 
undue influence, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally 
disabled persons, or economically or educationally disadvantaged persons, 
additional safeguards have been included in the study to protect the rights 
and welfare of these subjects.
24
 
 
Thus, IRB members must make sure that research involving vulnerable populations 
includes safeguards against coercion and manipulation so as to better promote valid 
consent. 
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 DHHS 2009, Section 111, 3(b). 
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The Common Rule also contains provisions directed towards certain vulnerable 
populations, namely, children, prisoners, and pregnant women.
 25
 According to these 
guidelines, researchers can only enlist subjects from these vulnerable populations for 
research in which the benefits to the subjects outweigh the risks. In addition, when 
subjects from these vulnerable populations have the requisite comprehension skills, 
researchers are required to ensure that subjects understand what they are consenting to 
when they agree to participate in a research trial. While the Common Rule provides for 
IRB oversight and contains guidelines pertaining to some vulnerable populations, it does 
not acknowledge problems that might occur when subjects are more vulnerable due to 
economic or education differences. Nor does it spell out which specific safeguards should 
be implemented to remedy these problems. 
9.4.2 An Indeterminate Account of Autonomy 
 This vagueness makes it difficult to determine which account of autonomy the 
Common Rule reflects. Recall that the guidelines that pertain to the vulnerable 
populations of prisoners, children, and pregnant women do not specifically attend to the 
ways that vulnerability can impede autonomy. Instead, they focus on the need to balance 
risks and benefits to subjects and the need for subjects to comprehend information 
pertaining to their research participation. As a result, such problems as how gender 
socialization might impede a pregnant woman’s ability to provide consent due to internal 
restraints of not fully developing self-assertion skills or internalizing oppressive beliefs 
that her desires being unimportant are not addressed. 
                                                 
25
 DHHS 2009, Subpart B: Pregnant Women; Subpart C: Prisoners; Subpart D: Children. 
191 
 
Of course, it may be that the IRB can fulfill the role of identifying how 
vulnerability impedes consent. Recall that the Common Rule leaves it up to the IRB to 
determine what problems might arise and whether the appropriate safeguards have been 
included in research. Admittedly, there is a possibility that IRB members might identify 
the various ways that social structures impede consent. In an attempt to ensure that the 
IRB will correctly identify restraints to autonomy arising from the multitude of 
vulnerabilities present in the research context and suggest appropriate safeguards, the 
Common Rule requires that IRB members include men and women, people from 
differing races and ethnicities, and a professional who is familiar with the specific 
vulnerabilities that come into play in the particular research trial.
26
 
Despite these inclusions, however, it is questionable whether a professional is 
able to adequately identify the ways in which external and internal restraints can impede 
consent. Just as researchers oftentimes drastically differ from patients due to the former 
being members of the privileged gender, class, ethnicity, and ability within society 
(Chapter 5), similarly professionals oftentimes do not share many of the characteristics of 
research subjects. Without adequate input from subjects, professionals are unlikely to 
adequately discern the external and, especially, the internal restraints subjects might 
encounter.
27
 Thus, even if we were to grant the questionable conclusion that the Common 
Rule reflects a relational account of autonomy, it is important to note that it does not 
ensure that subjects make self-governed decisions regarding their participation in 
research. 
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 Ibid, Section 107 (a) & (b). 
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 As the Handler case in Chapter 6 illustrated, differences in social positioning between 
professionals and others can impede autonomy. 
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9.5 UNESCO Declaration 
 In October 2005, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) enacted the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human 
Rights. UNESCO originated in 1945, bringing together people in the fields of education, 
science, culture and communication with the goal of finding a universal approach to 
addressing ethical issues in these areas. As of October 2009, UNESCO consisted of one 
hundred ninety-three member states and six associate members.
28
  
 The main purpose of the Universal Declaration is to act as a tool to guide States in 
constructing ethical guidelines for the treatment of human beings in biomedical contexts. 
In addition to guiding countries in constructing their own guidelines, the Universal 
Declaration also serves to “guide the actions of individuals, groups, communities, 
institutions and corporations, public and private”. The scope of the guidelines is broad; 
the guidelines are intended as general principles that can be universally applied to a 
variety of bioethical contexts, including medicine and research (Articles 3 through 17). In 
order to maintain universal appeal, the explanation of the application of these principles 
in bioethical contexts is vague, consisting of four short articles (18-21). Nonetheless, 
given that it is an international guideline that applies to bioethical contexts, including 
research on human subjects, it is important to examine. 
 Among the general principles that the Universal Declaration lists, the following are 
relevant to my concerns regarding research on human subjects: consent (Article 6), 
respect for human vulnerability and personal integrity (Article 8), equality, justice and 
equity (Article 10), non-discrimination and non-stigmatization (Article 11), and respect 
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for cultural diversity and pluralism (Article 12). Among the articles directed at the 
application of the principles, Article 18, which relates to decision-making, is relevant to 
my interest in informed consent as it relates to research on human subjects. In what 
follows, I describe each of these articles. After doing so, I explain why the vagueness of 
the articles makes it difficult to determine which account of autonomy underlies them. 
9.5.1 Ethical Principles and Their Application 
 Not surprisingly, the Universal Declaration addresses the issue of informed consent. 
According to Article 6: Consent, researchers must obtain subjects’ informed consent to 
participate in a research trial. To do so, researchers must provide an adequate amount of 
information that potential subjects can understand in order to make an informed choice. 
They must also inform subjects of their right to withdraw from the research at any time. 
In cases in which research is conducted on a group or community, researchers must get 
the consent of those involved in the research trial. In addition, when required by a 
particular society’s practices, researchers may need to get the consent of community 
leaders. Like other guidelines that have this provision (i.e., the CIOMS Guidelines), the 
Universal Declaration also includes the safeguard that community leaders’ consent 
cannot trump the research subject’s consent. 
 In addition to provisions relating to the obligation to obtain consent, the Universal 
Declaration attends to the issue of vulnerability. Article 8 reads: 
In applying and advancing scientific knowledge, medical practice and 
associated technologies, human vulnerability should be taken into account. 
Individuals and groups of special vulnerability should be protected and the 
personal integrity of such individuals respected.
29
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Because the Universal Declaration’s scope is admittedly broad, Article 8 does not define 
what constitutes a “special vulnerability”. Instead, it acknowledges that medical 
professionals should be attentive to vulnerabilities and attempt to protect and respect 
vulnerable individuals and groups. 
 Articles 10 and 11 are applicable to problems that arise from racism, sexism, and so 
forth. Article 10: Equality, Justice, and Equity asserts that all people should be treated 
“justly and equitably”, while Article 11: Non-discrimination and Non-stigmatization 
requires medical professionals not to discriminate or stigmatize individuals or groups. 
Again, the principles are intentionally broad, indicating general ethical requirements for 
how medical professionals must treat people. 
 At this point, some might object that the UNESCO guidelines are too vague to be 
useful. For example, Article 10 (in its entirety) reads: “The fundamental equality of all 
human beings in dignity and rights is to be respected so that they are treated justly and 
equitably.”30 Thus, it appears that Article 10 defines treating subjects justly and equitably 
as treating them with human dignity and respecting their rights. Yet, this does not tell us 
what is specifically entailed in respecting someone’s human dignity, nor does it tell us 
what rights might be applicable in the context of informed consent and research. I will 
have more to say about the problems that arise from these vague principles at the end of 
this section. 
 Because my focus is on international research, the final general principle that 
applies to our context is Article 12: Respect for Cultural Diversity and Pluralism. It 
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emphasizes the need to respect cultural diversity but never at the expense of respecting 
individual rights. 
 After spelling out the general ethical principles for bioethical contexts, the 
Universal Declaration includes more specific guidelines meant to illustrate how the 
general principles are to be applied. Among the four applied principles, Article 18: 
Decision-making and Addressing Bioethical Issues is relevant to our concerns. Article 18 
consists of three provisions. The first provision attends to the information that medical 
professionals must provide in order for patients or subjects to make decisions regarding 
their medical care or research participation. Professionals need to convey truthful and 
optimal information. In addition, they need to be transparent by divulging any conflicts of 
interest they may have. The second and third provisions deal with the communication 
between medical professionals and patients/subjects. Not only should those participating 
in medical treatment or research be involved in an on-going dialogue, but society also 
should be able to participate. According to Article 18: Part 3, “opportunities for informed 
pluralistic public debate, seeking the expression of all relevant opinions, should be 
promoted”.31 
9.5.2 An Indeterminate Account of Autonomy 
 As I explained, the principles that comprise the Universal Declaration are 
intentionally vague. This is due to the fact that the guidelines have a broad, universal 
appeal intended for all bioethical contexts. The result of such vague guidelines is that it is 
unclear which account of autonomy is reflected. For example, it appears that the 
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Universal Declaration attends to the problem of external restraints arising from racism, 
sexism, etc. Recall that Article 10 indicates the need to exercise justice and equity. We 
might interpret this as attending to concerns regarding unjustly limited options due to 
racism, sexism, etc. In addition, Article 11 further emphasizes the need to avoid 
discrimination and stigmatization, which also applies to avoiding racism, sexism, etc. 
Because both traditional and relational accounts acknowledge problems relating to 
external restraints arising from social structures, it is difficult to determine which account 
informs the guidelines. What we need is to identify whether any articles address problems 
arising from oppressive socialization in order to answer this question. 
 The only article that might relate to this problem is Article 8, which deals with the 
need to protect and respect vulnerable people. However, it is unclear what constitutes 
“vulnerable”. Does vulnerable mean having less power as a result of racism, sexism, and 
so forth? If so, then Article 8 attends to problems arising from social structures that deal 
with external restraints, a problem that both accounts of autonomy address. Or does 
vulnerable refer to problems arising from internalized oppression or not fully developed 
autonomy skills that result from oppressive socialization? If so, then the Universal 
Declaration reflects a relational account. 
Regardless of which interpretation one chooses, the vagueness of the articles is 
problematic. Even if we interpreted the Universal Declaration as broadly attending to a 
relational account of autonomy, it lacks the specificity for taking respect for relational 
autonomy seriously. For example, although it acknowledges the need to recognize 
vulnerabilities, the Universal Declaration does not provide guidance regarding how this 
can negatively impact subjects’ ability to consent and what safeguards must be 
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implemented to resolve these problems. Also, although Article 18 highlights the 
importance of making research a more participatory process by encouraging on-going 
and open dialogue between medical professionals and society throughout the research 
trial, it fails to attend to problems that can arise due to differences in race, class, and 
gender between participants and how this impedes autonomy. 
In response, one might insist that the guidelines are intentionally vague so as to be 
universally applicable in all bioethical contexts. However, as I explained in Chapter 4 in 
my analysis of Beauchamp and Childress’ principles, the problems arising from 
oppressive socialization and external restraints and how these impede subjects’ autonomy 
are universally applicable. As a result, promoting respect for a relational account of 
autonomy requires attending to the general internal and external restraints that stem from 
social structures. In other words, it should spell out the need to attend to unjustly limited 
options and disparate power (external restraints), as well as internalized oppression and 
not fully developed autonomy skills (internal restraints). 
9.6 Summary of Current Guidelines 
In this chapter, I argued that none of the current guidelines for informed consent 
in international research on human subjects adequately promotes respect for a relational 
account of autonomy. As I explained in Chapters 3 and 5, adequate respect for a 
relational account requires: (1) attending to the ways that external restraints and 
oppressive socialization arising from social structures can impede autonomy, and (2) 
recognizing the value that some place on community to the extent that they wish for it to 
be involved in informed consent and providing guidance regarding how to accomplish 
this while promoting subjects’ autonomy. 
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In analyzing the current guidelines, I addressed the following: the Declaration of 
Helsinki, the Belmont Report, the CIOMS Guidelines, the Common Rule, and the 
Universal Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights. Because the Declaration of 
Helsinki and the Belmont Report fail to attend to how internal restraints impede 
autonomy, I concluded that these reflected a traditional account of autonomy. Due to the 
ambiguity of the provisions in the Universal Declaration and the Common Rule, it was 
unclear which account of autonomy these reflected. However, even if we interpreted 
these as resting on a relational account of autonomy, I explained how the ambiguity in 
these guidelines fails to promote respect for a relational account of autonomy. Lastly, I 
explained how the CIOMS Guidelines reflected a relational account. 
Despite the commendable progressiveness of the CIOMS Guidelines, I indicated 
that further revisions are necessary in order to better ensure respect for a relational 
account of autonomy. In the next chapter, I explain the specific provisions that must be 
implemented to better promote this respect, using the CIOMS Guidelines as a template 
for illustrating these changes. 
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Chapter 10: Revisions to Informed Consent Guidelines 
I have been insisting that the philosophical foundation for informed consent in 
international research on human subjects must rest on a relational account of autonomy 
since only a relational account both recognizes the importance of community and 
adequately attends to the ways in which social structures impede subjects’ autonomy. In 
Chapter 6, I argued for a list of minimally sufficient ethical conditions for promoting 
respect for relational autonomy. In this chapter, I propose guidelines for informed consent 
that reflect these ethical conditions.  
Recall from Chapter 6 that I arrived at the following list of five minimally 
sufficient ethical conditions for respecting relational autonomy in international research 
on human subjects: critical reflection, support mechanisms, participation, external 
monitoring, and a safeguard for prioritizing subjects’ consent. Because the need to 
prioritize subjects’ consent necessarily comes into play in discussing the majority of the 
other conditions, I present this specific safeguard as it might appear within the various 
guidelines that deal with the other conditions. This leaves us with four main ethical 
conditions: critical reflection, support mechanisms, participation, and external 
monitoring. 
In what follows, I address each of the four ethical conditions in turn. I begin each 
section by briefly reminding the reader why the particular condition is important. I then 
explain how the condition can be translated into a particular ethical guideline for research 
on human subjects. Finally, to illustrate how the proposed guideline could be integrated 
into current policy, I map it onto what I have argued is the most progressive international 
ethical guideline for research on human subjects, the CIOMS Ethical Guidelines. 
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10.1 Requiring Critical Reflection 
Recall that critical reflection is a universal condition of all accounts of autonomy. In 
Chapter 6, I explained the importance of having subjects, community members, and 
researchers reflect critically on their values, beliefs, and choices. Critical reflection can 
help subjects and community members identify mistaken oppressive beliefs. It also can 
help community members and researchers identify any racist or sexist beliefs they may 
have that inform their actions or decisions, which might impede subjects’ autonomy. 
In Chapter 6, I concluded that international guidelines for informed consent in 
research on human subjects must include a provision that requires researchers, subjects, 
and community to reflect critically on their beliefs, values, and choices. Researchers 
should reflect critically on the extent to which possible mistaken beliefs might inform the 
research trial and their treatment of subjects. Subjects should attempt to identify mistaken 
beliefs that bear on their decision to participate in research. And community members 
should reflect critically on mistaken beliefs that they may have internalized that bear on 
their decisions, as well as identify harmful stereotypes that affect the way they interact 
with subjects in the research process. To facilitate critical reflection, a guideline that 
requires critical reflection would provide examples of some of the questions that people 
should ask themselves in order to identify these mistaken beliefs. 
Bringing these points together, we arrive at the following guideline for requiring 
critical reflection: 
All those involved in the research process are required to reflect critically 
on their beliefs, values, and choices to determine the extent to which they 
may be relying on mistaken beliefs. Especially harmful are beliefs that 
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mistakenly undervalue an individual based on race, ethnicity, disability, 
illness, class, educational level, sexuality, or gender.  To best ensure that 
people have the opportunity to reflect critically, they should be allotted a 
reasonable amount of time in which to critically evaluate their beliefs and 
values prior to making a decision. 
 
Researchers are required to exercise critical reflection to avoid relying on 
harmful mistaken beliefs about subjects and community in formulating the 
research protocol and in interacting with subjects and community. 
Specifically, researchers should reflect critically on whether their 
judgment of subjects’ and community members’ competency rests on 
mistaken beliefs that members of certain populations lack the requisite 
skills for understanding information about the research trial based on such 
irrelevant features as gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, and class. They 
should ask themselves a similar question with regards to determining what 
constitutes relevant and adequate information for the purpose of obtaining 
informed consent. 
 
Research subjects, especially those from oppressed groups within society, 
are required to reflect on whether they are internalizing oppressive beliefs 
that, in turn, inform their decisions regarding research participation. For 
example, in determining whether to participate in a research trial, do they 
mistakenly believe that their interests carry little moral weight compared 
to others’ interests? 
 
When community members are involved in the informed consent process, 
they should reflect critically on mistaken beliefs that they may have 
internalized that bear on their decisions, as well as identify harmful 
stereotypes that affect how they treat others in the community and the 
research subject. For example, community members should attempt to 
identify any mistaken stereotypes they may have about the more 
vulnerable people in the community and the ways that these influence how 
they interact with them in the informed consent process. Do they not value 
input from members of oppressed groups within the community? At the 
same time, vulnerable members of the community should ask themselves 
such questions as whether they mistakenly undervalue their interests 
compared to others’ interests. 
 
Notably, the CIOMS Ethical Guidelines do not attend to the need for researchers and 
subjects to reflect critically on their values and beliefs and the ways in which these might 
affect the informed consent process. To attend to this, then, we would need to implement 
the previously proposed guideline in its entirety. 
202 
 
Because, as we saw in Chapter 6, critical reflection alone is not sufficient for 
promoting autonomy, this amendment should be followed by a clause that explains how 
support mechanisms can help with critical reflection. With this in mind, I now turn to the 
ethical condition of support mechanisms and how we can translate this into an ethical 
guideline for informed consent in international research on human subjects. 
10.2 Providing Support Mechanisms 
In discussing the ethical condition of support mechanisms in Chapter 6, I 
explained that this condition addresses two general concerns. First, support groups and 
counselors can enhance subjects’ critical reflection by helping them identify mistaken 
internalized oppressive beliefs. In doing so, the ethical condition of support mechanisms 
attends both to critical reflection and to one of the problems relating to social structures, 
the problem of internalized oppression. The condition also addresses another problem 
that results from social structures, the problem of oppressive socialization causing 
subjects to not fully develop some of the skills for autonomy. Counselors and support 
groups can assist subjects in more fully developing some of these skills, such as self-
assertion, self-trust, and self-worth. 
How to Structure Support Mechanisms 
Since the primary goal of support groups is to help subjects identify internalized 
oppressive beliefs and to more fully develop their autonomy skills, we should determine 
how to structure these groups in order to accomplish this goal. One proposal is to have 
support groups comprised solely of members of the same vulnerable population, such as a 
support group comprised of women from the community. However, this proposal is 
problematic. Although it is by no means a certainty that all women suffer from 
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internalized oppression, it is likely that participants will share internalized oppressive 
beliefs and underdeveloped autonomy skills. In cases in which all support group 
members share similar oppressive beliefs and underdeveloped autonomy skills, it will be 
extremely difficult for them to identify and remedy these problems. 
An alternative solution is to have professionals facilitate the support groups. 
Because professionals are specifically trained in identifying internalized oppression and 
in facilitating the development of autonomy skills, they can assist participants in 
accomplishing these goals. Once we rely on professionals to facilitate support groups, we 
introduce concerns about disparate power and its negative impact on subjects’ autonomy. 
Since this problem also arises in implementing the next ethical condition, participation, I 
forgo discussing this problem until the next section. 
Guidelines for Support Mechanisms 
 With the preceeding arguments in mind, it appears that the best way to structure 
the support mechanism is to have professionals facilitate support groups that consist of 
members from the vulnerable population. So as to respect their autonomy, participants 
should never be coerced to join support groups. Rather, they should be provided the 
option of doing so, along with an explanation of how it is in their best interest to choose 
to participate.
1
  
Having argued that we should provide subjects with an option to participate in 
support groups, a guideline relating to support mechanisms would read as follows: 
                                                 
1
 Recall from Chapter 6 that the problem with forcing subjects from vulnerable 
populations to participate in support groups is that this further perpetuates their 
oppression. It reinforces the mistaken belief that all members of a certain group lack the 
necessary skills for making an autonomous decision. 
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As a result of social conditioning, members of vulnerable populations are 
especially prone to problems of internalizing oppressive beliefs and in not 
having fully developed some of the necessary skills for autonomy, such as 
self-trust and self-assertiveness. Internalized oppression occurs when 
members of vulnerable populations internalize oppressive societal beliefs 
about members of the population and allow these beliefs to inform their 
decisions, which results in further perpetuating their oppression. 
 
To better promote their valid informed consent, subjects from vulnerable 
populations should be provided the opportunity to participate in support 
groups aimed at identifying internalized oppressive beliefs and assisting in 
more fully developing autonomy skills. Such support groups are to be 
offered as an option and are not mandatory. 
 
Support groups should be facilitated by professionals who have the 
requisite skills for identifying and remedying problems relating to 
internalized oppression and underdeveloped autonomy skills. Although 
professionals are assigned the task of assisting subjects, subjects remain 
the primary risk-bearers of research. As such, their consent takes 
precedence. In no case shall the consent of a professional override the 
subject’s consent. 
 
Despite being the most progressive international ethical guideline for informed 
consent in research on human subjects, the CIOMS Guidelines do not insist that 
researchers provide subjects with the opportunity to participate in a support group. This is 
not to say that the Guidelines do not acknowledge that oppressive socialization can 
impede subjects’ autonomy. You may recall that Guideline 16: Women as Research 
Subjects acknowledges that some women’s autonomy may be impeded as a result of their 
social conditioning. However, rather than providing support mechanisms, the Guideline 
recommends: 
When women in such situations are potential subjects in research, 
investigators need to exercise special care in the informed consent process 
to promote that they have adequate time and a proper environment in 
which to make decisions on the basis of clearly given information.
2
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Although they do not specifically spell out what constitutes a proper environment, it 
appears that they have in mind an environment in which women are free to reflect on 
their choices. In other words, their solution for remedying problems that arise from social 
conditioning is to provide women more time and space to be able to reflect critically on 
their choices. 
 Yet, as I have been arguing, critical reflection alone is not sufficient. Many of the 
ways that social conditioning impedes autonomy have become internalized. Being 
granted enough time and space to reflect on one’s choices does not ensure that one will 
be able to identify internalized oppressive beliefs or nurture underdeveloped autonomy 
skills. Consequently, guidelines directed towards remedying these problems must include 
support mechanisms for assisting subjects from vulnerable populations who suffer from 
oppressive socialization. Because the CIOMS Guidelines do not contain a clause for 
providing support mechanisms, we must implement my proposed guideline in its entirety. 
10.3 Fostering Participation 
Recall from Chapter 6 that the reason for involving subjects and community in 
various stages of the research process is to attend to problems arising from social 
structures that relate to external restraints.  First, involving them in the formulation stage 
of research attends to unjustly limited options. Involving the pool of potential subjects 
and, when relevant, community, in the formulation stages of research enables them to 
identify unjustly limited options that result from racism, sexism, and so forth. Second, in 
being able to participate in the formulation stage of research, the pool of potential 
subjects can help researchers better identify subjects’ best interests. And finally, 
extending participation throughout the research trial helps to maintain more of a balance 
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of power between researchers, subjects, and community, thereby addressing the problem 
of disparate power between them. 
Guidelines for Participation 
 A guideline that reflects the need to involve subjects and community in the 
various stages of research process would require researchers to include subjects in the 
formulation stage and research trial stage. In addition, when the subject wishes for 
community to become involved or when the research directly affects members of the 
community, researchers also should include community in these stages. 
 Currently, the CIOMS Guidelines include a provision for having subjects 
participate in an on-going dialogue with researchers that begins in the early stages of the 
research. Recall from the previous chapter that the following recommendation is included 
in Guideline 4: Individual Informed Consent: 
Obtaining informed consent is a process that is begun when initial contact 
is made with a prospective subject and continues throughout the course of 
the study. By informing the prospective subjects, by repetition and 
explanation, by answering their questions as they arise, and by promoting 
that each individual understands each procedure, investigators elicit their 
informed consent and in so doing manifest respect for their dignity and 
autonomy.
3
 
 
Notably, this guideline is geared specifically towards having subjects ask questions and 
researchers provide information in order to promote that subjects understand various 
aspects of the research, such as the risks, benefits, compensation, and procedures. 
Although it is certainly important in order to promote subjects’ valid informed 
consent, I have argued that there are additional aspects of research that also bear on the 
subjects’ ability to provide valid consent. For example, recall from Chapter 6 that, by the 
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time researchers approach prospective subjects, they have already formulated the 
research protocol. The concern becomes that the options that researchers offer subjects 
may be unjustly limited as a result of racism or sexism. Including subjects in the pre-trial 
stages of research, during which time researchers determine the compensation and, in 
cases of therapeutic research, available treatments, enables subjects to help identify 
unjustly limited options. Given the disparities of wealth, education, class, ability, etc., 
involving subjects in the pre-trial stages of research also helps researchers better identify 
subjects’ interests. Hence, it is necessary to add to the CIOMS Guidelines an additional 
provision that calls for including subjects in the pre-trial stage of research: 
In addition to engaging in an on-going dialogue with subjects during the 
research trial, researchers should obtain prospective subjects’ input during 
the pre-trial stages, a time at which researchers determine the 
compensation and care which subjects will receive. Doing so helps 
researchers to better identify unjustly limited options that might arise due 
to subjects’ race, ethnicity, gender, socio-economic class, education, or 
illness. This also assists researchers in better understanding subjects’ best 
interests. 
 
In addition to including subjects in the pre-trial and trial stages of research, I argued that 
there are times when researchers also should include community. In cases in which the 
subject wishes the community to be involved or in cases in which the research has a 
direct impact on the community at large, community should be included. To address 
community involvement, we should add the following to the preceding proposed 
guideline: 
Besides having subjects participate in the pre-trial and trial stages of 
research, there are times when researchers also should include community. 
These include: (1) instances when the research subject or prospective 
research subject wants community to be included in the informed consent 
process due to the value he or she places on community; and (2) instances 
when the community at large will be directly affected by a research trial. 
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Adding these proposed guidelines to Guideline 4 in the current CIOMS Guidelines would 
better promote respect for subjects’ autonomy in research on human subjects. 
How to Structure Participation 
In requiring the research process to be more inclusive, ethical guidelines should 
provide general guidance regarding how to structure participation. Once we include 
community, we must spell out when a subject’s input should trump the community’s 
input and vice versa. The following guideline indicates how to structure participation 
with regards to prioritizing subjects’ or community’s input: 
Including community in the consent process raises questions regarding 
how much weight to place on community input. The answer to this 
question depends on the degree to which the community will be affected 
by the research. 
 
Because medical interventions that are part of many research trials directly 
affect the subject, the subject continues to be the greatest risk-bearer in 
research. For this reason, community input can never override a research 
subject’s choice regarding his or her research participation. 
 
In decisions that have a greater impact on the community than they do the 
research subject, community input should outweigh the subject’s input. 
For example, community input should collectively outweigh a subject’s 
input regarding benefit sharing, or the way in which researchers make any 
treatments they have discovered in the trial available to the community at 
large.
 4
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 Some might be concerned that problems would arise if one subject wanted community 
to be involved and another did not. If the decision dealt with an aspect of research that 
affected the community at large, such as benefit-sharing, then community has a right to 
be involved in the pre-trial stage of planning that deals with this aspect, regardless 
whether a particular subject disagrees. If, in contrast, the decision has to do with an 
aspect of research that has a greater impact on the subject, such as whether to participate 
in a research trial, each subject gets to choose whether they want community involved. 
The subject that does not want community involved can choose on her own, while the 
one who wants community involved can ask for community input. 
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Notably, the previous guideline includes the safeguard of prioritizing the subject’s 
choice in decisions where subjects bear the greatest risk, such as choosing to participate 
in research. However, this safeguard alone is insufficient for promoting that the subject 
has made an informed and self-governed choice. Namely, it fails to attend to problems 
regarding how subjects’ consent can be impeded by oppressive socialization in the form 
of internalized oppression and not fully developed autonomy skills.  
In an attempt to attend to this problem, some non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) have appointed professionals to assist vulnerable subjects in participating in the 
research process. Professionals facilitate what they call consciousness-raising workshops 
for women from less developed countries. These workshops are aimed at accomplishing 
two goals: (1) helping women identify and analyze systems of oppression within their 
culture; and (2) involving them in decisions regarding aspects of the research process.
5
 
Notably, the way that the NGO workshops are formulated illustrates how support 
mechanisms can assist with participation. By involving women in the decision-making 
process that deals with research, the workshops are directed at making the research 
process more democratic. At the same time, NGOs recognize the problems that arise 
from oppressive socialization that can impede subjects’ ability to provide valid consent. 
As a result, they supplement participation with what I have referred to as a support 
mechanism. Recall that support mechanisms are aimed at having professionals assist 
subjects from vulnerable populations in identifying internalized oppressive beliefs and 
more fully developing certain autonomy skills. The NGO approach to having 
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professionals help women identify and analyze systems of oppression within their 
community represents this sort of support mechanism. 
Yet, just as I pointed out in Chapter 6, the combination of participation and 
providing a support mechanism still fails to promote subjects’ autonomy as it relates to 
informed consent. In the case of the NGO workshops, for example, power disparities 
occurred between the staff and the women. For example, staff members “determine the 
categories for analysis, who the target groups are, and who will produce the knowledge 
that both comes to and emerges from the discussion”.6 
What we can learn from this example is that, if we are to have professionals 
facilitate, we must attend to possible power disparities that can occur between them and 
the group members. This is where the ethical condition of having an external review 
board comes into play. Because I have yet to discuss the external review board, I 
postpone presenting a guideline that spells out how to address this problem until after 
discussing the external review condition. 
10.4 External Monitoring of the Research Process 
In introducing the ethical condition of having an external monitoring board, I 
presented it as a means of attending to problems that can arise with participation. In 
Chapter 6, I explained how an external monitoring board could better promote a 
democratic research process by gauging and encouraging participation and by helping 
participants work through conflict. 
In the previous section, I indicated how the support mechanism and participation 
work together. Similar to the NGO workshops, a professional can assist subjects in 
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identifying internalized oppression and nurturing underdeveloped autonomy skills. 
Assisting subjects with such autonomy skills as self-assertion better promotes their ability 
to provide input. It may also be the case that subjects want the professional to speak on 
their behalf. 
As a checks and balances against the disparate power between professionals and 
subjects, an external monitoring board would monitor whether subjects are able to 
provide valuable input in the research process and, when applicable, the accuracy with 
which professionals speak for subjects. When community is involved, they could also 
monitor the balance of input between members and make sure that subjects’ consent is 
prioritized in decisions that deal directly with their involvement in research. 
Currently, the CIOMS Guidelines include provisions for an ethical review 
committee, which is a form of external review.
7
 Researchers must submit a proposal to 
the review committee for approval prior to conducting research. The committee is 
comprised of people who are not part of the research team and who are not in a position 
to benefit, in a financial or material way, from the results of the research. In addition to 
the necessary requirement of reviewing research prior to its being conducted, the CIOMS 
Guidelines state, “The ethical review committee should conduct further reviews as 
necessary in the course of the research, including monitoring of the progress of the 
study”.8 Because nothing in the Guidelines spells out what conditions call for a necessary 
review during the course of the research, it appears that the committee is to determine 
this. 
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Because the CIOMS Guidelines already include a provision for an external review 
committee to monitor the progress of a research protocol, the duties that I have insisted 
belong to an external monitoring board can be incorporated into the duties for the 
external review committee. Because these duties come into play once we insist on 
making the research process more democratic, I present guidelines that reflect both how 
to structure participation and the additional responsibilities of the external review 
committee: 
Whenever subjects, and, when applicable, community, become involved in 
the pre-trial and trial stages of research, the concern arises that subjects 
from vulnerable populations may be less likely to provide their input due 
to power differences between them, community members, and researchers. 
 
Professionals who facilitate the support groups should be available to 
assist subjects. Research subjects’ ability to provide input can be increased 
by assisting them in more fully developing such autonomy skills as self-
assertiveness, when applicable. Subjects may choose to have professionals 
speak on their behalf. When this occurs, the professional’s role is to act as 
an intermediary between researchers and subjects, and, when applicable, 
community. As such, they must be careful to only convey the subjects’ 
input. 
 
It is necessary for an external review committee to monitor the progress of 
the democratic process that occurs during the pre-trial and trial stages of 
research. The committee should not include members of the research team 
nor support group professionals. In addition, members of the committee 
must not be in a position to gain, either financially or materially, from the 
benefits of the research. 
 
In monitoring the democratic process, the external review committee 
should monitor whether subjects are able to provide valuable input in the 
research process and, when applicable, the accuracy with which 
professionals speak for subjects. When community is involved, they 
should monitor the balance of input between members. The committee 
must always promote that the subject’s consent is prioritized in decisions 
that deal directly with his or her involvement in research. 
 
In the CIOMS Guidelines, the previous guidelines would be added to the guidelines for 
support mechanisms and participation. Translating and incorporating these conditions 
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into guidelines, along with the safeguard to prioritize subjects’ consent, would better 
promote that the decisions that subjects make with regards to research participation are 
self-governed ones. 
10.5 Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I have argued that we need to revise the current philosophical 
foundation for international informed consent guidelines for research on human subjects. 
With more and more research being conducted on subjects from less developed countries, 
it is of the utmost importance that these guidelines be globally applicable. Yet, as I have 
argued, the current philosophical foundation of respect for autonomy and the guidelines it 
informs fail to address the importance that many subjects from less developed countries 
place on community. Based on this importance, many desire for community to become 
involved in the informed consent process. Once this occurs, researchers have even more 
reason to recognize and attend to the ways in which social structures, or differences in 
race, class, gender, or illness, can impede subjects’ autonomy. To adequately attend to 
these problems, I have argued that we need to revise the current foundation to reflect a 
relational account of autonomy. 
In support of this conclusion, I began by comparing the three general accounts of 
autonomy that appear in the philosophical literature, the traditional, communitarian, and 
feminist accounts (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). In doing so, I explained why we should prefer a 
relational account of autonomy. An account of autonomy should address the ways in 
which social structures impede people’s autonomy. Social structures result in such 
problems as internalized oppression, not fully developed autonomy skills, disparate 
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power, and unjustly limited options. Only a relational account of autonomy adequately 
attends to these problems. 
In Chapter 5, I strengthened our reasons for preferring a relational account of 
autonomy by illustrating how this account better promotes autonomy in the context of 
international research on human subjects. First, I explained how a relational account of 
autonomy best respects the importance that subjects from less developed countries place 
on community. To illustrate, I focused on the Akan from Africa, who hold an account of 
the person in which the value of the person rests, to a large extent, on community. 
Second, I provided examples of how social structures impede subjects’ autonomy in 
research on human subjects, focusing on those from less developed countries. This gave 
us even more reason to prefer an account of autonomy that attends adequately to 
problems arising from social structures. 
In order to understand how revising the philosophical foundation for informed 
consent guidelines might be reflected in policy, I devoted a chapter (Chapter 6) to 
arriving at a list of minimally sufficient ethical conditions for respecting relational 
autonomy. After exploring suggestions that others have made in the philosophical 
literature, I concluded that a combination of most of the previously proposed conditions 
were still insufficient. In addition to encouraging critical reflection, providing support 
mechanisms, and participation, I argued that we need an external monitoring board and a 
safeguard for prioritizing subjects’ consent. 
Having focused primarily on autonomy in the first few chapters, I shifted gears to 
address informed consent. In Chapter 7, I began by discussing the relationship between 
autonomy and informed consent, explaining how informed consent within the research 
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context has come to rely on the philosophical foundation of respect for autonomy. 
Because part of the role of being the philosophical foundation for informed consent is 
that the principle of autonomy justifies informed consent, I responded to objections 
against having autonomy justify consent, arguing that a relational account of autonomy 
overcomes the problems that plague the common account of autonomy. As a means of 
strengthening my arguments in support of relying on the principle of autonomy as 
justifying informed consent, I explained how relying on a relational account of autonomy 
provides a better solution than recently proposed alternatives to overcoming the problems 
that plague the current reliance on the standard account (Chapter 8). 
I then broadened my focus to attend to current guidelines for informed consent in 
international research on human subjects and examined on which account of autonomy 
each relied (Chapter 9). I concluded that two of the guidelines, the Universal Declaration 
on Bioethics and Human Rights and the Federal Code of Regulations (or Common Rule), 
were too ambiguous to be able to determine. Among the remaining guidelines, I argued 
that the Declaration of Helsinki and the Belmont Report reflected the traditional account 
of autonomy, while the CIOMS Ethical Guidelines reflected a relational account. 
Although the CIOMS Guidelines rest on a relational account of autonomy, I explained 
why further revisions to the specific guidelines were necessary in order to ensure respect 
for relational autonomy in the context of international research on human subjects. 
In this chapter (Chapter 10), I demonstrated how the list of ethical conditions I 
comprised in Chapter 6 could be turned into specific guidelines for guiding researchers in 
promoting respect for relational autonomy in the research setting. After proposing these 
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guidelines, I explained how we might incorporate them into what I argued was the most 
progressive informed consent guidelines, the CIOMS Guidelines. 
In closing, I hope that I have left the reader convinced of the need to have current 
informed consent guidelines for international research on human subjects reflect respect 
for relational autonomy. Doing so will enable these guidelines to be more globally 
applicable in accomplishing the goal to which they are directed. 
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